



Rural Pacification in Viet Nam: 1962-1965

PREPARED BY

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FOR



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May 1966

This research was supported in part by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, under contract with The American University. No statements or opinions expressed in this report are to be interpreted as reflecting official views of ARPA or any official of the United States Government.

Dissertation Abstract

"Rural Pacification in Vietnam: 1962-1965"

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The study is concerned with the efforts of the Republic of Vietnam and its allies to establish peace in the rural areas of South Vietnam. The focus of the study is the administration of counterinsurgency campaigns at the province level and below.

Part I deals with the context of the insurgency such as the social, political, and historical factors involved and the strategy and tactics of the communist movement in the rural areas. Part II briefly surveys the efforts to pacify the rural areas, beginning with the 1954 Civic Action programs of Ngo Dinh Diem. The strategy of the Strategic Hamlet program and its successors is analyzed as an introduction to more detailed discussions in Part III.

The focus of Part III is on province pacification programs, 1962-1965. A detailed description and analysis of the Quang Nam province campaign is provided, and several other special pacification efforts are described briefly. Special chapters on security programs, political/psychological warfare, and social and economic projects are included, with subject matter from various provinces.

Part IV deals briefly with the national pacification system, with special attention to the American advisory role. Part V

includes a summary evaluation of pacification efforts in Vietnam and a proposed theory and model for an improved approach to the problem. The model is an attempt to suggest a more effective system of program implementation through application of some of the more simple principles of the PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique) system to the complex management problems involved in pacification.

PREFACE

This study of pacification in South Vietnam is written from a perspective that involves a basic presupposition. Although the study is primarily concerned with how pacification has been and should be conducted, it is assumed that communist insurgency in the South should be defeated.

The impressive achievements in economic and social development by Russia and China are mirrored to a lesser extent in North Vietnam. In the view of the writer, however, these communist achievements have been made at too great a cost in terms of the totalitarian control required to achieve these goals and the consequent suppression of the civil rights cherished in western democracies. Perhaps a valid test of the pacification enterprise in the South is whether it will lead to the representative government and civil rights for all citizens pledged by every regime since 1954.

The background for this study began through my association with World Neighbors, Inc., whose community development projects in the Huk areas of The Philippines introduced me to the interrelation of social changes and insurgency. Studies in Chinese Communism with Lord Lindsay of Birker at The American University heightened my interest. Counsel from James Eliot Cross, of the Institute for Defense Analyses, pointed me towards Vietnam, and Rufus Phillips, then Assistant Director for Rural Affairs in AID/Saigon, offered me a position as a Province Representative

and I served a two year tour of duty in the provinces of Central Vietnam during 1962-1964.

The opportunity for full attention to the study in the final six months of preparation was made possible through a University contract with the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, which has prior and continuing rights to use of the study in whole or in part.

Many persons have contributed to the preparation of the study, and they, too, have my deep appreciation. The uniformly cooperative personnel of the Agency for International Development, the Department of Defense, the United States Information Agency, and other agencies greatly enhanced the content and perspective of the study, although responsibility for the analysis and evaluation is my own. The special assistance of the following is noted with warm appreciation: George K. Tanham, W. Robert Warne, Thomas Luche, Dan Whitfield, John Helble, Vincent Puritano, and Jerome French. Professor Kenneth Landon and the other members of the Committee have been helpful in many details of research and preparation. John Donnell and John Stempel permitted access to personal copies of their dissertations on Vietnam. When these studies are eventually available in microfilm, they will be of great value to many researchers.

Finally, the greatest single source of inspiration and assistance throughout doctoral studies has been my wife, Ruth. She typed and proofread the entire study, while her aunt, Garneta Wessel, provided order and sustenance in our household during the final months of preparation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	iii
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
PART I	
THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF INSURGENCY	
IN VIETNAM: A BRIEF SURVEY	
II. THE CONTEXT OF THE CONFLICT: AND INTERPRETIVE	
SURVEY	5
Geography and Demography	5
Vietnamese Rural Society	9
The Role of Foreign Penetration	15
South Vietnam After Geneva	19
The regime of Ngo Dinh Diem: controlled	
revolution	19
After Ngo Dinh Diem: the uncontrolled	
revolution	24
III. THE RURAL STRATEGY OF THE VIET-CONG	27
Historic and Organic Continuity.	27
The General Strategy in South Vietnam	29
Propaganda and Program Themes.	31
Viet-Cong Pacification: Destruction of the	
Government Presence.	33

CHAPTER	PAGE
Viet-Cong Pacification: Substitution by the Insurgent Government.	36
Communist Highlander Programs	40
Trends in Viet-Cong Pacification	41
PART II	
THE COUNTERINSURGENT RESPONSE	
IV. EARLY APPROACHES TO PACIFICATION.	46
The Irrepressible Conflict.	46
Civic Action and the Former Viet-Minh Areas . . .	48
Land Reform and Land Development.	51
Nation-building Via Political Mechanisms.	54
Military and Civil Defense Policies	58
Relocation of Population.	65
Summary of Early Efforts.	67
V. NATIONAL PACIFICATION STRATEGIES 1962-1965	70
The Growing American Involvement.	70
Sources of the Strategic Hamlet Concept	72
The Philosophy of the Strategic Hamlet Program: "Total Revolution"	74
Ngo Dinh Nhu's Personalist Revolution	74
An American concept of strategic hamlets.	78
The Evolution of Pacification Programs: 1962-1965	82

CHAPTER	PAGE
The Strategic Hamlets (Ap Chien Luoc)	
1962-1963.	82
The New Life Hamlets (Ap Tan Sinh)	
1964-1965.	86
Rural Construction: 1966	87
Ancillary Pacification Programs.	90
Civilian Irregular Defense Groups	90
Force Populaire (Luc Luong Nhan-Dan)	91
Summary Comment.	94

PART III

PROVINCE PACIFICATION: 1962-1965

VI. THE PROVINCIAL PACIFICATION SYSTEM	98
Provincial Political and Administrative Context.	98
Vietnamese Pacification Organization	104
United States Provincial Organization.	109
The MACV Sector Team	109
USOM Provincial Staff.	112
Other United States Agencies	114
A New Experiment: The United States	
Team Captain	116
Vietnamese-United States Organization.	116

CHAPTER	PAGE
VII. PACIFICATION OPERATIONS.	120
Geographical Emphases and Criteria for Selection.	120
Anatomy of a Province Campaign: Quang Nam.	123
Strategic Hamlets: The "Self-sufficient" Phase (Ap Tu Tuc).	124
The Special An Hoa-Nong Son Campaign	126
The Province-wide Strategic Hamlet Campaign.	131
Post-Coup Pacification Efforts	138
Rural Restoration.	139
Local Economic and Social Programs	139
Information Programs	144
United States Combat Forces: Pacification in the Danang Special Sector	150
Summary Evaluation of Pacification in Quang Nam.	152
Special Pacification Operations.	154
Long An Province	154
Hop Tac: A Regional Pacification Program	156
An Giang Province: Variable Response in Pacification	158
Pacification Cadres.	161
Previous Types of Cadres in Pacification	161
The 1966 Rural Construction Cadre Teams.	164

CHAPTER	PAGE
VIII. THE RURAL SECURITY SYSTEM.	168
The Hamlet Defense Apparatus: The Self- Defense Role	169
Popular Forces and Regional Forces	177
Intelligence Systems	179
The Police and Resources Control	181
Regular Forces and Civil Relations	188
Summary Comment.	191
IX. POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROGRAMS	193
The Political Strategy: The Fulfillment of the Vietnamese National Revolution	193
Pacification and the Administrative of Justice .	196
Training for Local Officials	197
Propaganda and Information Media and Programs. .	199
The "Open Arms" Amnesty Program (Chieu Hoi). . .	207
Rewards for Captures of Viet-Cong Leaders. . . .	209
The Role of JUSPAO in Province Operations. . . .	210
Summary Evaluation	212
X. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMS	214
Self-Help Projects	216
Training Centers	224
Public Works Projects.	225
Education Programs	228

CHAPTER	PAGE
Health Programs	231
Relief and Refugees	234
The Economic Emphasis: Agriculture Programs . . .	238
Other Rural Economic Projects	245
Summary Evaluation.	247

PART IV

NATIONAL PACIFICATION SYSTEM

XI. THE NATIONAL PACIFICATION SYSTEM	249
Pacification Organization Within the	
Republic of Vietnam	249
The United States Mission	252
Bi-national Coordination.	255
Free World Assistance	258
XII. INTRA-AGENCY PACIFICATION STRUCTURES:	
USOM AND MACV	259
The Evolution of the USOM Apparatus	259
The Office of Rural Affairs	259
Personnel Selection for Provincial	
Operations.	265
Technical Divisions	268
Possible Effects of the USOM Staff Increase . .	269
The Development of MACV	270
The Sector Advisory Role.	270
The Office of Sector Affairs.	273
American Combat Forces.	275

PART V

PACIFICATION IN VIETNAM:

AN EVALUATION AND A THEORY

XIII.	EVALUATION OF PACIFICATION	278
	Inspection and Field Evaluation.	278
	Criteria for Local Security Evaluation	281
	A Summary Critique of Vietnamese	
	Pacification Efforts	285
	Objectives in Pacification	286
	The Pacification Apparatus	288
	Planning and Scheduling.	293
	Operations	296
	The American Role in Pacification.	297
	USOM Provincial Operations	299
	Conclusion	302
XIV.	A PACIFICATION THEORY FOR VIETNAM.	304
	The Central Pacification Objective: A	
	Revolution in the Life of the Peasant.	305
	Rehabilitating the Governmental Apparatus.	308
	Provincial Pacification Administration	314
	A Variable Province Strategy	315

CHAPTER	PAGE
XV. A MODEL FOR PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION	319
The Methodology of Network and Critical	
Path Concepts.	320
Pacification Operations and the	
Implementation Model	326
XVI. CONCLUSION	331
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	334
APPENDICES.	347
A. Province Government Organization, Quang Nam. . .	348
B. Release Agreement for 1964, Quang Nam.	349
C. Release Agreement for 1966, Quang Nam.	354
D. Cadre Training Schedule, Quang Nam	357
E. Village and Hamlet Leader Training, Quang Nam. .	358
F. Multi-purpose Authorization Form, Quang Nam. . .	361
G. Warehouse Classification System, Quang Nam . . .	362
H. Warehouse Inventory Card, Quang Nam.	363
I. Program Work Plan Form, Quang Nam.	364
J. Transportation Log, Quang Nam.	365
K. Selections, Vinh Binh Province Self-Help Chart. .	366
L. USOM Summary of Counterinsurgency Projects, 1965.	371
M. National Rural Construction Program, 1966. . . .	375
N. USOM/Vietnam Organization Chart, 1963.	388
O. USOM/Vietnam Organization Chart, 1964.	389
P. USOM/Vietnam Organization Chart, January, 1965 .	390
Q. USOM/Vietnam Organization Chart, May, 1965 . . .	391
R. USOM/Vietnam Organization Chart, December, 1965.	392
S. USOM/Vietnam Organization Chart, February, 1966.	393
GLOSSARY.	394

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	PAGE
1. Map of Ethnic Groups.	8
2. Viet-Cong Regular Forces and Terror Activity.	30
3. Comparative Statistics on "Constructed" vs. "Completed" Hamlets	84
4. Allied Armed Forces and American Advisors in South Vietnam.	88
5. Republic of Vietnam: Provincial Organization.	102
6. New Life Hamlet Bureau, Quang Nam Province, 1964.	107
7. Provincial Sector Advisory Team	110
8. USOM Provincial Staff, Quang Tri Province	115
9. Political Map of South Vietnam.	121
10. Map of Quang Nam Province, with District and Village Boundaries.	125
11. Quang Nam Pacification Programs in 1964	143
12. Rural Construction Team Organization February, 1966.	165
13. Family Census Booklet	184
14. Family Census Booklet (reverse)	185
15. Sample of 1961 type Identification Card	186
16. USOM Self-Help Programs	219
17. Self-Help Status Report, Vinh Binh Province	220

FIGURE	PAGE
18. USOM Staff Control Card for Self-Help Projects.	221
19. Map and Statistics of the Refugee Problem	236
20. Map of 1964 Fertilizer Program.	241
21. United States Mission Vietnam	253
22. Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAD).	254
23. USAID Vietnam	266
24. Map of Vietnam Showing Location of Field-based USOM Employees.	267
25. United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam	272
26. Sample Work Breakdown Structure: Hamlet Pacification Plan	322
27. Sample Implementation Network: Hamlet School Construction.	323
28. Sample Implementation network: Hamlet Security System.	329

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study is an examination of the ways and means for the building of peace in rural Vietnam by the Republic of Vietnam and its allies. Its focus will be on what has been attempted--and could yet be done--1) to isolate the enemy and destroy his influence and control over the rural population, and 2) to win the peasant's willing support through effective local administration and programs of rural improvement.

Military, political, and administrative practices will be examined selectively--where they are relevant to the problems of pacification. These problems will be analyzed from the perspective of the provincial administrators of pacification, and, more particularly, the American advisors and representatives at that level. The peasant response to pacification will also be considered. The national pacification system will be briefly reviewed for its relevance to the problems of administering province programs.

A definition of several key terms may be useful at this point.

Counterinsurgency refers to any effort by the government against the insurgent. It is a broader term than pacification, and may describe many different types of military and political actions.

Pacification may mean, simply, to "make peace." In this study, pacification refers to a comprehensive government effort to bring law, order, and effective administration to the countryside. It may involve multiple social and political activities that could culminate in revolutionary change in the rural areas, leading to improved living conditions and increased self-government. It is a complex process which requires various civilian and military resources of the counterinsurgent government to be applied in a carefully coordinated sequence. Pacification as discussed in this study will be concerned with populated areas outside the major cities: the farming and fishing hamlets that house nearly 90 per cent of the nation's population.

Rehabilitation and Reconstruction are terms utilized to convey the positive aspects of pacification: the improvement and restoration of community life to a level more favorable than during the conflict. Increasingly, pacification has been referred to as Rural Construction, which implies far more than the building of physical facilities. The Vietnamese Government has employed Rural Construction to describe a massive social, economic, and political reformation of rural life, involving increased government services, greater political participation, and economic benefits.

In February, 1966 a newer name for the pacification effort began to take the place of Rural Construction. Revolutionary Development describes the same activities, but suggests the dynamism and depth of the changes intended for the rural areas.

Civic action is used by the United States Armed Forces denoting activities by military units to establish effective relations with civilians in an area in which an operation is underway.

Clear and hold operations are the military context for other pacification efforts: expelling main Viet-Cong units from an area and holding the area so that the insurgent forces cannot reassert their influence.

Sweeps, in contrast, are operations to locate the enemy and destroy him and his supplies. When the sweep is completed, the area may return to Viet-Cong control.

The reader is asked to note the limits set by the researcher for this study. Pacification touches on so many of the normal elements of military, governmental, and political affairs that one is tempted to tell too much in order to create an adequate context for understanding. Chapters II through V are an effort to give an overview, and a context, with footnote references for more detailed exploration.

Abbreviations and other terminology are defined in the Glossary located at the end of the Bibliography.

PART I

THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF INSURGENCY IN VIETNAM

SYNOPSIS

Some of South Vietnam's significant national traits and conditions (geographical, social, political, religious) are briefly reviewed for their relevance to insurgency and counterinsurgency. The characteristics of traditional rural communities, influence of other countries, and the new social and political revolutions are discussed.

Chapter III surveys the Viet-Cong insurgency, particularly in its rural strategy and tactics for political and military takeover through propaganda, terror, and mass organizations. The Viet-Cong "pacification" of a single village is discussed in detail.

CHAPTER II

THE CONTEXT OF THE CONFLICT: AN INTERPRETIVE SURVEY

The area now known as South Vietnam has been an historic arena for unconventional warfare. Long before the Cham peoples harrassed the Mongol invaders from their mountain hideaways in the thirteenth century, guerrilla activity had been conducted against pre-historic invaders who arrived by sea and forced the coastal dwellers into the safety of the mountains.¹

By most criteria, South Vietnam today could be classified as an insurgent's paradise and a counterinsurgent's nightmare. All of David Galula's elements for successful insurgency--a cause, a weak counterinsurgent, favorable geographic conditions, and adequate outside support--are fulfilled in the situation.²

I. GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY

Geography. The three disparate topographical regions in the South--highlands, coastal lowlands, and Mekong Delta--favor the insurgent. The coastal lowlands are a narrow ribbon of short river valleys--ten to forty miles long--that reach quickly

¹D.G.E. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan and Company, 1955), p. 166.

²David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964), Chapter II.

into the mountains which form the eastern edge of highlands. Some mountain spurs reach the very shores of the China Sea, providing cover and bases for guerrilla influence over the hamlets that dot the narrow coastal plain. The highlands extend past the western boundary into Laos and upper Cambodia, a nationally unpoliceable territory where insurgents may build major bases and find sanctuary after a military operation across the border in Vietnam.

The third major area is the flat and fertile Mekong Delta, where almost anything will grow and the counterinsurgent's problem is the difficulty of denying food to the enemy. This vast area was made arable and habitable by the French who drained swampland and laced the region with canals. The nearby Cambodian border and almost impenetrable swamps provide secure bases in close proximity to much of the Delta population.

Ethnic groups.³ Approximately 85 per cent of South Vietnam's population of about 15 million people is ethnic Vietnamese, whose predecessors inched their way down the coastal lowlands from the Red River Delta in the North. The process spanned 600 years and was capped by an enormous emigration after the Geneva partition of 1954, involving nearly a million northerners. The disparate

³Statistical data for this section is taken from the United States Army's Area Handbook for Vietnam, prepared by the Special Operations Research Office, The American University (Washington, D.C., 1962), Chapter IV, pp. 53-62.

regionalisms of central lowlanders, northern emigres, and southerners have created problems in administration and politics.

Of the three major ethnic minorities in the South, the Highlanders are the most unique and internally diverse. There are more than thirty ethno-linguistic groups in the Highlands. The French, who called them montagnards, encouraged their separation from the Vietnamese and administered the high plateau (Plateau Montagnard Sud) independently. Some tribes still carry the cultural memory of their violent primeval displacement from the fertile lowlands by more powerful invaders. Added to these legends is a consistent history of mistreatment of Highlanders by Vietnamese in politics, trade, and appropriation of land. These frustrations have found outlet in protest and even violent take-over (in Ban Me Thuot, September, 1964) of government facilities. More serious is the direct involvement of Highlander tribes with Viet-Cong insurgency in some areas. Viet-Cong supply routes from the North cross Highlander territories to reach guerrillas operating among the densely populated coastal and Delta lowlands. Thus the highlander tribes are strategically significant to both sides in the conflict, even in the conduct of operations among the lowlands.

Khmer peoples are the same racially as the majority population of Cambodia. Some 350,000 to 400,000 are in Vietnam--all in the Delta region. They tend to live in their own villages and they practice the Theraveda Buddhism common to Burma and Thailand.

The Chinese minority of over 1,000,000 is mostly centered in Cholon, the Chinese sister city contiguous to Saigon, and in smaller urban areas. Their enormous economic power, differing language, and school systems encourage separatism and have troubled the Vietnamese leadership. Extreme government moves to force Chinese into Vietnamese nationality early in the Diem regime led the Chinese to retaliate by using their power to paralyze the country's economy.⁴ The capability of the Chinese minority to give major financial and material support to the insurgents underscores their significance in the conflict.

II. VIETNAMESE RURAL SOCIETY

Despite the opportunities for insurgent gains through disaffected minorities, the heart of the insurgency problem is found in the Vietnamese majority itself. The most significant prize of the present conflict is the support and control of the ethnic Vietnamese rural population, almost entirely situated in lowland areas. They live in villages (xa), each comprised of several hamlets (ap).

Although there have been social changes forced by war, there is a continuity of the customs, habits, and world-view common to the traditional village life over several centuries. The average peasant's desires and hopes for life usually can

⁴Joseph Buttinger, "The Ethnic Minorities in Vietnam," Chapter VI in Wesley Fishel, Problems of Freedom: South Vietnam Since Independence (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 109-111.

be expressed in terms of what lies in the village where he lives. The peasant's concerns can be categorized into five general areas: rice, land, family, religion, and education.

Rice. In Vietnamese society rice is infinitely more important than any one food is to a westerner. It is almost equivalent--particularly for the poorer peasant--to food itself. The growing of rice dictates many of the villager's activities. His work calendar, feasts, and worship are geared to the phases of its production. Government demands for his labor may be deeply resented if they conflict with the production of rice.

Land. The land as the source of sustenance and as the symbol of status and security in peasant society is not unique to Vietnam. Hunger for land ownership is a major factor in agrarian discontent and a vital factor in the "cause" of the insurgent. Ownership patterns vary considerably in Vietnam. The most serious scarcity of land is in the densely populated enclaves along the central coast. However, an old tradition of communal cooperation in parts of Central Vietnam, possibly dating back to the early days when entire villages migrated there together, provides a democratic distribution of the land in the form of an equal portion to each voter in the family.⁵ In parts

⁵Charles Robequain (tr. by Isabel A. Ward), The Economic Development of French Indo-China, Institute of Pacific Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 62.

of Quang Nam the amounts per family sometimes total as little as 1/10 hectare, (about 3/10 acre).⁶ In the Delta, where there is far more land per capita, inequities of ownership are more severe. In his study of the village of Khanh Hau, Gerald Hickey describes the opposite extreme of land ownership that is characteristic of the Delta. Prior to a modest land reform in 1958, there had been only 130 owners of the 926 hectares of paddy land in the village of 3,241 people.⁷ But in Khanh Hau, even tenant farmers had much more land to till than the peasants in Quang Nam, averaging 2.4 hectares per tenant (vs. 1/10 to 1/5 hectare average in Quang Nam for a man-wife allotment).⁸ Shortage of land for whatever reason, whether from overpopulation or undistributed ownership, has been a vital factor in the problem of insurgency in South Vietnam.

Family. Traditional Vietnamese family life resembles that of China. The bonds of family are many times more relevant to human activity than in the United States. The peasant treasures his tie to his forbears and his progeny as links that project his

⁶This calculation is based on field investigation of land allocations in villages of western Dien Ban District, Quang Nam Province in 1963. Per voter shares ranged from 1/10 hectare to 1/20 hectare. One hectare equals 2.5 acres.

⁷Gerald Cannon Hickey, Village in Vietnam (New Haven: Yale, 1964), pp. 41-42.

⁸Ibid., p. 45.

existence beyond the present. He feels himself part of an unending stream to which he contributes and from which he receives. His self-identity is closely interlaced with that of his family. Family duties and attachment extend well beyond the man-wife-child relations familiar to the United States. One is a conscious and responsible part of a clan of cousins, aunts, and uncles in the local community. Such ties have been enlisted to strengthen both the positions of the insurgent and the government, and the family is always a factor to be considered.

Religion. Vietnam inherited its most pervasive religious views from the Chinese traditions of Confucianism/Ancestor Worship, Mahayana Buddhism, and Taoism. These various viewpoints may be manifested in the religious rites of a single village shrine. For the peasant, these views are all part of his world-view. He draws on the moral strength and humanistic confidence of Confucianism to run his family, do his work, and judge his government; he faces overpowering natural disasters with the resigned acceptance of Taoism; and he leans on the mercy of the Buddhist goddess Kwan Yin to forgive his moral inadequacies. Melded with this traditional Chinese contribution to his religious perspective is a fundamental matrix of superstition and spiritism common to rural Southeast Asians. The peasant lives in "two different worlds" at the same time--the real and the spirit-filled--and his behavior is conditioned by both.⁹ Insurgent

⁹Kenneth P. Landon, Southeast Asia: Crossroads of Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 36.

familiarity with this characteristic has been a valuable propaganda resource. Propaganda themes that appeal to traditional and local superstitions are often employed by the Viet-Cong.

Education and Morality. The traditional Chinese system of rule by scholars--mandarinism--left a residue that lingers today in the profound respect for learning among rural Vietnamese. In the Confucian tradition learning implies propriety and moral uprightness, as well as factual knowledge. There is a steady demand for schools and most peasants hope their children will get more education than they received themselves. Despite the prevalence of corruption at all levels, there is still a popular expectation of justice and morality as the pattern of behavior for government officials. As in China, the insurgents in Vietnam have appealed to the Confucian tenets of ethical rule both by their attacks on government corruption and by exemplary communist behavior.

The village as a microcosm. The Vietnamese village, in contrast to western communities, tends to be a little world to itself. It is highly structured in its internal relationships. It has traditionally been a closed society, which one enters by being born or by marriage. One cannot "run away" to another village, because it, too, is its own microcosm, and the stranger is strictly an outsider.¹⁰ Thus maintaining one's self in the

¹⁰Nguyen Dinh Hoa, Verbal and Non-verbal Patterns of Respect-Behavior in Vietnamese Society: Some Metalinguistic Data (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1957), p. 230.

good graces of his community and his family, is a strong motivation for the peasant. The influence of the village community on its individual members can, therefore, play a vital role in the motivation and control methods of insurgency and pacification.

For centuries the village confronted outside authority as an organic social unit, rather than a collection of individuals. An old Vietnamese saying notes that "the emperor's authority stops at the village gate." Imperial administrators levied taxes and troop requirements from villages as whole political units, leaving the village councils to determine which families or individuals would satisfy how much of the levy. Although the solidarity of the village has been shaken by communist and Government political organization in recent decades, most of the civil problems among village citizens are settled without recourse to higher authority. The village police chief still adjudicates, on an informal basis, the vast majority of civil disputes.

The foregoing portrayal of traditional Vietnamese village attitudes should be examined with the understanding that the tremendous new social forces arising from the war and modernization, are reshaping the peasant's viewpoint. Refugee relocations have particularly affected many families. But the traditional elements of the average peasant's world-view and his concerns for living are demonstrated in the current activities of village life which remain in many ways the same as centuries ago. The rural community is in transition.

Another fundamental problem common to Vietnamese peasants is physical security--for the safety of life and limb. This drive for preservation of self and family takes precedence over all other concerns, and determines, to a great extent, the nature of the peasant's response to both sides of the conflict. As the fighting in village areas has escalated, the search for survival has consistently shown its priority over political and other values. Generally, the peasant will support or oppose one side or the other as the situation requires in order to survive.

III. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN PENETRATION

China. Foreign influence on Vietnamese rural society is nothing new. A thousand years of Chinese rule profoundly influenced (as noted in the categories above) the shape of Vietnamese institutions. The Chinese dominance over Vietnam helped foster a permanent dislike for foreign rule and a distrust of the Chinese. Vietnamese nationalism has a rich collection of legendary heroism against Chinese and Mongol oppression. This early national heroism, is, in fact, the historic keystone of a strong insurgent tradition further developed against the French.¹¹

The French presence. The French introduced the cultural stimuli of western religion, education, and administration.

¹¹The reader will find Joseph Buttinger's The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1958), a useful historical source for the Vietnamese-Chinese experience.

With an ambivalence similar to their attitude towards the Chinese, the Vietnamese accepted the new ideas (among most of the educated class), while rejecting French rule. Thereby they enriched their anti-colonial arsenal with the revolutionary ideas of the West.

French colonial administration suffered from perpetual changes and poor quality French officials.¹² The behavior of French officials had a negative impact on the high Confucian expectations of the peasants. Donald Lancaster notes:

The failure of the administrative service to maintain French moral prestige. . . in distant and inaccessible provinces must be considered a contributory cause of the widespread discontent with French rule, which was to culminate in the uprising of August, 1945. . . .¹³

In the nineteenth century, the French undermined the mandarin administration by using it as a tool and by blocking Vietnamese attempts to reform the system.¹⁴ The old colonial technique of fomenting rivalries among different regions and political factions was widely practiced by the French. The tragic consequences of the policy are evident in the residue of splintered, suspicious, and conspiratorial nationalist groups in the South today.¹⁵

¹²Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 31.

¹³Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indo-China (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 64.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 77.

¹⁵Ibid.

The French recruited Vietnamese as low level fonctionnaires to do the paperwork of administration and thereby bequeathed a heavy burden of that clerical mentality to the Diem government. For want of more qualified people, Diem appointed many former fonctionnaires to executive positions demanding decisiveness and initiative. The result is clear to those who are familiar with the endemic government red tape, delays, and avoidance of decisionmaking. The fonctionnaire's psychic and vocational security rests in the safety of precedent, procedure, and routine--an orientation towards: "preparing papers for others' signatures, (to) forwarding dossiers to other offices for consideration, and (to) putting their date stamp on the administrative mail."¹⁶

Among the less culturally structured Delta communities, an outlet for the nationalism of the Vietnamese during the pre-World War II period was created through use of religious and quasi-political structures. The formation of two religious sects, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, after World War I, attracted substantial mass support and considerable influence over local political thought. The Cao Dai is an imaginative, if at times grotesque, amalgamation of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Catholicism (and every other major religion but Islam) claiming approximately a million adherents, principally in the Delta.

¹⁶Nguyen Thai, Is South Vietnam Viable? (Manila, Philippines, November, 1962), p. 54.

The Hoa Hao is closer to a revised form of Buddhism, with a strong spiritualist flavoring.¹⁷ Both groups have considerable strength in certain Delta provinces, and are now being armed and encouraged politically by the Government since the demise of Diem, who had subdued and disarmed them. Their sectarian and social cohesion apparently makes these groups less susceptible to communist (and other) influences.

The Catholic presence in Vietnam is a religious contribution sustained by France but initiated by Portugal. Now a nationwide religion with three centuries of Vietnamese tradition, its influence is well beyond its statistical share of the population. Many key officials in the army and among the educated class are Catholic. There is a long history of persecution between the Catholics and other previously established religions. Inherited resentments on both sides are factors in current conflicts in the South, and also played a major role in the fall of Diem.¹⁸

The Viet-Minh. In the conflict with the French after World War II, the nationalists were caught between the communist

¹⁷A brief analysis of these two indigenous Vietnamese faiths is available in Vittorio Lanternari (tr. by Lisa Sergio), The Religions of the Oppressed (New York: New American Library, Mentor, 1963), pp. 216-221.

¹⁸A lucid analysis of the historical roots of current revolutionary thrusts in Vietnam, including early religious conflicts, is available in George A. Carver, Jr., "The Real Revolution in South Vietnam," Foreign Affairs, April, 1965, Vol. XLIII, No. 3, pp. 387-408.

control of the united revolutionary effort in the form of the Viet-Minh and the French efforts to wipe out even the less volatile nationalist elements. Mass arrests of Vietnamese nationalists by the Viet-Minh occurred in 1946 when the constitution for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was established. Thousands of non-communist leaders were "reformed" or exterminated.¹⁹ Until the Geneva Accords there was no effective focus of non-communist nationalism, and the Viet-Cong inherited, after Geneva, much of the popular support and sympathies previously attached to the Viet-Minh in the South. Non-communists had been an important part of the Viet-Minh forces.

IV. SOUTH VIETNAM AFTER GENEVA

The Regime of Ngo Dinh Diem: Controlled Revolution

When Ngo Dinh Diem came to power in 1954 he established a governmental and political apparatus in the midst of an array of enemies, including the religious sects, many French-oriented army officers, and the numerous nationalist elements that had surfaced after the transfer of power from the French.

The vacuum of power left by the absence of the French and the withdrawal of Viet-Minh from their areas of control, was not easily filled by Diem, who had no political apparatus

¹⁹ Bernard B. Fall, Political Development of Vietnam, V-J Day to the Geneva Cease-Fire (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1955), p. 26.

he could count on for control. Saigon tea houses were full of intellectual attentistes (political fence-sitters) who had grown in numbers as the outcome of the previous war had become more clouded.²⁰

Diem surprised many in his victories over the various dissident sects, and his government went to work in the previously Viet-Minh areas to root out the remnants of communist influence (to be discussed in Chapter IV). His American advisors were pleased at his successes--which had been accomplished in close association with Col. Edward G. Lansdale, who had worked with Magsaysay in the Philippines. With American help, nearly a million refugees had been moved from the North and were being resettled. Diem had discarded the authority of Bao Dai through a nationwide election in 1955, which led to the proclamation of the Republic of Vietnam, with Diem as President. Diem received an overwhelming (and undoubtedly rigged) majority of more than 97 per cent.

After the establishment of his power, Diem had, by 1956, turned to a massive effort at nation-building--which he wanted to accomplish through a total revolution in the Vietnamese society.

²⁰Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 67. Chapters IV and V provide a responsible survey of events in the Diem regime, particularly as related to the insurgent conflict. Another journalist well acquainted with the subject is Denis Warner, The Last Confucian (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964). The most complete study of the Diem government is by Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1964).

Personalism--a philosophical system including elements from Confucian, Catholic, Marxist, and other traditions--was the philosophic touchstone from which a revolutionary elan and concrete programs would hopefully emerge.²¹

Vietnamese personalism (Nhan Vi) was based on the personalist ideas of Emmanuel Mounier, a French Catholic philosopher. Ngo Dinh Nhu, the French educated brother of Diem, attempted to blend the ideas with Confucian thought for application in Vietnam. The doctrine stresses the dignity and worth of the individual and the obligation of the state to develop the person to his fullest powers. Political affairs would be run by a highly qualified elite thoroughly schooled in personalist doctrines. Personalism is considered by Vietnamese and western students to be a confusing amalgam of traditions, neither understood nor practiced outside the Ngo family. Functioning as Diem's political alter-ego, Ngo Dinh Nhu increased his own role in government steadily after 1956. Nhu developed and largely controlled the mass political organizations of the regime.²²

²¹An analysis of Personalism may be found in John Donnell, "Personalism in Vietnam" in Fishel, Problems of Freedom, op. cit., Chapter III. The most thorough discussion of Personalism and politics under Diem is Donnell's Ph. D. dissertation, "Politics in South Vietnam: Doctrines of Authority and Conflict" (University of California at Berkeley, 1964).

²²The relation of Nhu and Diem cannot be discussed in detail here--although Nhu's role in pacification will be included in later chapters. Interviews with numerous sources unanimously confirmed the view that his influence over Diem, through his control of information reaching the Palace and the political apparatus of the regime, was critically important in the execution of policies that led to the fall of the regime.

As a nation-builder, Diem was a man in a hurry. He knew he had to be. He was an idealist with enormous revolutionary ambitions for the transformation of his country. But he was also aware of the older revolutionary intentions of the communist regime to the North.

When the insurgency was renewed after a period of comparative quiescence, 1954-1957, the government's nation-building effort was placed under increasing pressure. The race was on for the loyalty and control of whole communities in the rural areas and the communists had a headstart. Some of the problems faced by Diem in this titanic political contest were inherited; others were created by the regime itself. Both types of problems will be discussed in subsequent chapters as they pertain to pacification.

As a pattern, the movements of the regime were towards ever-enlarging programs, demanding more and more time from peasants and officials, but achieving little in the way of security or prosperity. There was much talk of revolution, democracy, and the dignity of man, but the behavior of the regime towards the citizenry, and particularly minority political leaders, was often the opposite of the edifying words.

While the communists whittled at government influence over the people through its techniques of terror and assassination, the government's apparatus itself was beginning to face away from the people and towards the Palace and its ambitious demands for realization of its personalist programs. Loyalty to the

regime became an obsession which negated the possibility of creative dissent. A "loyal opposition" became a contradiction in terms. Intellectuals, businessmen, and peasants were alienated from the administration and its demanding ideological idiosyncracies. Sycophants in the government learned to report the accomplishment of programs planned but never completed.

Presidential trips to the countryside were elaborately staged to give the showcase effect of successful efforts. A demoralized civil service endured promotions based on political loyalty and religious affiliation. Corruption increased as morals in the civil service decreased. The objective of local officials became control of the population, not genuine popular support from it.

Although the Viet-Cong hammered at the regime as an American puppet, Diem's isolation from American advisory influence also widened. Nhu's pathological distrust of the United States created a formal charade out of cooperation which further frustrated key advisors.²³

As the Viet-Cong pressed to isolate the government from the populace, the ironic self-isolation of the Ngo regime hit its maximum in the Buddhist crisis and subsequent coup of 1963. Along with the communists, and by using similar means, the Ngo regime had tried to control a revolution that neither it nor the

²³At least one top advisor felt he was in rapport with Nhu, but a highly placed American (Source Number 42) told the writer that, as Nhu's influence over Diem increased, each American Palace intimate was elbowed out. Nhu, he related, "would play the game only if it was his game."

communists had entirely spawned. Behind the militant response of the Vietnamese people in favor of the suppressed Buddhist demonstrators were political and personal aspirations and resentments reaching above religious affiliation, and covering every class and creed.²⁴

After Ngo Dinh Diem: The Uncontrolled Revolution

The administrative failures of the Diem regime were repeated and even made worse after the coup of 1963. The destruction of Diem's system of political control was followed by rapidly shifting political alliances among military officers and civilians. These changes further demoralized the civil servants. There were few political elites and these had almost no following--apart from the sects. Vietnam has since been governed by various elements of the evolving military officer class which has been forced to be responsive to the newly emerging pressure groups.

But a political and social revolution is underway in Vietnam. It is not controlled by the communists although they have sought to exploit it. It is rooted in a desire for political expression that may reach deep into Vietnamese tradition. The

²⁴The extremity of Diem's isolation (or perhaps his hypocrisy), both from the people and from the harshness in his own regime, is demonstrated in his front page statement in the Times of Vietnam just three days before his assassination: "South Vietnam is the only country of the Third World that sincerely and effectively endeavors to maintain a truly open society." (October 28, 1963).

current Vietnamese revolution has brought new names to the top in the military forces. It has thrust forward whole new publics: students, Buddhists, and Catholics. Older nationalist parties, like the VNQDD (Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang) and Dai Viets, have been revived. The sects are openly active again. All of these forces may be working toward an eventual political balance that can bring stability to the country or their inter-nacine warfare may destroy any hope for a viable political system. Carver puts it this way:

" . . . if South Vietnam's real revolution does not destroy the country first, over the longer term it may prove the eventual undoing of Communist ambitions and produce a real national entity where none has heretofore existed."²⁵

The "real revolution" in Vietnam has shown its power and its frightful lack of cohesion and direction. The Ngo regime failed to shape it for its own ends and it has been impressively immune, for the most part, to the overtures by the communists to control it. It is a "real revolution" in contrast to the artificially stimulated and controlled revolutions of Diem and the communists.

In sum, the context of South Vietnam's insurgency is steadily, perhaps radically, changing. The massive inputs of the insurgents and the government and its allies are reshaping the atmosphere of the conflict. For better or worse, South Vietnam will never be the same again, and it behooves the student

²⁵Carver, op. cit., p. 408. The grave social crisis is further described by Charles Mohr, "Saigon Social Ills Worry U.S. Aides," New York Times, February 21, 1966, p. 1.

of counterinsurgency to review the operational context of his programs, and those of his enemy, with an eye for significant social and political change.

The traditional factors of the social situation must also be considered. Despite all the impact on the Vietnamese peasant, there is a persistence of the traditional culture that mystifies the modern mind. The successful counterinsurgent, like the effective insurgent, must consider the peasant from the dual perspectives of his persistent traditional values and the fresh inputs of the modern world.

CHAPTER III

THE RURAL STRATEGY OF THE VIET-CONG

Historic and Organic Continuity

From the communist point of view, the Geneva Conference was merely a resort to diplomatic and political means for reaching the communist objective: the unity and control of Vietnam and the building of a communist society. The failure of these means has led to another chapter in the older conflict, with new opponents and a smaller theater of action (the home base in the North having been "legitimized" at Geneva). The desire for a united Vietnam is not unique to the communists. All nationalist groups have sought unity in the name of Vietnamese nationalism and for sound economic reasons. The rich ricelands of the Mekong Delta have traditionally supplied the industrialized North in a balanced and mutually advantageous exchange of products.

As has been mentioned previously, the rebirth of the communist insurgency benefitted from its popular association with the broadly nationalist image of the Viet-Minh as the liberating force from French imperialism. This historic continuity blessed the Viet-Cong with a fertile field for recruitment and other support in the South. The Second Indo-China War (as Bernard Fall calls it) began with the Geneva truce that ended the first conflict and permitted thousands of political cadres and soldiers

to go North for the elaborate training with which they would return to subvert the South.

This organic tie with the Viet-Minh tradition and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has also provided considerable revolutionary expertise for the southern conflict. The accomplishment of the Chinese in their own rural-based insurgency was passed to the Viet-Minh to great advantage after the fall of Chiang Kai Shek.¹ Vo Nguyen Giap's concept of the "people's army" is straight from the Chinese experience, stressing the party's political indoctrination and control of the army and the army's oath to respect, help, and defend the people.²

The formation of the National Liberation Front in December, 1960 as the precursor to a provisional government was an effort to assume the broadly nationalist image enjoyed by the Viet-Minh, in order to gain more ready acceptance among the peasants. The Front has hinted at a possible neutralist position, independent of the North, in order to gain the support of other nationalist elements in the South. The tactic has failed, however, to attract leading political personalities from non-communist parties.

The objective of the communist revolution in North

¹The sophistication of the Chinese advisory input may be seen in the reproduction of a secret manual for Chinese advisors to the Viet-Minh in Allan B. Cole, Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions: A Documentary History 1945-1955 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell, 1956), pp. 127 ff.

²Giap Vo Nguyen, People's War People's Army (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 55-56.

Vietnam are clear to knowledgeable southerners and the thousands of refugees who fled from the North. There the communists have executed a comprehensive change in almost every aspect of urban and rural life in a manner similar to the revolution in communist China. However, the program of the National Liberation Front publicizes more moderate objectives designed to appeal to peasants and other nationalist parties, even though its ultimate designs are identical to the communist North. The aims of the Front will be further discussed below as propaganda themes.

The General Strategy in South Vietnam

Like a disease, the revolutionary organism invades the body politic at the points of least resistance--in the peripheral or isolated communities less subject to government control. By the destruction of the government presence and the substitution of the Viet-Cong's control in one village after another, the area expands towards the centers of government power.

The initial communist bases were established where the Viet-Minh had actually ruled as a government before Geneva--in the coastal provinces of Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, and Quang Nam (known earlier as Interzone 5), jungle areas north of Saigon, and parts of the Delta. Young men who had gone to the North from these areas returned and recruited others. (See Figure 2).

The intensity and type of Viet-Cong local efforts have varied with the area. One could create a scale of intensity to indicate the wide range--in time and tactics--applied to various provinces, or within a province or even a single district. In

Viet-Cong Regular Forces*

1963	24,000
1964	34,000
1965	73,000

*In addition, irregulars are usually estimated at from two to three times the number of regular forces. Sources: 1963: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Vietnam and Southeast Asia, 88th Congress 1st Session (Washington, 1963); 1964: Wesley Fishel, "The Eleventh Hour in Vietnam," Asian Survey, Vol. V (February, 1965) pp. 98-107; 1965: U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The Vietnam Conflict: The Substance and the Shadow, 87th Congress 2nd Session (Washington, 1966).

Viet-Cong Terror Activity*

	1963	1964
Local officials killed	515	436
Other civilians killed	1,558	1,350
Kidnappings	7,262	9,531

*Sources: 1963: Republic of Vietnam, Communist Against the Republic of Vietnam (Saigon, July, 1964); 1964: U.S. Department of State, Aggression from the North: The Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam (February, 1965).

Figure 2

some provinces--such as Ninh Thuan and Tuyen Duc--Viet-Cong activity has been limited to propaganda efforts, agent systems, and occasional attacks on peripheral hamlets. In the Delta, provinces such as An Xuyen are Viet-Cong occupied areas, some parts of which have never been penetrated by government forces. In provinces such as Quang Nam (Central Vietnam), the political and propaganda activities continued at a steady but low level until 1964. Then the operations were escalated towards larger unit actions, increased terror, and continuing communist control of many villages. In some contested regions there is "shift-control." The government rules by day and the Viet-Cong by night.

Propaganda and Program Themes

One of the major propaganda themes is the appeal to oust the Americans, in the name of Vietnamese nationalism. The Americans have been made the symbols of foreign imperialism in place of the departed French. Americans have become the prime political and military target rather than the Government of Vietnam, and efforts have been made to alienate official Vietnamese and the populace from the Americans. South Vietnamese troop fatalities at Viet-Cong hands have been advertised as American deaths.³ A Vietnamese term to describe the Diem regime, "My-Diem," meaning "U.S.-Diem" (later U.S.-Khanh), has been so widely used that

³David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 88.

innocent peasants have addressed government officials in this manner.⁴ There are standard appeals to Vietnamese cadres and Armed Forces personnel to refuse to fight "for the Americans."⁵

The communists focus regularly on local issues of direct concern to the village. Provincial interests are singled out for emphasis at that level. Land reform is a standard local issue in many provinces and is often carried out as soon as the Viet-Cong have the power to execute it. The Viet-Cong give exacting attention to the dynamics of a local situation that may give them a special leverage. In a Delta village, for instance, lasting appreciation was won by the Viet-Cong for straightening a path that had forced villagers to walk a long way around an obstinate landowner's field.⁶ Noticeably missing from the Viet-Cong appeal is the communist call for denunciation of families, pooling of land ownership, attacks on religion, and similar communist revolutionary themes widely purveyed in the North as a part of the complete communist revolution. The Viet-Cong woos the peasant in terms of what the peasant already wants, hates, and fears.

A typical summary of Viet-Cong propaganda themes was

⁴Scigliano, op. cit., p. 158.

⁵AID province report, Khanh Hoa, 3 May 1965.

⁶John Mecklin, Mission in Torment: An Intimate Account of the US Role in Vietnam (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965), p. 87.

reported in Phong Dinh province as follows:

- 1) Tell the United States to withdraw from South Vietnam,
- 2) Resist the Government draft call,
- 3) Request that the bombings of North Vietnam be stopped,
- 4) Demand negotiations between the Government of South Vietnam and the National Liberation Front to terminate the war,
- 5) Stop the use of artillery in rural areas.⁷

These five themes epitomize the appeal to anti-foreign nationalism, national unity, and the very real local problem of war weariness. Notably they omit the less popular communist dogmas mentioned above.

Viet-Cong Pacification: Destruction of the Government Presence

Despite the rising emphasis on American targets, the heart of the communist effort has continued to be a two-fold political drive against the Republic of Vietnam: 1) the isolation and destruction of the government presence and influence in the villages, and 2) the substitution of the National Liberation Front as the local operating government.

In essence, the Viet-Cong strategy itself is a type of pacification of the rural areas. The initial phase of destruction of the government position assumes many forms, including efforts to suggest the relative superiority of Viet-Cong strength. Here follow a few of the techniques.

Symbolic victories. Careful selection of targets is made among Government posts or units, resulting in an impressive

⁷AID province report, Phong Dinh, 30 June 1965.

Viet-Cong victory. It may not change the Government capability, but it often changes the peasant's confidence in the protective capability of the government forces.

Sabotage. Damage or destruction of all symbols of the Government's presence is widely carried out. Roads, railroads, schools, health facilities, and village headquarters are favorite targets.

Assassination, kidnapping, threats. Perhaps the most lethal blows to the Government presence are the perpetual murders and kidnapping of its field representatives: village officials, school teachers, pacification cadres, health workers, agricultural agents, etc. (See Figure 2, page 30, for statistics). Kidnappings also effectively remove officials, many of whom are never released. Threats against local leaders have prompted many resignations and attempts to leave government service.

Neutralization. The response of many civil servants to the intimidations and terrorism cannot usually be measured. It often amounts to a form of neutralization. Officials may go into the countryside less and less. Or they may manage to be inconspicuous by not doing well at their work, and not seeing all they should notice as officials. The Viet-Cong tend to kill the outstanding leader and the most rotten--the former because he makes the Government look good and the latter because killing him appeals to popular feelings. The official who performs in

a mediocre manner is safest. His slowdown in response to intimidation may be unconscious. Or this accommodation may be a tacit "gentleman's agreement" between the official and the Viet-Cong to leave each other alone.⁸

Overloading Government apparatus. A relatively recent alleged Viet-Cong technique is the use of dislocated peoples to burden the Government with their care. The refugees often return after military operations have ended in their villages and may carry with them an image of poor government performance if their care as refugees has been inadequate.

Economic strangulation. In the Delta and other areas the Viet-Cong have demonstrated the Government's inability to control the flow of rice and other commodities to markets. Despite the tradition of rice surplus in Vietnam, thousands of tons must now be imported to serve some needy areas.

Disengagement of the populace. By the multiple means described above, the communists are able to drive a wedge between the rural citizen and his government. The citizen becomes convinced he cannot be protected by government forces. He may be warned by the Viet-Cong against repaying his loan to the government farm credit system, thereby erasing his chance to borrow from this source

⁸ Halberstam, op. cit., p. 114.

again.⁹ Candidates for province councils were discouraged by the Viet-Cong from standing for election in 1965--a direct act intended to disengage and neutralize the local leader from his government.¹⁰ Defectors have reported that they were forced to quit government local security forces and join the Viet-Cong because of terrorist threats against their families.¹¹

The methods are varied, but the result is the same: the annihilation of the Government presence through destroying the image of its capability in the minds of the peasants and by effecting a paralysis or withdrawal of its apparatus in the rural areas. With this destruction accomplished, the way is paved for the second phase: the substitution of Viet-Cong administration.

Viet-Cong Pacification: Substitution by the Insurgent Government

Viet-Cong pacification programs are rooted in the Viet-Minh experience against the French in the Red River Delta. Villages in that area had been protected for centuries against animal predators and pirates.¹² These communities were further fortified against the French by the addition of tunnels, trenches, and retreat systems, and by the organization, training, and arming of

⁹Hickey, op. cit., p. 177.

¹⁰From various AID province reports, 1965.

¹¹Washington Post, 27 December 1965, p. A8.

¹²George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Vietminh in Indochina (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 92-93.

village volunteers. The Viet-Cong have been developing many such fortified villages in the South since the recurrence of the insurgency after Geneva.

The fortifications of a rural community are only the physical symbols of communist influence over the people. To achieve community control, the Viet-Cong engage in a carefully planned campaign among the people, involving propaganda, community organization, and intimidation, if not terror.

The wooing of XB village. The following is an outline of the steps normally taken to move a village to the communist side. It is based on an actual village in Kien Phong province described in a captured Viet-Cong document and referred to below as village "XB."¹³ The first Viet-Cong efforts met with failure, death, and capture of cadres by government troops. The cadres regrouped and began to work more carefully. They focussed on land reform, distributing land owned by absentee landlords to those cultivating it and forcing resident landlords to reduce rents. The cadres eliminated the influence of recalcitrant village elders and "security agents" of the Government by fomenting popular resentments against them. The people were coached to express their feelings, especially hatreds, in public meetings.

¹³"XB" Village is the subject of an English translation of a captured Viet-Cong study issued by the United States Information Service in Saigon, entitled "When the Communists Come" (Saigon: USIS, July 1962), mimeographed. Denis Warner, op. cit., describes XB Village as the subject of Chapter VIII.

Psychological "liberation" from the landlords and the "oppression" of the "My-Diem" government were the beginning for the enlistment of the populace as a whole in the cause of a better life for the village.

Mass organizations for all ages were formed: "Lao Dong Youth," "Liberation Women," and a Farmer's Association. To celebrate their "new freedom," the villagers displayed 600 National Liberation Front flags and argued down government soldiers who objected. At the insistence of the Viet-Cong cadres, village leaders refused to work on government-sponsored projects, and the people would not use government-provided drugs. Instead, the Viet-Cong cadres opened a health station in the village.

A further step was taken by laying spiked boards (with sharpened ends pointing upwards) along pathways as hazards to discourage government soldiers from coming into the village. One soldier was hurt on a board and the troops came less often thereafter. The cadres laid the first boards with the people cautiously imitating them. It became a game, and slogans moved the people to "heroic spiked board laying." Eleven barricades were built and manned by the sub-cells of the Viet-Cong farmers association. Soon farmers were making grenades in a small factory. Everyone was expected to do something. Eventually the whole village was involved with the Viet-Cong.

Careful attention was given by the cadres to maintaining high revolutionary fervor--both among the cadres themselves and

the villagers. Villagers were encouraged to do daring things. Self-criticism meetings were held to keep the people psychologically strong. The cadres developed techniques for keeping mere formal adherence to a program from replacing true enthusiasm. Fighters against the "imperialists" and Diem were recruited. Taxes to support the National Liberation Front were collected. Two schools were built by the people, and Viet-Cong teachers were employed.

All this activity took place in an area very close to Vietnamese government forces. Although the ineffective and erratic effort of the government to control the situation aided the Viet-Cong cadres, the capability of the communists to motivate and manage a rural community is clearly demonstrated.

In Chuong Thien province in the Delta, Viet-Cong pacification efforts have apparently shown progressive social and economic results. The following is a counterinsurgent perspective of the Viet-Cong effort. It is a report by the United States Operations Mission (USOM) Province Representative:

Long held beliefs that the VC pacification program exists have been validated. They are developing "combat hamlets" vs. our "new life hamlets". The basic differences are that the VC hamlets are well organized, clean, economically self supporting and have an active defense system. For example, a cottage industry in one hamlet was as large as has been previously witnessed anywhere in Chuong Thien province. New canals are being dug and pineapples are under cultivation. The VC also have a relocation program for younger families. These areas coincide with the areas just outside the planned GVN sphere of interest. Unless the USOM/GVN activities exhibit a more qualitative basis, there is little likelihood of changing the present

attitudes of the people. For example, in one area only five kilometers from the province capital, the people refused medical assistance offered by ARVN medics.¹⁴

Communist Highlander Programs

The Viet-Cong have long given attention to highland tribes, some of their programs carrying over from the days of the Viet-Minh. In contrast to the absence of an adequate government program, Viet-Cong agents have learned bizarre languages, pierced their ears, and married Highlander women to become close to the tribes. Select young men are sent North for training as cadres. By the fall of 1962, a contest for control of the Bru tribe had developed. Many Bru had come for protection to the government centers in Quang Tri province. Other hamlets vanished overnight--induced by the Viet-Cong to move deeper into the jungle or into Laos.¹⁵

The xenophobic Katu tribe, located in Quang Nam province, had long enjoyed common cause with the Viet-Minh against the French, who had tried to control the tribe prior to World War II by engaging in military expeditions against them. Several thousand Katu were systematically relocated by the Viet-Cong in the jungles beyond the reach of government cadres after 1957. A Michigan State University field study unit made contact with a Katu village in 1957, but the Highlanders' fear of Viet-Cong

¹⁴AID province report, Chuong Thien, March, 1965.

¹⁵The writer was at that time (1962) involved in programs of assistance to the Bru tribe.

punishment prevented their acceptance of gifts of rice from an accompanying missionary even though they appeared to be starving.¹⁶

One of the chief appeals by the Viet-Cong to the more advanced tribes is their offer of an autonomous tribal zone for Highlanders, independent of Vietnamese internal administration (previously noted in Chapter II). Communist policy has always given considerable attention to the relations with tribal minorities.

Trends in Viet-Cong Pacification

Part of the underlying genius of the Viet-Cong success lies in the judicious mixture of persuasion and terror--the alternation of the carrot and the stick. As the power of the Viet-Cong has increased, there appears to be a similar rise in violence and threats of force to obtain their goals. The stick has begun to replace the carrot. In Vinh Binh province, a highly selective policy of terror--directed against particular officials and informers--has been replaced, as communist strength has grown, by wanton destruction of civilian facilities. Terror has been applied to bring in larger numbers of recruits and higher taxes.¹⁷ In Binh Dinh province (Central Vietnam) a Buddhist pagoda was destroyed by the Viet-Cong with a loss of ten lives--the first

¹⁶Michigan State University, Vietnam Advisory Group, Preliminary Research Report on the High Plateau and Field Trip Report on the Katu" (Saigon, June 1957). (Mimeographed.) p. 60.

¹⁷Robert Warne, "Vinh Binh Province" in George K. Tanham, War Without Guns: American Civilians in Rural Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 25.

such attack in the province, and considered by the United States Operation Mission Representative to be a serious Viet-Cong error.¹⁸

There are two causes for the more massive use of terror by the Viet-Cong. First, the increased size of the insurgent military apparatus has necessitated much higher taxes and larger numbers of men to keep it functioning. Terror is the only way to meet these enlarged requirements. Secondly, the great power of the Viet-Cong and its seeming nearness to victory may cause it to relax its self-control with regard to the populace.

In Quang Tri, on the border with North Vietnam, a similar pattern of Viet-Cong extremism appears to have created popular resentments. The USOM Representative reported on the popular attitude towards the Viet-Cong:

The people for the most part are anxious to be given the opportunity to openly side with the Government. There are indications of increased fear of and disgust with the VC, who have abandoned many of their programs to win the hearts and minds of the people and who are concentrating on killing or neutralizing GVN troops, terrorizing the countryside, stealing food and money, trying to cut GVN supply routes and trying to keep VC supply routes open.¹⁹

James Cross has noted that communist insurgency everywhere has tended towards reliance on more terror and coercion as its position matures.²⁰ Referring to popular response to terror in

¹⁸AID province report, Binh Dinh, December 1964.

¹⁹AID province report, Quang Tri, 30 June 1965.

²⁰James E. Cross, Conflict in the Shadows: The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 94.

South Vietnam, he cautions, however, that "the people will continue to support the guerrillas because they have no alternative unless and until the government is able to protect them from guerrilla depredations and punishments."²¹ Such popular resentments against the Viet-Cong are worthless to the counterinsurgent, however, if he cannot extend a viable option (i.e. government protection) to which the resentful peasant can repair.

As the communist build up in South Vietnam continued in early 1966, there were signs that they were determined to meet the concomitant American increase and to press the villages for more men, food, and funds to fight the war. Communist China may have suggested a course different from the Viet-Cong policy of escalation. RAND experts, D.P. Mozingo and T.W. Robinson, interpreted the remarks of Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao as suggesting abandonment of terror, forced conscription, confiscation, and assassination and a move toward "multi-class" united front tactics against the Americans as the Chinese had done against the Japanese. The Chinese think the Viet-Cong should shift to defensive and small-scale warfare in the face of superior American military capability. The Chinese recommend more Vietnamese patience in wearing the Americans down while keeping the populace on the side of the communists.²²

²¹Ibid., p. 39.

²²Washington Post, 27 January 1966, p. A19.

Whatever the future may bring, at this writing the communist system of support and control within South Vietnamese rural areas appears to be well entrenched and a long way from disestablishment. At the moment the Viet-Cong seem able to afford their excesses. Only a highly imaginative and comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign, with nearly perfect execution and with substantial military support, would be capable of dislodging such a powerful and extensive insurgent apparatus.

PART II

THE COUNTERINSURGENT RESPONSE

SYNOPSIS

Chapters IV and V are a survey of the developing response of the Government of Vietnam and the United States to growing communist insurgency. Chapter IV deals with the various pacification efforts prior to the full blown emergency measures during and after 1961. Civic Action in former Viet-Minh areas in 1966-1956 is described. Military policy, political ideology (Personalism), mass organization, land reform and land development are described. Early efforts at population relocation and self-defense programs are introduced.

Chapter V summarizes the advent and development of the systematic national plans for pacification expressed in the Strategic Hamlet and New Life Hamlet campaigns. Other special pacification efforts are noted, including the innovation of United States combat forces for pacification.

CHAPTER IV

EARLY APPROACHES TO PACIFICATION

The Irrepressible Conflict

As has been noted, the Second Indo-China War is closely tied to the conflict before Geneva. The dramatis personae had changed, but the tactics of the insurgent and counterinsurgent were in the continuity with the previous war. The French had tried, under Navarre and de Lattre, to develop controlled areas, protected by Vietnamese troops, so that French forces could be more mobile.¹ The French had moved into their own rear area villages with Vietnamese cadres (called GAMO--Groupe Administrative Mobile) who served under the military government forces (Suppletives). With the input of American aid through the French, under the acronym, "STEM" (Special Technical and Economic Mission), a clash occurred between American and French officials concerning the content of village-based programs. General de Lattre resented the wide-open moves of Robert Blum to spur economic and social change in the country. Blum, the head of STEM, was bent on helping the people improve their lot. De Lattre considered the STEM role contributive to troublesome

¹Pacification efforts by the French in the Red River Delta are surveyed by Robert Donlevia, "Behind the Lines in Indo-China," Freeman, 25 January 1954.

anti-French nationalism. De Lattre once addressed Blum as "the most dangerous man in Indo-China."²

Diem inherited the insurgency with his accession to power. The nearly 90,000 Viet-Minh sympathizers who went to the North were mostly cadres and soldiers and their families, many of whom would return for subversive roles later. As they left, these cadres and officials issued warnings of retaliation towards any who cooperated with Diem's government, indicating that they would return after the uniting elections.³ Agent systems were retained and caches of weapons and equipment were hidden.⁴ Clandestine meetings of cadres and small acts of violence occurred even during the 1954-1955 peaceful period.⁵

Indeed, informally, the war had never really ended. Diem deeply resented the American belief that the insurgent problem was over.⁶

²Quoted by Shaplen, op. cit., p. 86.

³Michigan State University Advisory Group, "Report on the Organization of the Special Commissariat for Civic Action" (June, 1957), p. 1. (Mimeographed.)

⁴Ibid., p. 2.

⁵Notes made from Government intelligence reports confirming these events were revealed to the writer during an interview with a highly placed American (Source Number 19) in 1965.

⁶Interview with Wesley Fishel, former Chief Michigan State University Advisory Group to Vietnam.

Civic Action and the Former Viet-Minh Areas

Using his armed forces, Diem moved into former Viet-Minh areas with a pacification program referred to as Civic Action, led by civilian cadres who had been recruited and trained (as had their Viet-Minh predecessor cadres in those areas) in a revolutionary spirit and a desire for reform. Col. Edward Lansdale, the American anti-guerrilla advisor who had been closely associated with Ramon Magsaysay's victory against the Hukbalahap communist movement in the Philippines, worked out much of the program. The cadres learned the "Three Withs: eat, sleep, and work with the people." Diem had refused to use the GAMO cadres developed by the French because he thought they had not been effective during the 1952-1954 period.⁷

They undertook a bewildering variety of political, social, and economic programs intended to stimulate self-help and implant a sense of solidarity between the peasant and the new government. Dressed in the traditional plain black peasant calico clothing, 1,800 cadres moved into these recently vacated areas.⁸ Examples of activities reported as achieved included the following:

- census and surveys of physical needs of the village;
- building schools, maternity hospitals, information halls;
- repairing and enlarging local roads;
- digging walls and irrigation canals;
- teaching personal and public hygiene;
- distributing medicines and giving inoculations;

⁷Ibid.

⁸Michigan State University Advisory Group, op. cit., p. 8.

- teaching children in school by day and anti-illiteracy classes at night;
- forming a village militia or self-defense group;
- conducting political meetings;
- explaining agrarian reform legislation.⁹

Political activities also included anti-communist denunciation campaigns (identical in function to the communist campaigns); sometimes involving peoples' courts where local resentments could be vented and where a conversion from communism of various Viet-Cong sympathizers was the rule of the day.¹⁰ These public exhibitions were sometimes a brutal and physically painful ordeal for those marked as sympathizers because their kin had gone North to the communist regime. It is thought by some observers that these mistreated individuals became a significant source of support of the Viet-Cong in later years.¹¹ Unlike similar excesses by communist governments in Red China and North Vietnam, where no insurgent nucleus existed as an alternative, the mistreated fence-sitter in the South still had a champion to whom he could go with his grievance. Thus, even in the first counterinsurgent effort in the South, the improprieties of the government may have aided the enemy.

The early successes of Civic Action were also accompanied by other difficulties. The government tried to enlarge the operation by the transfer of regular civil servants from other

⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁰ Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam," op. cit., p. 290.

¹¹ Interview with Source Number 23, 1965.

agencies. The results were mass resignations by transferees and eventual abandonment of the effort. The various ministries, wanting a network of their own specialized cadres, closed ranks against an expansion of the Civic Action worker as a multi-skilled person who represented several ministries to the rural areas. Michigan State University advisors proposed elevation of the Civic Action Directorate to a Commissariat General within the Presidency, giving it more position in uniting the various ministries for effective work in the countryside, but the plan was rejected.¹²

The death in 1957 of Civic Action's dynamic first director, Cieu Cong Cung, permitted Ngo Dinh Nhu to move the organization into his expanding political and intelligence system. Activity in the field became more propagandistic and political, with less emphasis on economic and social services to the people.¹³

The American aid mission assisted the pacification efforts of Civic Action through equipment and funds. The Field Service Division of the United States Operations Mission had representatives in most provinces where grassroots aid was being administered. Originally the plan had been for USOM to assist provincial authorities with direct programs of aid, but the Diem government had channelled it into the Civic Action Directorate.¹⁴

¹²Michigan State University Advisory Group, op. cit., p. 11.

¹³Interview with Rufus Phillips, former AID official, 1966.

¹⁴John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid: American Experience in Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 180.

The South Vietnamese government refused a proposal by the Field Service Division to assist province chiefs directly in carrying out community aid programs, saying the province chiefs had no time for such things. USOM technical divisions (health, education, agriculture, et. al.), were interested in their own specialized programs which they tried to keep independent of Field Service personnel who had been assisting various divisions at the province level. As a result of the antipathy of the USOM Divisions and the Vietnamese government, Field Service withered away as only a reporting and housekeeping department.¹⁵

Land Reform and Land Development

Ngo Dinh Diem's government engaged in four major social experiments before the strategic hamlet program: 1) pacification through civic action, 2) refugee resettlement, 3) land development and land reform, 4) creation of "agrovilles"--rural towns.

Refugee resettlement is not directly relevant to pacification, except as it is expressed in the third program of land development and land reform. (Later in the chapter, agrovilles will be discussed). In subsequent programs, Diem and Nhu were consciously trying to articulate the nation-building ideology of "Personalist revolution." Its first major application was in land reform and development.

Land reform, particularly in the Delta was given a great

¹⁵Ibid., p. 181.

deal of attention by the Viet-Minh and, later, the Viet-Cong. Land abandoned by absentee French and Vietnamese landlords was given outright by the communists to the cultivators.

In 1956 Diem began a land reform that was more modest in scope. He permitted landlords to keep up to 100 hectares (250 acres), with the rest being sold by the government to landless farmers, who would pay the government over a six year period. In turn, the landlords would be compensated. Rent control contracts were created. The contracts specified a minimum rental of 15 per cent of the crop and a maximum of 25 per cent. The tenant was assured use of the land for a five year period.

The government took over about 25 per cent of the riceland in Vietnam, 646,000 hectares, from French and Vietnamese landlords when the program began. Approximately 300,000 hectares of this amount were sold to 121,123 tenants over the next four years. These tenants represent about 10 per cent of all the tenant farmers in Vietnam.¹⁶ Rent controls have not been enforced. Landlords have been able to make arrangements on the side for higher rents in some areas, and the Viet-Cong have forced rents below the specified levels elsewhere.

As has been noted, the land problem in the Delta has been a powerful issue in the insurgency. The Viet-Cong fought the

¹⁶USOM Rural Affairs memorandum, "Summary Estimate of Land Tenure Status in South Vietnam" (Saigon, 15 June 1964). A report of land reform measures in South Vietnam is given by Wolf Ladejinsky "Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam," in Wesley Fishel, Problems of Freedom, op. cit., pp. 153-175.

milder government efforts at reform by urging and threatening the peasants to refuse to cooperate.

The Diem regime turned away from its emphasis on land reform as the insurgency intensified in 1960. Ironically, funds were diverted from land reform in order to finance stronger security programs. At the very moment that bolder land reform measures for popular support were needed, the regime chose stronger control programs instead.

Land development was an ambitious program for settling refugees and emigrants from densely populated regions on sparsely settled and underused land. Its relevance to pacification lay in Diem's strategy of placing a "human wall" of new settlements along the western border of the Highlands to obstruct communist infiltration. In previously insecure Delta areas the new settlers pushed Viet-Cong squatters off valuable rice land, denying the communists a valuable source of production.¹⁷ American opposition to the program on technical and administrative grounds delayed USOM participation for a time. No objection by the Americans to the strategic concept of spreading communities over a vast wilderness area was raised, but later, the difficulties of supplying and defending these isolated and loyal communities became very serious. An unexpected political problem was created by the resettlement through the expropriation of Highlander tribal lands for cultivation by the Vietnamese.

¹⁷ Interview with Milton J. Esman, former AID official, 1965.

Severe resentments between Highlander groups and the Vietnamese settlements undoubtedly served the propaganda interests of the Viet-Cong.

Excessive preoccupation with the many needs of the newly settled groups created a serious unbalance of government activity vis-a-vis the total population. It was estimated by USOM that the 2 per cent of the population thus resettled was getting 50 per cent of all agricultural aid.¹⁸ Further, the overwhelming predominance of Catholic and northern refugee settlers created resentments because of religious and regional favoritism.

Nation-building Via Political Mechanisms

Diem started with almost no control of elites or grass-roots political elements. His brother, Nhu, led the development of a political base for the regime in a manner that reflects the methods of communist mass organization whose goal is total immersion of the individual in its social policy by control of all social units. The organizations included divisions by age, sex, family, and vocation.

American advisors urged from the first that Diem encourage the various non-communist nationalist elements to express themselves politically, but the Ngo brothers suppressed and imprisoned their opposition instead of encouraging them. Key Americans

¹⁸Ibid.

asked for pressure from Washington against Diem's policy, but were refused by their superiors in Washington.¹⁹ Instead of moving towards democratic pluralism, even in a modest way, the Ngos imitated the totalitarian single party approach of communism.

National Revolutionary Movement. Beginning in 1956, a broadly based national party was formed, intended to include practically every voter. Never screened for communist influence, or well organized, the National Revolutionary Movement was largely a formal paper apparatus without elan or particular utility (except in Central Vietnam where Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Can, made it his instrument of control).

Can Lao. The heart of the mechanism for control of administrative and political elites was the secret Can Lao party. Patterned after the communist system, even using the term "comrade," it included every key civil servant and served as a spying agency on the behavior of all government officials. Donnell has pointed out that the Can Lao's role was to approve the program and personalistic philosophy of the Ngos, thus serving functionally in a "post-decisional" role.²⁰ It never contributed, but only executed and explained what the Palace had proposed.

¹⁹David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 158. This view is substantiated by interviews concerned with this period.

²⁰Donnell, Politics in South Vietnam, op. cit., p. 227.

Farmers associations. Although some 288 farmers associations at the local level were claimed by the Government on paper, USOM is reported to have maintained that only 35 were functioning as associations of farmers.²¹ Such paper formalities became a characteristic of the mass organizations and government operations as a whole in the countryside.²²

Republican Youth. In 1958, Nhu organized a younger alternative to the National Revolutionary Movement. By 1960, its emphasis had begun to be on paramilitary training and political intelligence activities.²³ The provincial civil administration was the party vehicle, and the Deputy Chief of Province for Security was nearly always the Republican Youth Director. Nhu saw his Republican Youth organization as the means of bringing "controlled liberty" to the countryside.²⁴ The accent was clearly more on control than on liberty.

Republican Youth and Madame Nhu's Woman's Solidarity Movement--its feminist counterpart--provided crowds, demonstrations, and other "spontaneous" activities needed to build the impression of popular support towards government policies. Whatever its intent, the mass organizations of the regime had the traits of rigid control from the top, wooden and formalistic activities, and inflated estimates of their size and influence.

²¹Ibid., p. 246.

²²Ibid., p. 257.

²³Ibid., p. 255.

²⁴Ibid., p. 271.

Elections. The Ngo apparatus delivered overwhelming majorities for Diem and his chosen candidates--in a pattern familiar to totalitarian governments. Patent manipulation of voters and voting records, and restriction of opposition candidates were standard practices. The increasing threat of communist influence in the elections justified precautionary screening of candidacies in some areas, but the Ngo strategy for survival included more than the defeat of communist insurgency. They sought to secure their own political position against all forms of political opposition.

In 1956, the regime took a giant step away from rapport with the countryside by changing elective village offices to positions appointed from above--only months after some areas had enjoyed the first local elections since the departure of the Viet-Minh. These earlier local political expressions had been both revolutionary and highly meaningful to the rural participants.²⁵ Apparently Diem felt that he needed tighter and more far reaching control from the top, and decided to appoint even the lowest level officials. It was a costly decision in terms of the need for rural support in the later insurgency.

The Ngo regime's attitude towards opposition elements had become particularly frustrating to intellectuals and other nationalists by 1956, when Diem had collected the reins of

²⁵Richard J. Evans, Field Service Officer for USQM, describes the impact of one such election held in 1955, in a report to USQM dated 22 July 1955. The voters had free choice and were deeply proud of their opportunity.

power and could have afforded overt opposition. Diem appeared to invite popular expression in the various elections, and such activity revealed a great popular interest in political participation. Donnell compares the government's response to this political expression with Mao's "hundred flowers" repression.²⁶ The stimulation, and subsequent frustration, of these political elements in the cities and the countryside discouraged genuine popular support of the regime's counterinsurgency objectives. Some authorities feel that Diem could have profitably and safely widened popular participation after he established his position in 1956, but that his failure confirmed the dictatorial character of the regime and the doubts of the intellectuals.²⁷ In the Hoa Hao areas some researchers found a correlation between government suppression of Hoa Hao political activity and rate of increase of Viet-Cong influence.²⁸

Military and Civil Defense Policies

American policy. After 1956, the approach of South Vietnam and the United States to the problem of defense against potential

²⁶Donnell, Politics in South Vietnam, op. cit., p. 369.

²⁷William Henderson in Richard W. Lindholm (ed.), Vietnam--The First Five Years (Michigan State University Press: Lansing, 1959), p. 343. See also, Scigliano, op. cit., pp. 98-100.

²⁸Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, My Thuan: A Mekong Delta Village in South Vietnam (Washington, D.C. Department of State, 1961), p. 37.

communist aggression had shifted radically from reliance on people-oriented Civic Action campaigns to preparation of a conventional army. Initially the White House apparently intended to duplicate the Magsaysay successes against the Huks through skilled anti-guerrilla forces.²⁹ President Eisenhower's personal emissary, General Lawton Collins, was reported to have planned for "a smaller but more reliable armed force chiefly designed to maintain internal security," with protection from "external aggression" supplied by SEATO nations.³⁰ Lt. General John W. O'Daniel, who headed the army advisory program for training, was quoted in the same month:

The army will be above all, according to American ideas on the subject, a police force capable of spotting communist guerrillas and communist efforts at infiltration.³¹

The results, however, were quite another story. Military Advisory Assistance Group commanders began to refer to the danger of mass invasion from the North. The Vietnamese army took on an appearance in its equipment, organization, and training much like American units of that period. Mechanization and elaborate command structures were instituted. Col. Amos A. Jordan has called this tendency "mirror-imaging" of the armed forces of

²⁹Wise and Ross, op. cit., p. 156.

³⁰Baltimore Sun, 1 February 1955, p. 1.

³¹New York Times, 13 February 1955, p. 1.

of the United States.³² While Vietnamese army units acquired conventional capability against invasion, the insurgency was steadily growing. Top American military advisors, however, tended to belittle the rising insurgent threat in public statements such as that of Major General Sam Myers in July, 1959: "The guerrillas were gradually nibbled away until they ceased to be a major menace to the Government."³³ The rising insurgency was not, in fact, considered serious until 1960 by American military or civilian officials.

With the establishment of comparative political stability in 1956, there was a movement in all fields of United States-Vietnamese relations towards conventional programs and traditional patterns of diplomatic involvement.³⁴ The continuing political problems were ignored in the absence of overt crisis. Relations were formalized, and advisors were cautioned against being too involved in the other country's affairs.³⁵ After Lansdale left, in 1956, American influence in the Palace began to fall in inverse proportion to Nhu's growing influence with Diem.³⁶ Nhu eventually

³²Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 50-51.

³³Quoted by Robert P. Martin, "U.S. Bungle in Vietnam: The Inside Story," U.S. News and World Report, 14 September 1964.

³⁴John Dallas Stempel, "Policy/Decision Making in the Department of State: The Vietnamese Problem 1961-1965," unpublished dissertation, (Berkeley: University of California, 1965), p. 98.

³⁵Interview with Source Number 45, USIA, 1965.

³⁶This is the consensus of Americans interviewed who were present during the period of change.

came into control of virtually every regular contact which Diem had with the situation of the country outside the Palace.

Armed Forces and Civil Defense Measures

At the beginning of the Diem regime, there was a sizable collection of various armed organizations from the earlier war, all more or less in disarray. These units have been traditionally classified into regular, regional (provincial), and popular (local village) forces. (For current force personnel levels see Figure 4).

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The regular army, in terms of its service in a guerrilla war, was improperly trained and equipped in the pre-emergency period. Its combat performance and other problems are well known through various journalistic writers.³⁷ Until 1962, regular troops had not been widely employed in systematic pacification, being reserved for major force engagements which rarely came. Even currently, their pacification role appears to be secondary, though increasing in priority.

The Civil Guard (Bao An). A direct descendant of the French Garde Civile, the Civil Guard is a provincially based force, organized and equipped along the lines of the regular forces. From 1957 through 1960, the Civil Guard was stymied

³⁷Intimate and generally accurate reporting on Vietnamese military operations are provided by David Halberstam, op. cit., Denis Warner, op. cit., and Malcolm W. Browne, The New Face of War (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

in its development, remaining as an ill-trained and poorly equipped regional organization caught between conflicting philosophies concerning its role in protecting the rural population.³⁸ The Michigan State University Group in Vietnam (MSUG) had, as a USOM contractor, agreed to train the Civil Guard as a lightly armed (up to submachine guns) constabulary, living as small units among the people to perform the police role in a traditional sense. Diem wanted a hard hitting mobile force (on wheels) that would be heavily armed and organized in larger units. The issue was basically whether the Civil Guard would function as rural police or military units. Michigan State advisors were not thinking of the counterinsurgency aspects, but of the need for an effective rural constabulary designed for a normal situation.³⁹

MSUG eventually withdrew from this role in 1959 and the USOM/Public Safety Division was directed to build a staff to take over the MSUG training role. USOM/Public Safety initiated an anti-guerrilla training school at Vung Tau in 1960, preparing several classes in special police techniques. However, it was decided in Washington to turn over the training and equipment role to the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in late 1960. Some elements in MAAG, and other even higher in the

³⁸The complicated controversy is discussed by John Montgomery, op. cit., pp. 64-70, and also in Robert Scigliano and Guy H. Fox, Technical Assistance in Vietnam: The Michigan State University Experience (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 10-17.

³⁹Interview with Ralph Turner, Michigan State University, 1965.

United States command, are reported to have deliberately obstructed USOM efforts to equip and supply the Civil Guard units at the Vung Tau center.⁴⁰

Popular Forces. The Self Defense Corps (Dan Ve) was an even lower level of local forces. Normally responsible solely for the defense of their own village, these black clad, lightly armed troops have been the first line of defense in the current conflict. Their number has varied upwards to around 140,000, with the inclusion, in 1964, of large blocks of the volunteer hamlet militia as full time popular force members. Earlier in the emergency, the Self Defense Corps was also part-time, and was paid by the Government for duty on a part-time basis. In some areas, these forces were supported by a Hamlet Volunteer Guard, consisting of all able bodied men between 18 and 50 years of age, who were armed with assortments of guns, knives, and sticks.⁴¹ The Self Defense Corps was elevated to military status and put on full pay in 1961 as a part of the United States Military Assistance Program. However, it is commanded by the local district chiefs. There are still large numbers of militia-men who have not yet been assimilated into the full pay status of popular forces. These are expected to serve as guards for

⁴⁰Interview with Source Number 4 (AID), 1965 and confirmed by Source Number 7 (Formerly Department of Defense), 1965.

⁴¹This data is taken from research conducted in 1958 in a Thua Thien province village by Nicholar Luykx in Some Comparative Aspects of Rural Public Institutions in Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, June 1962), pp. 682-686.

hamlet defense only.

Police. The role of the police in the early counterinsurgency programs was severely limited because of the controversy that led to the military takeover of what would have been a rural constabulary. In 1961, USOM/Public Safety and the National Police proposed an increase of National Police from 21,000 to 72,000 to meet the problem in rural areas. It was not until the fall of 1963 that the increase was approved by the United States.⁴²

Other Civil Defense measures. In 1959, as the insurgency grew, the Government issued Law No. 10/59, ordering the death penalty for acts of sabotage and other insurgent crimes, setting up military tribunals and "reeducation centers" to handle the cases.⁴³ There also was an acceleration of "denounce communists" campaigns beginning in 1959.

The regime organized inter-family groups (lien gia) within each hamlet in order to have tighter control over the rural areas, and to propagandize. A family member was put in charge and the group as a whole was made responsible for individual behavior. This was a precise imitation of Red Chinese and

⁴²Interview with Frank Walton, former Chief, USOM/Public Safety, Vietnam, 1965.

⁴³An English translation of Law 10/59 is available in Luther A. Allen and Pham Ngoc An, A Vietnamese District Chief in Action (Washington, D.C.: Agency for International Development, 1961), pp. 69-71.

Viet-Minh tactics.⁴⁴

As an upgrading of the French-instituted identification card system, the Michigan State police advisors arranged in 1958 for a less easily duplicable system through improved laminating machines. Insurgents had previously forged false cards with ease. The Michigan State University advisors also obtained Vietnamese action to convert to the superior Henry Method of fingerprint classification.⁴⁵

Relocation of Population

The relocation of population was an old technique for the Government in its land development and refugee resettlement programs. These two relocation efforts were both intended to fulfill a national revolutionary strategy and to provide a string of settlements in remote areas to deterr Viet-Cong invasion or infiltration. Later relocation programs, while still concerned with revolutionary development, were more heavily oriented towards improved control of the population.

By February 1959, relocation of families within communities had begun and, in contrast to the land development and refugee activities, these relocations were often forced. The earliest form of relocation was into "rural agglomerations" of two types: 1) qui khu for Viet-Cong related families, and 2) qui ap for

⁴⁴Donnell, Politics in South Vietnam, op. cit., p. 294.

⁴⁵Interview with Ralph Turner, Michigan State University, 1965.

loyal families in indefensible areas. The program was apparently a "bare-bones" military effort, devoid of economic or social consideration.⁴⁶ Both regroupings elicited negative reactions from those families relocated.

In April of 1959, more sophisticated relocations were planned as a part of a "strategic route system"--key highways protected by rural towns, called agrovilles (khu tru mat). These agrovilles were to be social and economic centers. About eighty were planned, with smaller agro-hamlets (ap tru mat) as satellites. The relocated families would labor to construct defenses, homes, schools, and dispensaries in a spirit of self-help. Able cadres for administrative posts would be trained, and public land sources would be developed (such as fruit trees and fish ponds) for community fund resources. Finally an active youth movement would be organized.⁴⁷

In 1961 the program was discontinued after twenty-three agrovilles had been started. The application of the plan made enormous demands on the peasants involved: corvee labor well beyond the ten day assessment, and long commuting distances to their fields, which were often inadequate in size and soil quality. The Viet-Cong peppered the agrovilles with propaganda relevant to peasant resentments.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Joseph Zasloff, Rural Resettlement in Vietnam: An Agrovillage in Development (Washington, D.C.: Agency for International Development, n.d.), p. 9.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

⁴⁸ Donnell, Politics in South Vietnam, op. cit., p. 188.

The smaller 100 family agro-hamlet was located more closely to lands tilled by the occupants. Construction was carried out at a slower pace fitted to the peasant's planting and harvesting schedule. By the end of 1961, the agro-hamlet had become the prototype of a vast civil defense scheme known as strategic hamlets Ap Chien Luoc. (To be discussed in the next chapter).

Summary of Early Efforts

Despite auspicious beginnings, by 1956 the Ngo regime had begun to destroy the confidence of key elites by autocratic behavior. Instead of building his good will by increasing popular political participation after consolidating his power, Diem continued the repressive measures of a typical police state, talking all the while of revolution and democracy. As Diem tried to tighten his control, the American mission diluted its influence over the regime by a return to conventional bi-national relationships. The peasantry and the urban political elites were at the mercy of the regime and had no power source to challenge Diem, except the Viet-Cong insurgency.

The insurgency heightened, and the governmental structure became the prime target in rural communities. Diem multiplied his demands on administrators and peasants alike for drastic programs in resettlement and relocation. The official Americans stood by, remote from the grassroots struggle of these two strikingly similar totalitarian systems each trying to destroy the other

and impose its own revolution on the Southern peasant.

After 1958, initiative and influence in rural areas shifted steadily to the communists, with the extreme counterinsurgent programs possibly accelerating the insurgent growth through the government's irritation of the peasantry. As United States policymakers were belatedly awakening to the crisis, the Ngo regime was concocting a coup de grace for the insurgency that it hoped would also be the coup d' eclat towards realizing the Personalist revolution. This was the immodest intent of the strategic hamlet program, which was the first truly nationwide pacification campaign against the insurgency.

The American failure to grasp the insurgency problem. It is widely understood that official Americans misread the nature and extent of the insurgent threat between 1956-1960. It is less clear as to why the misreading occurred. There are several possibilities. American officials had little contact with the peasants and lower officials who were in daily touch with the insurgency problem. The two key problems of the regime, the insurgency and its own internal administrative political malfunctions in the rural areas, were far from the Americans, who were concentrated in the cities.

Most American officials had little training or experience with revolutionary warfare. Most of the highly competent military and civilian advisors in Vietnam during this period were examining events and proposing programs in terms of their

previous experience with conventional programs of economic and social development and defense. As in many other historical situations, preparations for a future war were based on the requirements of the preceding conflict (i.e. Korea). Finally, as noted, American policy from Washington after 1956 discouraged the intimate involvement with Vietnamese political problems necessary for adequate analysis of the Viet-Cong threat.

CHAPTER V

NATIONAL PACIFICATION STRATEGIES 1962-1965

I. THE GROWING AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT

By 1960, American advisors had begun to respond to the insurgent threat. MAAG commander Lt. General Lionel McGarr had helped the Vietnamese Army to create sixty Vietnamese ranger companies geared to anti-guerrilla operations. The first plan for organized, "team" pacification was prepared by MAAG in late 1960. The plan was not immediately implemented, although, after many revisions, it served as the basis for later strategy.¹ The crisis was further complicated by the attempted coup of November, 1960. Diem had managed to bring in loyal forces to rescue him from siege of his Palace by paratroopers. Although the coup failed, it revealed the dissatisfaction with Diem's conduct of the war and his suppression of political activity.

Edward G. Lansdale (by then a general) was sent by the White House to study the situation. His pessimistic report was followed by formation of the inter-agency Vietnam Task Force in Washington. It operated under the aegis of the State Department, but included key personnel from the Defense Department, AID, USIA, and CIA. Plans were initiated to escalate the

¹Interview with Source Number 46, Defense Department, 1965.

American contribution in Vietnam. Two study missions to Vietnam in 1961 were led by Eugene Staley and General Maxwell Taylor.²

In sum, the studies called for: political and administrative reform, new economic programs for rural areas, greatly increased United States advisory and supply efforts, a larger and more effective Vietnamese army, and other armed elements. Diem successfully ignored American pressure for more popular political participation, and the United States began sending the increased aid without the strings of political reform. The United States Special Forces were already engaged in an early form of pacification among highland tribes by early 1961. But the MAAG advisors did not operate below the division level until 1962, and thus had tended to be remote from the village security problems.³ MAAG was doubled in 1960, and further increased from 685 to 10,000 by the end of 1962, when teams of advisors were assigned to provincial (sector) headquarters throughout the country.

USOM enlarged its apparatus in preparation for pacification operations to be managed primarily at the province level. The Division of Rural Affairs was created in the Spring of 1962, and was changed to the Office of Rural Affairs in June.⁴ Rufus Phillips,

²Stempel, op. cit., pp. 121-122, gives a comprehensive version of the contents of the Taylor study. A report on the eleven point proposals of the Staley Mission is in the New York Times, 5 January 1962, p. 1.

³Interview with Source Number 7, formerly Defense Department, 1965.

⁴Interview with Source Number 5, formerly AID, 1965.

a former Lansdale aide, was appointed Assistant Director in charge. Recruiting began for USOM province representatives for field work in close cooperation with the forty province chiefs and MAAG Sector Advisors functioning as provincial committees for rural rehabilitation.

II. SOURCES OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET CONCEPT

As noted earlier the practice of fortifying villages was a tradition in North Vietnam. It was natural that, as the Viet-Cong rural threat developed, innovations of this nature would be attempted in various provinces. Perhaps the first effort of this nature under Diem was by Col. Khanh, the province chief of Ninh Thuan, in 1960. He had been an officer in the army under the French when they tried to fortify villages in the northern Red River Delta.⁵ Col. Khanh organized several villages for self-defense, including armed volunteer militia and fences. In the refugee village of Trung Hoa, Darlac province, the Catholic priest had led in the construction of defenses and had asked in May, 1961 for thirty shotguns to help defend the village from Viet-Cong incursions. Later Ngo Dinh Nhu is said to have stated that Trung Hoa was among Vietnam's first "strategic hamlets."⁶

The previously described agrovillage program had been tried several places in the Delta and was undergoing considerable

⁵Interview with Rufus Phillips, formerly AID, 1966.

⁶Interview with Thomas Luche, AID, 1966.

revision, because of many complaints from officials and peasants, and a perpetual propaganda barrage from the Viet-Cong. In July, 1961 Vinh Long became the scene of the first three completed "strategic hamlets."⁷ Many were also established in Quang Ngai province shortly thereafter, and the universal stress was on the isolation of the insurgents from the population and winning the loyalty of the villagers through increased government services and civil defense organizations.⁸

Vietnamese officials had long been acquainted with the Malayan program, and Diem eventually invited Sir Robert Thompson, former Defense Minister in Malaya, to advise him. Thompson arrived in September, 1961, assisted by several British experts with experience in Malaya. The mission was terminated in the fall of 1965, when Thompson returned to Britain.

During the height of the experimental period (the last half of 1961), broad economic and social programs were under discussion by Vietnamese officials and members of the Staley Mission--including problems surrounding the agrovilles and how the resettlement might be improved.

Although there was a variety of sources for the strategic hamlet concept, the point of their convergence into a single

⁷Vietnam Press, 30 July 1961, as reported in Milton E. Osborne, Strategic Hamlets in South Vietnam: A Survey and Comparison, Data Paper Number 55, Southeast Asian Program, Department of Asian Studies, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, April, 1965), p. 25.

⁸Ibid.

plan was Ngo Dinh Nhu. He was given credit for the program by the Government which called him "architect and prime mover."⁹ Nhu created the conceptual framework for the plan and set its pace for completion.

III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM:

"TOTAL REVOLUTION"

Ngo Dinh Nhu's Personalist Revolution

By the time the nationwide strategic hamlet program was announced in March, 1962, Nhu had worked out a rationale for the campaign drawn from his personalist philosophy. For the Ngos, at least, the strategic hamlet program was to be the vehicle of total revolution for the entire nation--rural and urban. The war had created, Nhu thought, the occasion which demanded a Herculean effort of people both to defend themselves and bring about a revolutionary change for "democracy and development" at the grassroots.¹⁰

Nhu saw his plan as a new pattern for self-sufficient development appropriate to emerging countries. In an interview he said:

My ambition is that the fortified hamlets may thus form a new approach to the saving of civilization. It is better than the Indian system of trying to get progress as a gift of the capitalist societies.¹¹

⁹Republic of Vietnam, Vietnam's Strategic Hamlets (Saigon: Directorate General of Information, February, 1963), p. 5.

¹⁰Speech by Ngo Dinh Nhu, Ibid., p. 20.

¹¹Interview by Charles Stevenson, Washington Editor of Reader's Digest, March, 1962.

This total revolution would have several facets: military, political, economic, and social.

Military revolution. Nhu argued that the communist advantage in fighting a "frontless war" would be eliminated by making every hamlet perimeter a defended "front" against the insurgents.¹² He criticized the conventional equipment and training of the Vietnamese army as inappropriate to the present conflict. The new government defense strategy would have a "bi-polar organizational base," involving 1) "popular guerrilla action" by hamlet people (backed up by Civil Guard and Self Defense Forces), and 2) "Special Ranger Forces," which would fight in areas controlled by the enemy.¹³ One of the initial six points for creation of the hamlet included establishment of a "stay-behind" cell of hamlet guerrillas to harrass the attacking Viet-Cong force if the militia had been forced to withdraw and leave the hamlet open to the Viet-Cong.

The Personalist stress on self-sufficiency is seen in Nhu's naively ambitious policy for arming the hamlets by imitating the Viet-Cong technique:

The Government of Vietnam will lend weapons to the hamlets for six months. Paramilitary forces will have to count on arming themselves by takin weapons from the enemy. The Government will supply ammunition.¹⁴

¹²Vietnam's Strategic Hamlets, op. cit., p. 6.

¹³"The Strategic Hamlet and Military Policy," Times of Vietnam Magazine, Vol. IV No. 43, 28 October 1962, p. 20.

¹⁴Vietnam's Strategic Hamlets, op. cit., p. 10. (emphasis added).

Political revolution. As a step towards democracy, the strategic hamlet was to have an elected administrative committee and new village by-laws to serve as a "legal framework for democracy (for example, there would be no arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. . . and equal rights and duties for all villagers)." ¹⁵

Self-sufficiency was invoked as the approach to finance, with the committee members getting no salary and having to "exploit public and private estates" for costs of administration. ¹⁶ There was a dramatic move to emphasize the hamlet (ap) level for organization and defense in place of the village mechanism (xa). But the Government avoided legalizing hamlet taxation which the village level had always enjoyed.

Nhu believed that the Personalist "middle way" between western democracy and dictatorship, "liberalization" and "centralization" was ideal for the Vietnamese situation. The strategic hamlet program was intended to unite these two opposite forces of democracy and dictatorship into a creative synthesis. Some of the finer print in the "how to" sections of achieving political revolution implies a rather unfortunate blend of the two, from the democratic point of view. The following example is official advice from the Government of Vietnam to cadres on holding a "free" hamlet election:

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

¹⁶ Ibid.

If the district chief is prudent enough the inhabitants will elect the persons selected by him. This type of election is very advantageous in the psychological field. Since these people will be different from the persons designated by the district chief (as in the case of the former village councils), those who are elected will not be influenced by the district chief to be dictatorial towards the inhabitants. . . .¹⁷

This confused counsel is typical of Nhu's internally contradictory personalist system, in which central authority was to insure proper choice in the village while, on the other hand, free popular will was to be expressed at the same time.

Economic revolution. A bonanza of economic development was planned for strategic hamlets--involving improved agriculture, village industries, schools, health facilities, and self-help projects, the last freely chosen and built by the villagers. Most of these economic programs were to be backed by USOM.

Social revolution. The strategic hamlet would also reshape the social order of the community, putting the anti-communist combatants and other Government supporters at the top. No longer would the hamlets be "ruled by the law of the powerful and the rich, but by a new system of values based on the contribution of each to the common struggle."¹⁸ Also

¹⁷From an anonymous Vietnamese government (emphasis added) document translated and reproduced in "USOM Province Representatives Guide" (Saigon: United States Operations Mission to Vietnam, December, 1962), p. 40. (Mimeographed.)

¹⁸Vietnam's Strategic Hamlets, op. cit., p. 19.

another national social goal would be the uniting of Highlanders and lowland Vietnamese in a synthesis, stressing their allegedly common racial source.¹⁹

The lofty, if sometimes fuzzy, philosophical concepts described above were not successfully communicated to the Vietnamese peasant. His more pedestrian perspective of the strategic hamlet program was mostly concerned with what it would provide himself and his family in the way of protection and a better life and how much he would have to pay for it.

An American Concept of Strategic Hamlets

The strategic hamlet program was well on its way by the fall of 1962, when American civilian and military personnel were operating throughout most of the provinces. The various strategic hamlet activities, involving relocation, militia training, construction of physical defenses, civil defense organization, and economic projects, enjoyed general concurrence among United States and Vietnamese officials. The idea of revolution as a motivating factor in securing popular support had been stressed by AID officials in training their representatives for field activity.²⁰ The basic strategy of isolating

¹⁹Gene Gregory, "The Strategic Hamlet in the Perspective of Vietnamese History," Times of Vietnam Magazine, Vol. IV No. 43, (28 October 1962), p. 13.

²⁰The writer attended various USOM sessions in which genuine hamlet political and social reform were stressed as vital aspects of the program.

the Viet-Cong from his contacts in the hamlets and winning village support through relatively just and effective government programs was emphasized by Vietnamese and Americans alike.

However, there were significant divergences of view, which became apparent as the program unfolded. Vietnamese and Americans often meant different things when saying the same words. When the objectives were identical the means of carrying them out often varied. It was clear that Vietnamese and Americans sharply differed on the relation of the peasant to the program and particularly his participation in it. The regime was trying to articulate a revolution in terms of what it believed was necessary and proper for the Vietnamese people. The official statements (cited earlier in this chapter) about the need for "democracy and development" were quite familiar to the western-educated elite at the top of the Vietnamese bureaucracy. But there is little evidence of concern about the peasant's interests and probable response to the program.

In contrast, the USOM Office of Rural Affairs had given a great deal of attention to assessing peasant motivations and reactions concerning the strategic hamlet program. This perspective was expressed in an analysis prepared by the Office of Rural Affairs in the summer of 1963, two years after the strategic hamlet program had been informally begun by the Vietnamese.²¹

²¹USOM Office of Rural Affairs, Notes on Strategic Hamlets (Saigon: 15 August 1963).

The study examines the basic desires of the peasant and the means of satisfying his wants in ways normal to his tradition.

These desires are:

A reasonable degree of safety; a reasonable livelihood; a reasonable amount of elementary justice; a reasonable chance for his children; a reasonable degree of status in his community; . . . and a reasonable degree of opportunity.²²

It is with such popular desires in mind that the officials must carry on the hamlet program, not allowing form to supplant substance, carefully keeping in mind the expressed needs of the peasant, and asking his help, but not requiring more than he can give without serious personal deprivation. In response to these peasant motivations, the report maintains that the first task in the strategic hamlet is to offer the peasant: "1) reasonable satisfaction of his wants; 2) organization and facilities for self-defense; and 3) motivation to defend himself and his community." The second task is "to teach, through experience, the practices and processes, the requirements and rewards, of self-government." The final objective is "establishment of a stable, prosperous, self-governing nation, offering adequate and equal opportunity, under law, to all its loyal citizens."²³

The objectives of Nhu for a personalist synthesis of "liberalism and centralism" were a long way from this American:

²²Ibid., p. 6.

²³Ibid., p. 15.

proposal, although the words were often identical. An indictment of both the Ngo regime and the Viet-Cong is implied in this comment from Notes:

If the practices, the ideals, the strengths and weaknesses of democracy are well learned in the strategic hamlets, no oppressive or alien government can long endure in Vietnam--neither can an insurgency inspired by an alien ideology and officered by its dupes.²⁴

Another theme of the study is an effort to define a strategic hamlet beyond the obvious visual attributes of fences, weapons, and propaganda signs.

The essential, unique attribute of the true strategic hamlet is the commitment of the majority of its residents to resisting the communist guerrilla, the Viet-Cong (or to supporting the government, the other side of the same coin). This commitment is essentially a state of mind to be fostered and strengthened, to be reinforced by every physical and psychological means²⁵

The study repudiates the view that a police-like control of the population is the program's primary purpose. Control within the hamlet should be implemented by the people themselves. This approach would be based on the ability of the hamlet, through use of its tightly knit social structure, to police itself if the majority wills to do so. Such internal control must be coupled with arms and defenses that make it

²⁴Ibid., p. 13-14. It is possible that Nhu himself could have endorsed this very quotation, without accepting its relevance to the Ngo regime, for he and Diem clearly felt that the regime was neither oppressive nor alien to the people. (Emphasis added).

²⁵Ibid., p. 3. (Emphasis added).

possible for a willing citizenry to protect itself from intimidation and attacks by Viet-Cong forces coming from outside the hamlet.

USOM Public Safety officials held that effective resources control required much greater professional police activity in rural areas.²⁶ Resources control problems will be further discussed in Chapter VIII.

Differences in concept between the Ngo regime and USOM Rural Affairs did not affect American support of the strategic hamlet program. All American agencies continued to be fully involved in the campaign.

IV. THE EVOLUTION OF PACIFICATION

PROGRAMS: 1962-1965

The Strategic Hamlets (Ap Chien Luoc) 1962-1965

In mid-1961, the strategic hamlet program had been started (although not yet announced) by Ngo Dinh Nhu. He moved in advance and independently of American planners, including the members of the Staley mission who were discussing plans for rural rehabilitation at that time. Nhu's strong dislike for Americans may have made him more committed than ever

²⁶Interview with Frank Walton, former chief, USOM Public Safety, 1965.

to the personalist principle of self-sufficiency.²⁷

In September 1962, the United States tried to speed up American assistance to the rapidly moving program through direct dollar purchase of \$10,000,000 worth of Vietnamese piasters, enabling immediate release of funds to urgent projects instead of the long delay associated with usual USOM counterpart financing.

However, the rate of activity in the earlier Vietnamese program--planned and executed without USOM assistance--was so great that one-third of the population of 15,000,000 was reported as already in 3,235 "completed"²⁸ hamlets by September, 1962, when the United States funds were becoming available. (See Figure 3). Another third of the population was scheduled to be in completed hamlets by the end of December, 1962.²⁹ In fact, however, the two-thirds goal was not reached until the next summer. The total goal was inclusion of all 12,000 of Vietnam's hamlets as a part of the system. The limited value of statistics in the Diem period will be discussed later.

By not waiting for funds, materials, and specially trained cadres, the full burden of the program fell on the

²⁷Nhu had expressed his willingness to carry out the revolution without foreign aid in the interview with Charles Stevenson, op. cit.

²⁸The criteria for a "completed" strategic hamlet were: 1) census and elimination of Viet-Cong infrastructure; 2) organization of civic groups; 3) organization of civil defense system; 4) completed physical defenses; 5) organization of secret guerrilla cells; 6) hamlet committee elected by secret ballot.

²⁹Times of Vietnam Magazine, op. cit., p. 22.

Strategic and New Life Hamlet Programs

Date	Hamlets completed/ constructed	Hamlets under construction	Population in New Life Hamlets
September 1962	3,235	2,217	34%
November 1963*	8,544	1,051	85%
April 1964**	6,562	782	55%
May 1964***	4,207	n/a	n/a
December 1965	3,800	n/a	n/a

* Inflated data under Nhu program.

** Last revision under strategic hamlet criteria.

*** Re-revision under New Life Hamlet criteria.

n/a - Not available.

Sources: 1962: Times of Vietnam, October 28, 1962; 1963-1964; USOM/Rural Affairs Memorandum, 1 July 1964; 1965: Robert Shaplen, "Letter from Vietnam" New Yorker (12 March 1966).

Figure 3. Comparative statistics on "Constructed" vs. "Completed" hamlets.

peasants and regular civil servants, whose other duties inevitably suffered. The pace of completion, and the even more impossible schedules announced but not made, created an air of unreality in the early process, which carried over into the later period of construction (1963) when materials, money, and cadres were available.

Some activities in the strategic hamlet program were financed by Vietnamese funds and others through agreements made by the Vietnamese with USOM or the Military Assistance Program (MAP) of MACV.³⁰

By the summer of 1963, when the Buddhist crisis paralyzed much of the nation's administrative and military apparatus, most of the province programs had been staffed and were operating at full strength. The fall of the Ngo regime was accompanied by a complete collapse of the pacification efforts in many areas, and vast regions that had been under government control quickly came under the influence of the Viet-Cong.

In the months prior to the coup, USOM Rural Affairs officials had grown quite concerned about the reports from their Delta field representatives that the hamlet campaign was not being thoroughly executed or correctly reported to the Vietnamese Government. Reports from USOM and MAAG provincial advisors often arrived in Saigon with opposing conclusions. President

³⁰ See Appendix B for pacification activities funded in a typical USOM release agreement with the Government of Vietnam.

Kennedy received the report of the McNamara-Taylor visit of late September which led to the announcement on October 3, that most of the military advisory effort would be completed by 1965, and that 1,000 advisors would be home for Christmas, 1963. Rufus Phillips had made a personal report to the President earlier in September, giving the estimate of USOM Rural Affairs that the Delta was falling under Viet-Cong control in areas where pacification was supposedly complete.³¹

The strategic hamlet program was, in fact, overextended and falsely reported as completed. Subsequent chapters will deal with this subject.

The New Life Hamlets (Ap Tan Sinh) 1964-1965

The Viet-Cong struck like lightning in the rural areas amidst the military and political disarray of the post-coup period. Some ARVN corps headquarters produced pacification programs of their own while Saigon shuffled its leadership.³² By January, the pacification program had been renamed "New Life Hamlets," stressing rural reconstruction. New criteria were set for judging a hamlet as completed, and safeguards against forced relocation, widespread in the previous program, were

³¹The writer was involved first hand in the USOM-MACV drama that preceded the coup. A readable account of the situation is given by Halberstam, op. cit., pp. 253-254. For a description of the Viet-Cong penetration in the Delta, see his Chapter XVIII.

³²See Chapter VII for a description of the Rural Restoration Campaign in the I Corps area after the November revolution.

instituted.³³

During early 1964, enormous planning exercises for new pacification programs in all fields of government were carried out, involving many months of delay caused by red tape and repeated political eruptions. Great increases in MACV, USOM, and USIS personnel in 1964 and 1965 added to the American presence but did not appear materially to improve the generally stagnated pacification program (see Figure 4). These efforts were also hampered by lack of coordination with regular military forces. Meanwhile, the Viet-Cong steadily increased their military and political position, both from internal recruiting and North Vietnamese infiltration. The advent of American combat forces in March, 1965 marked a new phase in pacification, with the assignment of the Marines in Danang to the responsibility for a special pacification zone around the city and the adjacent province of Quang Nam.

Rural Construction: 1966

The reappointment in July, 1965, of Henry Cabot Lodge as Ambassador, and his choice of Major General Lansdale as his special liaison officer for counterinsurgency matters, marked a

³³The six criteria for a completed New Life Hamlet are: 1) elimination of Viet-Cong infra-structure; 2) trained and armed militia; 3) physical defenses completed; 4) communications systems for requesting reinforcement set up; 5) organization of community for civil defense and social development activities; 6) free election of hamlet committee by secret ballot.

Allied Armed Forces in South Vietnam*

	<u>TOTAL</u>
Republic of Vietnam	635,000
Regular Forces	300,000
Regional Forces	120,000
Popular Forces	140,000
Civilian Irregular Defense Groups**	25,000
National Police	50,000
United States of America	170,000
Republic of Korea	21,000
Australia	1,500

*All amounts based on data as of December 1965, from United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Vietnam Conflict: The Substance and the Shadow, 89th Congress 2nd Session (January 6, 1966).

** Many more irregulars are in other armed militia units.

American Advisors in Vietnam*

Military Assistance Command (MACV)	8,500
United States Operations Mission (AID)	800
Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (incl. USIS)	150

* Data as of the first quarter of 1966, supplied in interviews with Defense Department, Agency for International Development, and United States Information Agency (1966).

Figure 4

Allied Armed Forces and Advisors in Vietnam.

watershed in pacification emphasis. Although the programs which Lansdale has encouraged have yet to be put in full operation, cautiously favorable reports on the new emphases in the recruitment and training of Rural Construction teams indicate an adjustment to avoid some of the shortcomings of previous pacification efforts. Teams are recruited and trained in an atmosphere of close identification with the peasant and his problems. Pacification scheduling has been drastically decelerated with 1966 goals set to cover only fourteen per cent of the population.³⁴ Unrealistic schedules, as noted previously, have been a nemesis of earlier programs.

The pacification strategy devised by the end of 1965 included choosing of four province areas as foci of intensive pacification efforts, using the full resources of Vietnamese and American agencies and armed forces. The four areas selected are: 1) Danang--the area encompassed in the perimeter defended by American Marines, reaching out from the air base into Quang Nam Province in a ten mile radius, 2) Binh Dinh--Quinhon and surrounding districts, defended by Korean forces, 3) Saigon--the multi-province pacification program called HOP TAC, underway since 1964, and 4) An Giang Province--a relatively peaceful delta area suitable for economic and social projects.³⁵

³⁴An accurate description of the current pacification emphasis was made by Charles Mohr, "To Win the People to Win the War," New York Times, 13 February 1966, p. 4E.

³⁵Interview with Source Number 50, State Department, 1966.

V. ANCILLARY PACIFICATION PROGRAMS

Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG)

The United States Army Special Forces teams have conducted pacification efforts among Highlanders in Central Vietnam and in extremely difficult areas of the Mekong Delta. Beginning with the Rhade tribe around Ban Me Thuot in Darlac Province in early 1961, American "A" teams of a dozen specially trained men joined Vietnamese Special Forces counterparts in training and equipping young men from Rhade villages.³⁶ After six weeks of instruction the well-armed young men are returned to defend their hamlets and report movements of Viet-Cong.

By 1965, scores of "A" teams were at work in Vietnam, relying on "strike forces" of around 200 men assisting in operations to reach new villages for inclusion within the protection system. The American and Vietnamese team members live and eat with the tribesmen and the Americans have generally developed close relations with them. The Vietnamese have remained suspicious of Highlanders and have been reluctant to see them armed. Comprehensive civic action projects are carried out in the hamlets, including medical care, construction projects, and education. More than 25,000 tribesmen have been armed under the program, but the vast area of the Highlands and the movement of large units of Viet-Cong and North Vietnamese troops have reduced the

³⁶ An intimate early report of United States Special Forces in Darlac province is given in the New York Times, 29 April 1961, p. 1.

effectiveness of the effort.

A costly failing in the assembling of strike forces has been the recruiting of Vietnamese in the lowlands and then moving them far from their homes to the jungles. There have been many instances of desertion and betrayal as a result:

Force Populaire (Luc Luong Nhan-Dan)³⁷

Ngo Dinh Can, the youngest of the Ngo brothers, had developed an alternative program of pacification for his own area of control, which was Central Vietnam. Can's background and viewpoint were much closer to the peasant than any of his brothers, and in direct contrast to the French-educated Nhu. His tightly run section of the National Revolutionary Movement was an important arm of control in the villages, particularly in the provinces nearest his home in Hue. From within this political organization Can fashioned a force of highly motivated and well trained peasant teams who moved unobtrusively into the countryside to live and work with the peasant much as the Viet-Cong does. Although armed, they would not attack the Viet-Cong unless they threatened the peasants. Their intent was to build confidence in the peasant that they would be around a long time.

Selection of trainees was carefully made. Can insisted that all be volunteers and peasants. Members of the National

³⁷Data for this section was secured in an interview with John Helble, former United States Consul at Hue, and from occasional contacts with Force Populaire operations in Quang Tin and Quang Nam provinces in 1963.

Revolutionary Movement--Diem's mass party--were not considered "hard-nosed" enough--too decadent. Many recruits were sons of parents who had suffered at the hands of the Viet-Cong.

Force Populaire members helped peasants at their normal chores of harvesting, woodcutting, weaving conical hats, cutting hair, etc. They always paid their board so as not to be a burden. They operated in company size, fanning out in a village of perhaps 4,000 people.

Training the Force Populaire was arduous and focussed on the development of esprit. Political activity was the major emphasis. Full and free discussion and self-criticism were a part of training. Instructors carefully engineered the absorption "in depth" of the instruction and the spirit of the program.

The pilot program was started in Thua Thien province (location of the city of Hue). Later cadres from the seventeen Central provinces were trained and prepared to open training centers in their own provinces. By the time of the death of Diem most of these province programs were operational. The early successes had encouraged Diem and even the strategic hamlet-minded Nhu. Diem ordered the expansion of the program into the Delta. Some cadres for the Delta had been trained when the Diem regime was toppled. As a program for use in contested areas, it gave great encouragement. There had been a dilution of effectiveness when the province training centers began turning out their own units. In sum, however, the brief life of the Force

Populaire stands as one of the best conceived and implemented programs attempted in Vietnam. In essence, it was an effective expression of the Government's interest in the life of the peasant, and could have provided a viable alternative to his subjection to Viet-Cong terror. Although Can had hoped to substitute the Force Populaire for the Strategic Hamlet Campaign, he was forced by Diem to maintain the latter. However, proper correlation of the two programs, with the Force Populaire serving as the spearhead in contested areas, might have achieved a highly successful result. The acquisition of intelligence in the early stages of pacification--leading to identification of the Viet-Cong supporters--is a delicate operation and requires the penetration of the outward "mask" of the village. This was the main approach of the Force Populaire.

Some of the Force Populaire methods are discernible in the current Political Action Teams that are part of the 1966 pacification plan. The Force Populaire, however, had a subtlety of approach--a "soft sell" which made it unique. When the Ngo regime fell in 1963, Can was imprisoned and eventually executed. His political organization vanished and the Force Populaire disappeared as quickly and quietly as it had begun.

VI. SUMMARY COMMENT

The failure of national pacification campaigns will be probed in subsequent chapters, but it is appropriate at this point to examine the problem briefly from a broad perspective.

The methodology of the Ngo regime in pacification was, as has been implied, almost identical in concept to that of Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-Tung. However, when the strategic hamlet program was launched, no apparatus comparable to the highly skilled and motivated communist rural cadre system yet existed. Instead, Nhu had accepted the network of mass organizations and the governmental bureaucracy as the "revolutionary vanguard." Nhu, in fact, made an irrational leap from his personalist philosophy to the creation of a hamlet level revolution without the benefit of a revolutionary apparatus. It would appear that he was more concerned with the idea of a grassroots personalist revolution than its realization. His subordinates accommodated him by reporting the progress he wanted to hear.

In addition to overestimating the capacity of his political and administrative networks to produce revolution, Nhu made a second costly departure from reality. He overestimated the will of the peasant to shoulder the substantial burdens required in his "self-sufficient" hamlet construction policy. In contrast with communist tactics, which are usually closely geared to the interests and tolerances of the peasant and the capabilities of its party cadres, the pacification

policy of the Ngos reflects the isolation of the regime from its own bureaucracy.

Subsequent governments, attempting pacification with even less political control or consensus, and with multiplied communist forces in opposition, have fared even worse.

Since 1956, the American involvement has been conceptually clouded. First the threat from the North was misdefined; then the insurgent threat was underestimated; and, finally, the solution was sought in terms of an uncoordinated proliferation of government programs to aid the peasants without the essential ingredient of protection from the Viet-Cong. The more fundamental question of the adequacy of the counterinsurgent government at the center was bypassed by Americans in favor of finding means of establishing its image and power at the grassroots. As Stempel notes, the United States was busily asking what to do to help Diem without pausing to ask whether he should be helped at all.³⁸ The parameters of analysis had been set to avoid this question, because no adequate alternative to Diem had been found or even conceived.

As a consequence, much of the United States involvement in pacification had been at the level of projects and programs--amounting usually to a superficial solution. These activities may resemble treatment of the symptoms of governmental

³⁸Stempel, op. cit., p. 120.

malignancy rather than the disease itself. For the student of revolutionary warfare, however, a healthy political and administrative context for a government's pacification campaign is a necessity.

PART III

PROVINCE PACIFICATION: 1962-1965

SYNOPSIS

In Part III pacification is examined in depth at the province level, including the province administrative context, the bi-national pacification apparatus, and the agreements, procedures, resources, and funding involved. The role of United States advisors and representatives is analyzed.

After a description in Chapter VII of the elements involved in the pacification effort as a whole, subsequent chapters are devoted to province-level analysis of national programs and locally initiated innovations in the special fields of security, administrative improvement and political-psychological warfare, and economic, social, and community development programs.

CHAPTER VI

THE PROVINCIAL PACIFICATION SYSTEM

I. PROVINCIAL POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT

The diversity and distinctiveness of the regions and peoples of Vietnam were counterbalanced by what used to be a highly centralized governmental system. The forty-three province governments are entirely dependent for their authority on the central government in Saigon. Since the fall of Diem, the four Army Corps commanders have exerted considerable influence over civil as well as military activities in their areas.

The Vietnamese provinces vary in population from less than 20,000 to more than 800,000. Each province (tinh) is comprised of from two to eleven districts (quan), which are made up of villages (xa). For pacification purposes the village has been further subdivided into hamlets (ap), which have no legal status as a tier of government. In some cases the village coincides with the traditional Vietnamese community (described as a village in Chapter II). In other situations a hamlet may be the traditional community. The French and the Diem regime occasionally lumped traditional villages into larger units for administrative convenience. In every case, however, the administrative and legal entity is the village, and therefore the focus of the peasant's relation to his government. In some areas, particularly

in the Delta, there is an intermediate layer of organization, called canton, between the district and the village.

The province could be compared, in American terms, to a county or small state, although the relationships of control from the central government are quite different. For purposes of more concrete description, the large central lowland province of Quang Nam will be examined in some detail.¹

Quang Nam Province. The Thu Bon river valley in which most of the population of Quang Nam lives, is typical of the densely populated rivers in the narrow strip of lowlands along the coast of Central Vietnam. Settled nearly 500 years ago by Vietnamese, its strong village tradition is similar to the ancient Red River Delta area in the North.²

Quang Nam's population of 578,000 dwells in 525 hamlet communities organized into 120 villages that comprise nine

¹The pacification program in Quang Nam will be presented as a whole in Chapter VII. The writer was USOM Province Representative there from December, 1962 through August, 1964. Ironically, the name of the province is translated "Pacified South."

²Three studies concerning Quang Nam may be of interest to the reader. An administrative analysis of Dien Ban, the province's largest district, includes interesting historical detail. It was prepared by Luther A. Allen and Pham Ngoc An, op. cit. John D. Donoghue's, Cam An: A Fishing Village in Central Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, Agency for International Development, n. d.), discusses village organization and customs. In George K. Tanham, War Without Guns, op. cit., Chapter IV deals with pacification efforts in Quang Nam and was contributed by the writer.

districts.³ The population, except for several thousand Highlanders under Viet-Cong control, dwells in rural communities--averaging about a thousand people each--in the flat lowlands which comprise the eastern third of the province. The western area is dense and mountainous jungle.

The Province Chief is in full administrative charge of the government, responsible militarily to the commander of the ARVN Second Division in Danang and to the I Corps headquarters also located there. He also reports to the Ministry of the Interior on most administrative matters. The Province Chief had direct access to the Presidency during the Ngo Republic.⁴

The Province Chiefs have varied in military rank from major to colonel in Quang Nam--which is the usual range of rank for other large provinces. He commands nine district chiefs, all military, with ranks varying from lieutenant to major. The Province Chief is also the administrative superior for twenty provincial technical services each of which is also responsible to its counterpart ministry or directorate in Saigon (Public Works, Education, Agriculture, Information, etc.). The larger

³The statistics concerning Quang Nam in this chapter were supplied by provincial authorities in 1964.

⁴A more complete presentation of a Province Chief at work is available in Jason Finkle and Tran Van Dinh, "Provincial Government in Vietnam: A Study of Vinh Long Province." (Saigon: Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, August, 1961). (Mimeographed.) Several other Michigan State University studies not cited in this chapter may be useful to the student. They may be found in the bibliography.

technical services have field staffs attached to each of the nine district headquarters.

In 1964, Quang Nam employed 1,897 civil servants--not counting pacification cadres. The Province Chief has an administrative staff and various local government offices that report to him and not to Saigon. His key subordinates are a deputy chief for administration (a civilian) and a deputy chief for security (an army major). An important assistant is his Chief of Cabinet, who is responsible for presiding over the routine of the Province Chief's office and maintaining liaison with the technical services, who form, in effect, a province cabinet. The Province Chief commands the Regional Forces (also known as Civil Guard, Bao An) and Popular Forces (formerly Self Defense Corps, Dan Ve).

The Province Chief's office is also the political center of the province, and a steady stream of local luminaries from outlying districts may be seen in his anteroom almost any day. An elected Province Council of five to eleven members advises the Province Chief on a wide range of public affairs. The councils vary in the degree of their advisory activity and influence. Under Diem they were strictly a figurehead group.

The Vietnamese administrative system burdens the Province Chief with enormous amounts of inconsequential paper work--a heritage from the fonctionnaire mentality inculcated by the French. He may have to affix his signature to thousands of documents in a single week.




Figure 5
 Provincial Organization.
 Republic of Vietnam

The military character of the province leadership increased with the rising insurgency in all of Vietnam. Scigliano notes that in 1958, only 13 of the 36 Province Chiefs were military, but that 36 of 41 Chiefs were military by August, 1962.⁵ Under Diem the Province Chiefs were nearly all Catholic, according to Donnell.⁶ Often the Province Chief was not a native of the region in which he served. The province government of Quang Nam was hampered during the Buddhist crisis by the triple burden of a militantly Catholic Province Chief who was an Army major with no previous civil administrative experience--and a native of Hanoi.

In 1962, Quang Nam was divided by Diem, the lower third becoming Quang Tin. The intent was more effective administration of the remote lower portion where the Viet-Minh had previously ruled for years. The strategy of chopping up provinces into smaller, theoretically more manageable, pieces has been attempted several times.⁷

The province technical service departments in Quang Nam are hampered by the Viet-Cong presence in the countryside. Their field personnel are often unable to travel in the rural areas. Many of the educated officials yearn for the day

⁵Scigliano, op. cit., p. 166.

⁶Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam," op. cit., p. 489.

⁷Other new provinces formed for security reasons are followed in parentheses by their parent province: Bac Lieu (Ba Xuyen), Chau Doc (An Giang), Go Cong (Dinh Tuong), Hau Nghia (Long An, et. al.), Chuong Thien (An Xuyen), Phu Bon (Phu Yen, et.al.).

when they will be transferred to Saigon. A few earnest officials wanted to do field work but had no budgets for extension personnel in the quieter years through 1962. Now the money is there but manpower cannot easily be found. The Viet-Cong and the army have taken most young men.

Local government at the village level is usually administered by persons native to the village, acting under the influence of the District Chief. In 1956, when Diem abolished the traditional elected village councils, the last shred of local self-rule disappeared. Since the 1963 coup, elected village councils have been established in all controlled areas but their role is limited mainly to fiscal and property matters. The village administrative committee is appointed by the Province Chief through the District Chief. The committee has members who deal with finance, police, propaganda, and youth. The police chief handles the deployment of the popular forces in the village, and works with the various hamlet chiefs in the use of volunteer militia. He is also responsible for other security affairs.

II. VIETNAMESE PACIFICATION ORGANIZATION

Many provinces have appointed a special deputy chief of province for pacification, but earlier in the campaigns pacification was usually in the hands of the deputy for security. The earliest "self-sufficient" phase of the strategic hamlet program was almost without extra budget, and the paperwork at

headquarters was handled by personnel seconded from other departments. Eventually, however, special pacification bureaus were created--again often with funds from other budgets and borrowed staffs. These bureaus vary a great deal by province but usually have divisions for planning, finance, reports, economics and logistics. Sometimes the finances are handled within the regular province financial section.

The main burden of local planning for pacification falls on the District Chief, particularly for the choice of operational areas and sequence of activity in his own district. The planning of the various functions of pacification is carried out through the pacification bureau, in concert with the various sections and technical services. These province-wide program elements must usually be approved and funded by Saigon before being implemented in the province. A pacification committee, comprised of all service chiefs and military officers, usually holds a formal meeting to reconcile elements of the plan--under the presiding hand of the Province Chief. Americans are not always invited to these sessions, particularly if the Vietnamese have not come to a clear policy on their own side.

Kien Hoa province has operated an elaborate war room since 1964, which combines military and civil pacification operations and is equipped with maps, charts, and graphs. It is manned around the clock to facilitate response to hamlet attacks and less urgent crises. Similar operations centers have been constructed in other provinces, although no formal policy for their creation has been established. Unfortunately the

typical war room tends to become a briefing room to impress dignitaries, rather than being a control center for pacification activity.

In Quang Nam a pacification bureau of more than twenty employees, many of them hired specifically for the purpose, was geared to support field operations of pacification cadres, through a self-help project section, a logistics section responsible for storage and transportation of commodities and materials, and a motor repair system to maintain more than a dozen vehicles. Vietnamese pacification authorities in Saigon objected to expenditures in Quang Nam (and other provinces) for these extra personnel at headquarters. Even with more staff, the multiplied paperwork (most of it required by the objecting Saigon authorities) retarded disbursements of pacification funds many times.

In Binh Thuan province, the USOM Representative facetiously reported an "administrative defeat" by the Viet-Cong who kidnapped a Government messenger carrying many freshly prepared pacification documents. It took the province bureau ten precious days to remake the documents so they could resume the affected operations.⁸ Complications in dealing with the Saigon bureaucracy have been considerably increased by the greater civil roles of the Corps and Division levels of the Army. At times Corps commanders have

⁸AID province report, Binh Thuan, 30 April 1965.




Figure 6. New Life Hamlet Bureau
Quang Nam Province, 1964.

ruled on pacification and political matters with little regard for the Saigon leadership.

As pacification efforts have become more sophisticated, the regular village, district, and province officials have been better informed about the new government policies through the innovation of orientation sessions on rural development in some provinces. Administrators at every level of the pacification apparatus have been helped to see the larger picture and, as a result, coordination has been improved within the province.⁹

Sometimes USOM Representatives have been directed to encourage new organization for pacification by local innovation. As the development phase of the strategic hamlet program approached, some provinces established USOM-recommended Province Development Councils to facilitate coordinated economic planning among the technical services.¹⁰

Additional regular ARVN forces are sometimes needed for pacification duties by the Province Chief. They may be attached by the Division to a given district or province for a special pacification mission. In this case, the operation usually comes under the control of the visiting regimental commander who almost invariably outranks the District Chief.

⁹AID province report, Chau Doc, 30 April 1965.

¹⁰"USOM Province Representatives Guide," op. cit., pp. 106-107.

The National Police are also a part of the pacification apparatus, and function under the administrative command of the Province or District Chief. The police role will be discussed in Chapter VIII.

Pacification cadres. The key element in the pacification apparatus, vis-a-vis the civilian population, is the pacification cadre, who works directly with the rural people. The evolving and varied concepts of the cadre's role, and the proliferation of various cadre systems will be discussed in Chapter VII.

III. UNITED STATES PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION

It has been noted that the early phases of the strategic hamlet program had started ahead of the United States buildup in the provinces. The first "advisors-in-residence" on the provincial level were the MAAG (later called MACV) Sector Advisor and his staff. USOM Representatives took up residence in most provinces by late 1962. As the American buildup continued, United States Information Service (USIS) officers acquired field offices serving one or more of the provinces. The staffs of both MACV and USOM have been greatly enlarged since 1962.

A. The MACV Sector Team

There has been steady buildup of the American military advisory staff at the province level. The key man is always




Figure 7

the Sector Advisor usually with a rank of major or lieutenant colonel. During the earlier period he handled most advisory duties directly, with special assistants for intelligence and Popular/Regional Forces training--plus a radio operator and office personnel.

The Sector Advisor serves as a personal military counselor to the Province Chief, often making field inspections with him. The Sector Advisor participates in planning and project approvals for pacification as a member of the provincial Coordinating Committee (to be discussed later). His role has been to foster the improvement of training and operating effectiveness of province armed forces, intelligence, and pacification activities as a whole. As his own staff has increased, supervision of his subordinates has become a major responsibility. The buildup continued into 1964, and Civil Affairs (S-5) Advisors assumed many of the duties related to pacification.

Starting in 1964, the creation of sub-sector advisory teams --attached to district headquarters--brought the MACV advisory role into more direct, daily contact with the actual process of pacification. These five man teams regularly support the provincial USOM Representative by assisting in the activities of approval and inspection of social and economic projects. The Sub-Sector Advisor is officially authorized to "act as United States area coordinator" in the sub-sector, covering all

US-related programs.¹¹

In 1965, Viet-Cong preference for Americans as targets necessitated the addition of American security forces in the provincial MACV. By the end of the year, the headquarters establishment was staffed by about 30 to 40 Americans in the larger provinces. By then there were advisory specialists in intelligence, regional forces, popular forces, civil affairs, and medical aid--occasionally further augmented by engineering and artillery advisors. In early 1966, sub-sector teams were at work in 118 of the 238 districts in South Vietnam.¹² Each headquarters unit maintains a pool of Vietnamese interpreters procured through ARVN.

B. USOM Provincial Staff

The urgency of the rural pacification effort and the enormous American financial and material input prompted USOM to furnish province level representatives to expedite the program. Unlike many advisors, the USOM Representative had significant power to approve, reject, or propose projects, on a day to day basis. The Representative is expected to be a generalist, with flexibility and experience in working under difficult administrative conditions.

¹¹MACV memo MACJ 32, 14 August 1964.

¹²Interview with Major Arthur Brown, Department of Defense, 1965.

His prime role is intended to be an administrative catalyst, who could encourage more dynamic and effective administration in pacification. The day to day contact with pacification projects in the field gives the USOM Representative a valuable reporting and control function for both American superior and Vietnamese counterparts.

The initial assignment of area development officers as province representatives for pacification began in mid-1962. For more than a year, however, some Representatives were handling two or more provinces, shuttling from one to the other. By mid-1964, each province had its representative and most of these had received American assistants. USOM assigns a Vietnamese "area specialist" to each American. These men function as interpreters and sometimes as administrative assistants, depending on individual abilities. An increasing number of USOM Representatives have been able to communicate in Vietnamese or French, since the program began in 1962. In many provinces, key Vietnamese have become fluent in English and use it in dealing with USOM and MACV. In late 1964, some provinces began receiving Vietnamese USOM personnel trained as rural technicians who worked closely with provincial technical services (for a typical USOM province staff see Figure 8).

Assignment of Filipino experts in community development in 1964 increased the USOM capability, particularly in the self-help program. In many areas, International Voluntary Services (IVS) had field personnel at work in agriculture,

health, and education. IVS is the prototype on which the better known Peace Corps was patterned.

The Regional offices of USOM send American specialists into the provinces regularly. They maintain continuing advisory relations with the appropriate province technical services and consult with the USOM Representative. USOM/ Public Safety has the largest network of rural advisors, with one to a province in some areas.

Teams of rural experts from the Republic of China are sometimes assigned for a year or more to agricultural development projects. USOM nursing advisors are beginning to serve in province hospitals, in an effort to upgrade the quality and efficiency of these institutions. Although not directly responsible to the USOM Representative, the nursing advisor will provide counsel on province health programs. The pressures of the Province Representative's advisory role have eased considerably with the increase of USOM specialists and assistants.

C. Other United States Agencies

Many provinces have United States Special Forces teams operating in specially assigned areas, who are not under the direct command of MACV. USIS personnel visit every province at least every week in pacification-related information activities. CIA representatives also deal with Vietnamese officials concerning programs related to pacification. United States voluntary agencies operate social welfare programs in many provinces, often in conjunction with USOM and MACV activities.




Figure 8
 USOM Provincial Staff
 Quang Tri Province

D. A New Experiment: The United States Team Captain

The obvious need for coordination of the United States provincial advisory effort led to the establishment of a "team captain in three provinces (Binh Thuan, Darlac, and Dinh Tuong), in May, 1965. The team captain serves as the coordinator of all American programs, without command authority, but with special status as the key American in dealing with the Province Chief.¹³ The guideline for determining whether the USOM or MACV Representative is made team captain depends on the security situation and consequent pacification emphasis. Started on a three month trial basis, two of the captains have been retained, and Washington has recommended extension of the plan to another province.¹⁴

IV. VIETNAMESE-UNITED STATES ORGANIZATION

Agreements. The American provincial advisory system exists on the basis of aid agreements negotiated at the national level and confirmed in the province. As a method to speed the flow of assistance to the villages, the Vietnamese and Americans established a new policy of providing money directly to provincial pacification programs in lump sums to be expended by the joint Vietnamese-American apparatus there. Regular Vietnamese government funds and foreign aid resources had

¹³Washington Post, 25 May 1965, p. 1.

¹⁴Interview with Source Number 50, State Department, 1966.

normally required years between the appropriation and the expenditure dates. In the new system, funds or materials could be released in a matter of minutes. Joint Vietnamese-American teams, containing members of the armed forces and civilian officials, visit the province and discuss the budget proposals for the pacification effort. The general guidelines, noting the types of programs to be conducted and the financial and material resources to be employed, are used in advance by the province authorities to plan the particular provincial requirements. A suitable agreement is drawn up in Saigon and signed at the national and provincial levels.

Coordinating Committee. The agreement is administered by the Coordinating Committee (sometimes called Province Rehabilitation Committee) comprised of the Province Chief, who is Activity Manager, and the MACV and USOM advisors. In the first pacification agreements of 1962 and 1965, the Province Chief and the MACV and USOM Representatives had to approve requests before the committee. In 1965, the American approval role was removed by the action of the Director of USOM. The role still was kept in some provinces by request of local Vietnamese authorities. USOM has asked for return of the approval system for the 1966 agreements.

The earlier agreements listed separate columns noting which were USOM and which were Government of Vietnam funds. Later, all funds were placed under the Vietnamese finance

system. The Military Assistance Program requirements are usually negotiated without the approval of the USOM Representative, although the details of such agreements are available to him. Day to day allocations of MAP resources often include USOM approval, presumably as a courtesy. The usual practice between the American advisors has been to interfere as little as possible with the special field of the other.

Meetings of the Coordinating Committee are regular in some provinces, but in others the committee often is supplanted by less formal decisionmaking regarding some question. On day to day questions in the social and economic area (approval of self-help projects, minor shipments of materials, etc.) the crowded schedule of the Quang Nam Province Chief was eased by meetings attended by the Pacification Bureau Chief (as his substitute), the USOM Representative, and the civil affairs advisors of MACV. Formal committee meetings were reserved for an accumulation of higher policy matters, and often even these were settled by ad hoc conversations over tea in the Province Chief's office.

Many province representatives use office space adjoining or in the pacification bureau, thus facilitating quick concurrence on questions as they arise.

Material resources. In addition to funds, a wide variety of materials and commodities are made available for hamlet programs. The USOM and MAP agreements include the following:

barbed wire, steel pickets (fence posts), weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, wheat, corn, fertilizer, United States Army surplus tools, cement, roofing, cloth, ad infinitum. Province warehouses have been constructed and supervised. storage and shipment systems have been devised in most provinces. Several provinces solved early acute transportation shortages through the use of rebuilt World War II type 2½ ton trucks. In 1964, USOM distributed as many as ten new 5 ton trucks to larger provinces. Quang Nam province asked for regular military transportation occasionally, usually meeting with little success. The decay of rural security in 1965 has led to reliance on air transport in many areas.

CHAPTER VII

PACIFICATION OPERATIONS

In order to convey the perspective of a province pacification campaign as a whole, Chapter VII will survey the changing program of Quang Nam province. Significant campaigns in other provinces will be examined briefly. The cadre role in pacification will be analyzed, including the changes of approach beginning in late 1965. Pacification operations will be critically analyzed in this chapter, but a more comprehensive evaluation will be presented in Chapter XIII.


I. GEOGRAPHICAL EMPHASES AND CRITERIA FOR SELECTION

As American support of the strategic hamlet program developed, special areas for high intensity pacification were chosen through joint Vietnamese and American planning. The first was Operation Sunrise, which had begun in March, 1962 in a Viet-Cong controlled area of Binh Duong province north of Saigon.¹ The "Delta Plan" included ten key provinces which were Viet-Cong dominated or seriously threatened. The provinces formerly held by the Viet-Minh in Central Vietnam

¹Operation Sunrise is described and critically analyzed by Bernard Fall in The Two Vietnams, op. cit., pp. 374-379.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM

FIELD ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT



- 1 - The Convention was promulgated and adopted June 19, 1965.
- 2 - The Prime Minister appoints and replaces all public officials. However, decisions affecting positions equal to the rank of Province Chief, Director-General or higher must receive the agreement of the National Leadership Committee (Art. 14 of the Convention).
- 3 - Provincial Councils consisting of from 6 to 15 members were elected on May 30, 1965.
- 4 - Mayors of the autonomous cities and the Prefecture of Saigon are appointed by the Prime Minister.
 - Decree 69 - NV of 4/9/65 created Municipal Councils of 6 to 15 elected members in the 4 autonomous cities.
 - Decree 67 - NV of 4/9/65 created the Saigon Prefectural Council of 30 elected members.
- 5 - Regional Administrative Assistants for Civil Affairs are appointed by the Prime Minister to assist Corps Commanders in performance of duties as the Government Delegates. Arrêté 805 - TTP NV 4/19/64.
- 6 - Village Administrative Committees of 3 to 6 members are appointed by the Province Chiefs. Village Citizens Councils of 5 to 11 members are elected. Decree 203 - d/NV 5/31/64.





Figure 9. Political map of South Vietnam.

UNOFFICIAL AS OF AUGUST 1965 USOM / PUBLIC ADMIN DIVISION.



LIST OF PROVINCES & CHIEF TOWNS WITH POPULATION

REGION I			REGION II		
PROVINCE	CHIEF TOWN	POPULATION	PROVINCE	CHIEF TOWN	POPULATION
Quang Nam	Hoi An	19,000	Bien Hoa	Bien Hoa	43,000
Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai	10,000	Binh Duong	Phu Cuong	31,000
Quang Tin	Tam Ky	11,000	Binh Long	An Loc	14,000
Quang Tri	Quang Tri	12,000	Binh Tuy	Ham Tan	11,000
Thua Thien	Hue	113,000	Hau Nghia	Kham Cuong	2,000
Da Nang	Da Nang	162,000	Long An	Tan An	23,000
			Long Khanh	Xuan Loc	17,000
			Phuoc Long	Phuoc Binh	2,000
			Phuoc Tuy	Phuoc Le	10,000
			Tay Ninh	Tay Ninh	20,000
			Vung Tau	Vung Tau	42,000
REGION III			REGION IV		
Binh Dinh	Qui Nhon	52,000	An Giang	Long Xuyen	27,000
Binh Thuan	Phan Thiet	62,000	An Xuyen	Quang Long	35,000
Khanh Hoa	Nha Trang	57,000	Bo Xuyen	Khanh Hung	45,000
Darlac	Ban Me Thuot	33,000	Bac Lieu	Vinh Loi	20,000
Kontum	Kontum	20,000	Chau Doc	Chau Phu	11,000
Pleiku	Pleiku	15,000	Chuong Thien	Vi Thanh	3,000
Lam Dong	Bao Loc	11,000	Dinh Tuong	My Tho	67,000
Ninh Thuan	Phan Rang	25,000	Go Cong	Go Cong	18,000
Phu Bon	Hau Bon	3,000	Kien Giang	Rach Gia	48,000
Phu Yen	Tuy Hoa	25,000	Kien Hoa	Truc Giang	18,000
Quang Duc	Gia Nghia	3,000	Kien Phong	Co Lonh	5,000
Tuyen Duc	Dalat	60,000	Kien Tuong	Moc Hoa	7,000
			Phong Dinh	Can Tho	77,000
			Vinh Binh	Phu Vinh	20,000
			Vinh Long	Vinh Long	33,000
CAPITAL MILITARY ZONE					
PROVINCE	CAPITAL CITY	POPULATION			
Gia Dinh	Gia Dinh	78,000			
Con Son	Saigon	1,662,000			
	Con Son	2,000			

● Projected to July, 1965
 ● Autonomous City
 ● Administrative Delegation as of April 21, 1965 and included in Capital Military Zone.

CHIEF TOWN POPULATION FURNISHED BY NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS

also got intensive support: Phu Yen, Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, and Quang Tin.² Provinces that had few security problems were allocated less support. Those provinces denoted as "critical" received priority treatment on all types of monetary and material assistance. American officials visited them more often and special weekly progress reports went to Washington.

The number of critical provinces varied from eight to as many as thirteen. Some were reclassified non-critical and others were added. Regulars on the list included: Long An, Kien Hoa, Binh Duong, Phu Yen, Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, and Quang Tin. The classification was eliminated in late 1964 and the provinces around Saigon (as part of the Hop Tac plan) became the focus of special attention.

In 1964, a new strategy for non-military aid was introduced by the newly appointed USOM Associate Director for Operations, Dr. George K. Tanham. He proposed concentration of substantial economic assistance in rural areas where security was not yet a serious problem, thus facilitating operations and denying Viet-Cong supporters the benefits of increased prosperity. These areas would serve as examples of what could be done by a major effort to improve the life of the peasants.³

²Another of the early pacification campaigns involving substantial American support was Operation Sea Swallow in Phu Yen province in mid-1962. For a summary of the early months of the campaign see Warner, op. cit., pp. 204-216.

³Interview with George K. Tanham, 1966.

The four intensive pacification areas for 1966 include one such province: An Giang, which will be discussed later. The other three zones--Binh Dinh, the Hop Tac area, and the Danang special zone--are keyed to Viet-Cong concentrations and important government centers.

II. ANATOMY OF A PROVINCE CAMPAIGN:

QUANG NAM

The pacification campaign in Quang Nam is reviewed as an example of efforts and problems in other areas of Vietnam for several reasons (other than the writer's personal acquaintance with the situation).⁴ One of the larger provinces, it is much like other provinces in the central lowlands. There are both Highlanders and lowland Vietnamese. A special high priority campaign in a communist controlled district (Duc Duc) was conducted. A direct American pacification role is expressed in the Danang special zone under the Marines. Finally, although the province is largely controlled by the Viet-Cong today, the period up to mid-1964 was sufficiently free of Viet-Cong control to permit the development of a wide range of political, economic, and social activities. Given the sharp disparities of the three regions in South Vietnam, Quang Nam can probably be called as "typical" as any other major province. Specific

⁴Data for this chapter, unless otherwise cited by footnotes, is taken from the writer's observations and personal records while assigned to the province. Subsequent interviews and reports have provided more recent information.

Quang Nam programs will be further examined, along with those of various provinces, in the special subject Chapters VIII-X.

A. Strategic Hamlets: The "Self-sufficient" Phase (Ap Tu Tuc)

Quang Nam was well launched in the "self-sufficient" phase of the strategic hamlet program by the time MAP and AID funds began to arrive in January, 1963. Over 100 hamlets had been reported as "completed" (having fulfilled the six-point criteria). Most of these hamlets were built in secure areas close to roads or district headquarters. Peasants had been required to work a given number of days on the hamlet, the duration depending on the area, and in some places they were also assessed 1000 VN\$ (about \$10.00 U.S.) or bamboo for materials. In Quang Nam bamboo is always someone's property and it has a market value. In effect, the assessment of time and materials was a serious drain on the poorer peasant, who often must consume his entire rice crop just to survive.⁵ Few families were moved inside the walls of the hamlets because they were usually in a secure area. No funds were provided to cover the relocations at that time. Later these hamlets were included in the first phase of the nationally financed program, but there was no compensation for the construction of the fences and it is questionable that these relocated families

⁵The average peasant in Central Vietnam is much poorer than his counterpart in the Delta, consuming 69 per cent of his crop for food. See Robert H. Stroup, Rural Income Expenditure: Sample Survey (Preliminary Report) Saigon: USOM, July, 1965), p. xxix.




Figure 10. Quang Nam Province, with District and Village boundaries.

were ever paid, since no promises were made at the time of their relocation. Civil servants and Civic Action cadres⁶ directed the organization and construction process.

Quang Tri province, relatively secure at the time, had reported completion of 411 of its 498 hamlets by January, 1963, done entirely by the populace and the regular civil officials.⁷ In Quang Tri and Quang Nam these hamlets were sometimes referred to among knowledgeable Americans as "paper hamlets." Their fences were built, but they were not yet defended by armed or trained militia, and there were incidents of Viet-Cong propaganda penetration.⁸

B. The Special An Hoa-Nong Son Campaign

One of the dreams of Ngo Dinh Diem was the development of a major industrial complex in western Quang Nam, built around the Nong Son coal mine, which is South Vietnam's only significant source of mineral energy.⁹ The An Hoa area, five miles to the north, was to be the site of coal-related industries--financed by French and West German interests.

⁶Each province had a section of the National Civic Action Commission, organized in 1954 for the pacification efforts described in Chapter IV.

⁷Vietnam's Strategic Hamlets, op. cit., p. 22.

⁸These conditions in Quang Tri were described to the writer in visits to hamlets while he was assigned in that province October and November, 1962.

⁹The mine produced 100,000 tons of coal in 1962 and it was planned to increase production to 250,000 tons by 1965. See Republic of Vietnam, Eight Years of the Ngo Dinh Diem Administration 1954-1962 (Saigon: October, 1962), p. 296.

The Government sought and received American backing for a top priority effort to pacify the 43 hamlets in the An Hoa-Nong Son area as a means of providing security for the economic project. The ARVN Second Division, quartered in Danang, began work in December, 1962. The ambitious Division Commander, Lam Van Phat (later famous for the bloodless coup of September 13, 1964), proceeded with the project--using an advance guarantee of American funds and the considerable resources of his Division.

Soldiers were positioned at strong points on the steep mountains that overlooked the hamlets in the valley below. To the west is mountainous jungle and to the immediate east a small but rugged range of mountains that cuts the valley off from the safety of the lowlands on the opposite coastal side. The area had a long history of relations with the communists and part of the famous "Interzone 5" of the Viet-Minh. It was the worst possible place to begin a pacification effort, in terms of working out from a secure base.

The new Duc Duc district had been created from uncontrolled areas of three other districts to encompass the An Hoa-Nong Son pacification effort. It had no cohesive administrative tradition, few internal transportation links, and no previous defense system. The province authorities had to handle the paperwork for the operation but had no executive role while the Second Division was in charge. The Division commander, eager to please Diem, accelerated the schedule for completion to a span of two and one-half months instead of six months, as

previously programmed. The Province Chief resented the Division commander's control over the operation and slowed its progress by delaying paperwork for fund releases. The Division commander's monopoly of province manpower resources for construction cadres delayed, in turn, pacification in other parts of the province.

The province government was required to send regular civil servants as "construction cadres," and 104 special recruits were hired for the same purpose and trained for 15 days. The expert Civic Action section of the ARVN Division helped the cadres learn to deal properly with the villagers.¹⁰ Cadre pay was 900 VN\$ per month, and a uniform was provided.

Census and defenses. Working in eight man teams, the cadres made a thorough census of each hamlet, specially noting the history of families having Viet-Cong relationships, land ownership, and house location. A photographic map of each hamlet was made, and a perimeter was drawn to determine the location of the double fence of barbed wire, separated by a moat filled with bamboo spikes. The maps and a summary of census data were mounted on displays in an operations center near the coal mine. Roads were improved for heavy vehicle use to facilitate delivery of construction materials and to permit rapid response of troops in case of Viet-Cong attack.

¹⁰These military civic action cadres were the only cadres of any kind whom the writer ever found working in the villages while wearing the "black pajamas" of the peasants. All other male cadres wore western style clothes in Quang Nam.

Peasants provided the labor on the fences and moat and were promised .7 kilograms (about a pound and a half) of rice for each day's work. This payment for labor was a special dispensation, not typical of the regular hamlet program but it was deemed appropriate because a great deal of work was being demanded in a very short time.

Transportation problems prohibited full payment in the rice promised, and a resort to a compromise of one-third payment in wheat and two-thirds compensation in cash was arranged. Even then there was a delay of eight months before paperwork was received and approved by the province.

Relocation. All houses outside the fence were moved inside, with relocations in some hamlets running as high as 40 per cent of the hamlet population. The release agreement called for 1,290 relocations, but the total was over 2,000-- forcing reduction in level of payments. Records were made of each house relocated, but payment depended on the arrival of these records in satisfactory condition at province headquarters for approval. Delays of four to six months were ascribed to "paperwork." It was later learned that the Province Chief had delayed the payments until the departure of the Second Division. Then he had the opportunity to embezzle sizable portions of the relocation funds, also including the compensation for construction of the fences.¹¹

¹¹Information received from local Vietnamese officials just before and after the November coup.

Armed defense. Two squads of volunteer militia for each hamlet (totalling more than 800 men for the area) were recruited and sent to Danang for two weeks of training by the Division. These costs were covered by American funds supplied through USOM and MACV. They were armed with carbines and shotguns. Self Defense Corps units were increased. The critical difference in security, however, was the presence of at least a regiment of the ARVN Division.

Hamlet leader training. Elections of hamlet officials were conducted after the cadres had screened out candidates with strong family ties to the Viet-Cong. Four elected officials from each hamlet attended a ten day training course to learn their new duties as leaders of the civil defense organization and intelligence system for their hamlet. They also were taught about government social and economic projects to be offered the hamlet population. The course was taught by province civil servants. Economic and social projects were conducted several months later, when the regular provincial pacification apparatus had been set up and the Division had turned over the campaign to province authorities.

The campaign clearly improved the security of the area and denied the Viet-Cong access to the hamlets. A civil guard unit had been sent to the area after the ARVN forces were removed at the end of the construction period. The Province Chief continued to retain cadres in the hamlets to work at

rooting out the Viet-Cong infrastructure (the secret organization within the hamlet), which, he maintained, had not yet been eliminated.

With the decline in government control of the area outside the hamlets after the soldiers left, the Viet-Cong slowly began to come back. The rapid deterioration of security in the entire province during 1964 affected the Duc Duc area, but the thoroughness of many of the defense aspects of the operation was demonstrated in the reduction of incidents and the willingness of the population to defend themselves when attacked was evident in 1963 and 1964.

While the campaign was a temporary tactical success it was a strategic failure. The site was too far away from the coast to be defended as part of a larger pacified area. Inadequate planning for documentation eventuated in broken public promises for prompt and full payment of the people and regular government services never were provided when the pacification period ended.

C. The Province-wide Strategic Hamlet Campaign

With the arrival of substantial funds via the province rehabilitation agreement at the end of January, 1963, the hamlet program took on new life. The initial agreement-- including a special section for the An Hoa-Nong Son campaign-- amounted to 26,164,700 VN\$ (about \$300,000 U.S.), and was designed to finance the first quarter of 1963. The Province

Chief preferred to go more slowly, using the haste of the Duc Duc operation as an example to avoid. He noted that the Duc Duc activity had drained the province of personnel resources that forced a slower pace for the regular campaign. All of the seven other District Chiefs (Hieu Nhon, the ninth district, was created out of Dien Ban later in 1963) were ready with their recommended locations and sequence for establishing the hamlets in their areas.

Using national criteria, the hamlets were classified by province officials according to security as follows: A Zone, secure; B Zone, contested; C Zone, enemy controlled. Under the nationally approved standards on which fund allocations were based, the formula was as follows: A Zone hamlets were authorized one squad of armed militiamen, a single fence with no barbed wire, and no funds for relocation; B Zone hamlets received two squads of militiamen, would have two fences, one of which was barbed wire, and could relocate an average of twenty families; C Zone hamlets were allowed two squads or more of militia, two barbed wire fences, and could relocate twenty or more families.

The Province Chief set a goal of completing about half the program by July of 1963, with the other half to be done by the end of the year.

Four hundred young men were hired as cadres (in addition to those from the Duc Duc campaign) and given two weeks training in the mechanics of organizing the people and

constructing the defenses. They worked as fifty eight-man teams distributed among the districts according to their population. The quality of personnel was low and supervision by the harried District Chiefs was loose.

The sequence of the hamlet activity was the same as that described in Duc Duc, except that the pace was slower. Barbed wire and steel pickets were several months late in arriving (Duc Duc had used military supplies controlled by the Division). When wire did arrive it was discovered that there were no funds or vehicles available to transport it. For months, field visits revealed neatly formed moats and earthen foundations for fences that were not there.

Many of the same hamlets received their squads of trained militiamen without weapons because the supply was not keyed to the rate of training. Only 5,000 of the 9,000 militiamen ever received arms. Two-way radios were programmed by USOM for all hamlets as a system to call in reinforcements and artillery support. Only a few hamlets received their sets during the construction period. The gravity of these errors in program coordination became costly to the peasants as Viet-Cong terrorists and propagandists chose these newly completed hamlets as special targets, since they had cooperated with the government. Often there were no fences, no weapons, and no radios to call for help as the Viet-Cong arrived. It became obvious later that these delays, often involving months of waiting, gave the Viet-Cong ample time to establish "agreements"

with the villagers not to oppose their propaganda or their calls for taxes and recruitment.

By midsummer of 1963 the barbed wire and pickets had begun to arrive--after a steady barrage of requests to Division and Corps headquarters in Danang. Transportation of MAP supplies got a big boost by USOM payments to local trucking contractors to haul the materials (although this was not an authorized USOM role).

The bottlenecks of paperwork continually obstructed the progress of pacification. There were province-wide delays in payments for relocation. Field checks indicated that the delays cost some peasant relocatees dearly. Some had borrowed at monthly rates of 5 per cent interest to cover relocation costs, but still had not been compensated six months later. The plan had called for immediate compensation during the move. The delays were the result of the cumbersome and complicated documentation system used by the Vietnamese. Corruption as another delaying factor will be described below.

Social and economic programs were introduced in the spring of 1963, focussing on the hamlets that had been completed. Fertilizer was distributed to all farmers in qualified hamlets. A pilot pig raising program, using American surplus corn for feed, was instituted for 250 families. USOM/Education provided for construction of 18 hamlet schools (42 classrooms) and the training of local villagers for teachers. There were many more calls for schools from other hamlets--an illustration of the

great desire and respect for learning among the peasants.

Political problems further complicated the administration of the hamlet campaign. Quang Nam has been a strong Buddhist province for centuries, and the 1963 crisis deeply affected popular feelings there. Considerable attention was given by the regime to the removal of Buddhist officials thought to be anti-administration. The three key pacification officials, including a Deputy Chief of Province, were removed for this reason. This brought central administration of the hamlet program, never strong, almost to a halt.

As the crisis deepened, evidence of embezzlement of pacification funds by the Province Chief and several District Chiefs was discovered. The Province Chief had directed subordinates to find means for taking money from the relocation funds. Problems of corruption came to a head in October, 1963, when falsified records on cement distribution were discovered in a routine check by the USOM Representative. The distribution implicated the Province Chief directly. USOM refused to approve further aid (except that of an emergency nature) and requested a government investigation. The coup brought removal of the Province Chief for political reasons. Despite confirmation of the irregularities, the man was never penalized in any way for his fraud.

Shortly before the November coup, the USOM Representative visited a district headquarters to discuss a forthcoming fertilizer distribution. He discovered a complete set of signed

receipts for the distribution, which was still months away. The District Chief, perhaps at the instance of higher authority, had allocated fertilizer to exactly 150 families in each village (about 1/8 of an average village's population) and secured their signatures in advance. The fertilizer, as jointly agreed in Saigon, was intended to be given in equal amounts to all farmers in each community, and it was finally distributed according to this approved formula.

The distribution plan that was discovered had provided for allocation of equal quantities for each village, regardless of its population or amount of land--a Vietnamese administrative inclination. The 150 families within each village apparently included only those who were supporting the regime politically--as opposed to the recalcitrant Buddhists.

Highlander program. The Release agreement allocated funds for the special care of 2000 Highlanders to be resettled in safe areas. As noted in Chapter III, the Katu tribe had undergone total removal from areas adjoining South Vietnamese villages starting in 1957. Forty-three Highlanders, all from a single village, chose not to follow the Viet-Cong into the deeper jungle areas. Mostly older men and women, these Highlanders were under the care of a Vietnamese Protestant minister near An Diem, the last Vietnamese settlement to the west before the jungle begins.

A United States Special Forces "A" team decided to begin a resettlement program, using these 43 people as contacts to bring in others. USOM assisted in the financial and material support for resettlement, underwriting the cost of all the new homes, a pig for every family, a rice ration, and a school.

The result of the effort to find other Highlanders was a complete failure. Occasional contacts were made with a few Katu but the only promising effort was ruined by a Vietnamese Air Force bombing attack on the area where the Special Forces had made the friendly contact. The huts were completely destroyed. It was claimed the area had been designated a "free zone" for air attacks.

In the summer of 1964, United States Special Forces closed the camp, returning the same 43 people to the care of the same Protestant preacher. By the end of the year the entire district (Thuong Duc), except for the district headquarters, had come under the control of the Viet-Cong. It should be noted that the long history of Katu disaffection with the Vietnamese and the French made it unlikely that any resettlement effort would succeed. The opportunity for winning the Katu to the Government side was when officials were in regular touch with approximately 8,000 of the tribe in 1955-1959 period. At that time, however, the government was not concerned about their steady removal by the Viet-Cong beginning in 1957, and there was no American program until 1963. The American province advisors had no success in arousing serious Vietnamese interest in the Highlander

problem, even though a staff of more than twenty Highlander cadres were on the province payroll (but doing other work) until 1964.

D. Post-Coup Pacification Efforts

The November 1 Revolution ended the Diem regime and created a temporary upsurge of relief and confidence in Quang Nam. Most of the joy was in the cities, however, and the rural areas waited to see what would happen. In remote areas, Viet-Cong political cadres moved in quickly, claiming credit for the overthrow of Diem and encouraging the people to tear down the hamlet fences and fortifications. In the northwestern area of the province--due west of Danang--most of the fences were destroyed in a few days. USOM Rural Affairs in Saigon developed an emergency policy designed to build confidence in the new government, by permitting use of USOM funds on hand to catch up the rural programs uncompensated by the Diem regime.

The old Diemist Province Chief was removed the week following the coup after great pressure from Buddhists and students. When the new Province Chief arrived, ceremonies were held in key districts to pay the back salaries of 380 hamlet workers who had been on the job six months without pay. It was part of a national USOM effort to show the "good faith" of the new government. At the same time, three USOM ambulances were given to outlying districts. An intensive effort was made to pay relocated families, but lack of

documentation again deferred the critical problem for several more months.

Political and administrative changes, based on the unsettled Saigon climate, hampered decisive action. Within a month a capable ARVN colonel replaced the first revolutionary Province Chief and more personnel changes were made. But he, too, left within three months and his successor lacked administrative competence. The entire provincial government apparatus declined steadily in its performance from that point.

Rural Restoration

By December, the I Corps area, commanded from Danang, began a new pacification campaign on its own--in the absence of Saigon action--to substitute a plan for the defunct strategic hamlet program. "Rural Restoration" involved some very sound principles, starting with getting all the civil servants out into the rural areas to tell the people the plans of the new government and to conduct elections for village councils--the first since Diem's abolition of local elections in 1956. It did not, however, include any local planning in association with Americans. Unfortunately, adequate security against Viet-Cong propaganda efforts and intimidation was not provided at the same time. Its themes and programs were discarded once the New Life Hamlet program took its place.

Local Economic and Social Programs

Before the November coup, plans had already been devised in Quang Nam for the Development Phase of the strategic hamlet

program which had been planned as the followup phase to the construction period. The joint pacification budget committee from Saigon had been scheduled to visit the province and examine the development plans, but the 1963 coup had interfered.

In place of the Construction Cadres, who were underpaid and underqualified, a new Economic Cadre (Kinh Te) concept had been developed in Quang Nam. These cadres were intended as semi-permanent representatives of the various province technical services to the various villages, representing the interests of each to the other. The cadre was to be a "living link" between the government and the people. He would serve as a catalyst for community action and be an agent for government assistance. By December the cadres had all been recruited, one for each of the 120 villages in Quang Nam. They were given 17 days of training by the various pacification officials and technical services chiefs, then sent to the field in teams to work with the Rural Restoration campaign. They were paid 1500 VN\$ (about \$18,00 U.S.) a month. Most had a ninth grade education or more. Unfortunately many had not been reared in a village (although this was part of the job requirement) and some were not at home with peasants. A later recruitment effort was aimed at getting outstanding farmers as cadres, to serve in their own districts after the training period. They were more successful. They were older men, and though less educated, they were familiar with the peasant viewpoint.

One of the International Voluntary Services men assigned to the province agreed to work with USOM as an advisor to these cadres. Trained in agricultural extension methods at Ohio State University, he worked to encourage, inspire, and improve the work of these cadres.

The cadres were supervised by district cadre chiefs and selection of program emphases for each month was made by a cadre control committee, including several technical services chiefs and the USOM Representative. In the six months after their training they stimulated requests for several hundred self-help projects such as wells, schools, bridges, etc., by living and working in the villages. They were each loaned a new bicycle, a mosquito net, and a brief case. The cadres organized 64 young farmer's clubs, 16 4-T (like 4-H) clubs for boys, volleyball leagues with 376 teams (USOM supplied the initial ball and net for each), distributed thousands of fruit trees, and generally tried to make the government presence in the village respected and supported by the people.

Other projects were developed by the province to support the field operation of these cadres. A dozen trucks in the motor pool were kept busy shuttling materials to various project sites for construction. Six motorbikes were purchased in order to aid the coordination of materials deliveries and the distribution of documents. A special section in the pacification bureau for self-help projects included three construction

experts to analyze the proposed plans and to check the quality of construction. Unfortunately the construction outran the inspectors, and many substandard buildings were completed. A pre-cast concrete yard was put into operation to assist village self-help projects and a nursery, with 40,000 fruit trees for later distribution to farmers, was begun.

An efficiency study of the Hamlet Bureau led to the development of a streamlined management information system, involving printed, bi-lingual and color-coded forms for various activities. A pacification operations center was tied by telephone to the military Tactical Operations Center. MACV advisors led in the establishment of a single center for all intelligence systems in the province. Control boards in the pacification center contained data on work loads and schedules for the finance and logistics activities. Although the system greatly facilitated the enlarged operations, breakdowns in paperwork and supply were frequent.

Twenty of the economic cadres were girls. It was decided that all the girls would specialize as "home improvement" workers. Two Saigon experts gave them a two-week course in farm and home skills, and the province had its first, and Vietnam's largest, staff of home improvement workers. They were assigned to various districts in pairs, and went to work organizing women's clubs and giving demonstrations in food preparation and preservation, child care, and home hygiene.

Quang Nam Pacification Programs in 1964

SECURITY OPERATIONS	ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL	
Relocation of families	Self-help projects	NACO
Highlanders	A. Schools	A. Pig-corn program
Combat youth	B. Roads and bridges	B. Village credit unions
Village police	C. Wells	C. Farmer's Assoc. warehouses
Radio communications	D. Health facilities	D. Dist. NACO cadres
Family census	E. Conference halls	
	F. Hamlet offices	Animal Husbandry
	G. Markets	A. Chickens-flocks
	H. Dams	B. Livestock center
	I. School repairs	C. Cadres
	J. Institutions	
INFORMATION-PSYOPS	Elementary Education	
Radio station	A. New units/teachers	Forestry
Radio receivers	B. Self-support com.	A. Self-help tree planting
Drama teams	C. School textbooks	B. Charcoal kiln
Agitprop teams	D. Wells and toilets	
Hamlet movies	Public Health	Fishing
Administrative training for officials	A. Village level staffs	A. Fish ponds
Rewards for Viet-Cong officials	B. Hamlet workers	B. Fishing equipment
Rewards for weapons	C. Medcat teams	C. Boat motors
Open Arms	D. Hospital improvement	D. Motor training
	E. Village dispensaries	
	Agricultural Hydraulics	Public Works
	A. Dams and dredging	A. Precast concrete yard
	B. Pumps	B. Tool kits
	C. Windmills	
	D. Survey teams	Economics Section
	Agriculture Services	A. Community industry center
	A. Young farmer's clubs	B. Sericulture extension program
	B. 4-T youth	
	C. Home improvement	Youth Section
	D. Fruit tree nursery	A. Hamlet volleyball
	E. Secondary crops	B. Aid to Scouts, etc.
	F. Garden seeds	C. College student vol. work proj.
	G. Gift fertilizer	
	Joint Projects	
	District demonstration centers	
ADMINISTRATION		
Gasoline and diesel		
Vehicle pool		
Warehouses		
Repair pool		
Mobile Action Cadres		
Headquarters staff		
Indemnification for field personnel (KIA)		

Figure 11

More than twenty clubs were organized and eventually USOM supplied sixteen sewing machines for hamlet sewing classes.

Information Programs

In an effort to build greater contact with the hamlet population, several local information programs were assisted by USOM, USIS, and other American agencies. These included ten drama teams (travelling around the hamlets with music and short plays), showing of movies monthly in many hamlets, and the building of a 250 watt radio station. The most significant program was the Open Arms Policy (Chieu Hoi). This was a campaign to win the Viet-Cong back to the government fold and provide them assistance for a new start by learning a trade and returning to their hamlet. By 1964, an Open Arms center had been constructed, and several returnees each month were coming in. But the steady Viet-Cong buildup in the province increasingly hampered the program. Another serious problem was the lack of understanding and appreciation of the Open Arms program among key province officials, who gave little attention to its promotion.

After Saigon began recovering from the coup of January, 1964, the New Life Hamlet program was launched in Quang Nam. It was the national successor to the old strategic hamlet program. Considerable revision had eased the harsher requirements of the old program. No one was to be forced to relocate his home. The six points were changed--as noted in Chapter V. There was

to be a much heavier emphasis on economic and social development and an effort to strengthen and expand the strategic hamlets organized so far. The general stress was supposed to be quality rather than quantity in hamlet-building, better training of officials, more careful work to destroy the Viet-Cong political infrastructure in the hamlets, and more sensitive response to peasant attitudes as a whole.

Planning. Secretary McNamara's visit to Vietnam in early 1964 created a rash of planning by Vietnamese to spend the 40 million dollars he said the American would supply for civilian counterinsurgency programs. Quang Nam's Province Chief, by this time the third replacement of the man under Diem, set his military and civilian planners to work to prepare a comprehensive pacification plan covering the next three years, and including anything the service chiefs wanted. They had only two weeks to complete the plan. The province itself had no time to reconcile the plans submitted by the various sections. MACV and USOM representatives were not asked to participate. There was no time.

The result was a 437,000,000 VN\$ program for one year-- so unwieldy and unrealistic that it was never even discussed in Saigon. (According to reports of other USOM field personnel, planning elsewhere was being conducted under similar conditions.) A similar exercise was repeated by the Government about two months later and again most USOM advisors were not consulted in

the field or in Saigon about the planning for the various technical service budgets.

Despite these expensive delays in planning, the Quang Nam economic and social operations continued to gain momentum, based on locally concocted development plans framed before the death of Diem. The agricultural and animal husbandry divisions in Quang Nam had asked for and obtained (from the provincial Coordinating Committee) the most complete field staffs in Vietnam at that time, functioning as technical support personnel to assist the multi-faceted economic cadre operations. In the absence of directives from Saigon the USOM Representative had requested guidance and received informal approval from Vietnamese and American technical advisors in Saigon for the scores of programs that were actually in operation. The funds left over from earlier agreements made it possible for these local programs to continue. (More than 60 million piasters had been directly budgeted for pacification).

As the Saigon ministries and other bureaus recovered from the political removals and shifts, the national New Life Hamlet Permanent Bureau began to function. This resulted in the disapproval of many of the projects started in Quang Nam on the grounds that they were not part of some nationally authorized program. Some of the programs were curtailed or shut down by the end of 1964. However, a surprising number survived and were fused into other nationally approved programs by the Saigon budget team when it visited Quang Nam in March, 1965.

Hamlet construction. The critical failing of the efforts in Quang Nam following the coup was the absence of any comprehensive consolidation or construction plan for securing the rural areas from increasing Viet-Cong intrusions. While province, division, and corps officials ordered and reordered comprehensive planning, only irregular, incomplete, and superficial pacification efforts were attempted in Quang Nam.

Throughout 1964, the Second Division had maintained its Fifth Regiment in sweep operations in the lowland areas west of the railroad. The eastern portion of the province was assigned to the Civil Guard. These ARVN sweeps were not coordinated with province pacification, however, and provincial authorities had no control over the ARVN movements. Provincial authorities considered the ARVN plan wasted motion.¹²

The "Four Corners" Operation. The second new Province Chief after the November coup helped initiate in January, 1964, a program to pacify a small but vital area 12 miles west of Danang. The 17-hamlet region is known as the "four corners" because four districts meet at a point surrounded by five villages--all of them deeply involved with the Viet-Cong. This was their center of power in the lowlands. It conveniently (for the Viet-Cong) borders the mountains and straddles a quick water route to Danang twelve miles away. The Province Chief asked for a comprehensive program of pacification, involving the long term presence of ARVN troops coordinated with intensive

¹²Briefing by Source Number 53, ARVN, 1964.

efforts of all provincial civilian services. Locally, USOM and MACV pledged cooperation and the Second Division agreed to provide the troops. Twenty-five different civilian programs were developed for application in this area. Maternity clinics, health stations, schools, and markets were to be built. Hamlet officials were to be carefully trained. Census projects and resources control were to be scrupulously carried out. The people could talk to the officials about the Viet-Cong because they would be protected. This was the plan.

Before the various service chiefs and the USOM Representative could get into the area for the preliminary survey, the troops were pulled out on an unrelated "search and kill" mission elsewhere. The Viet-Cong immediately moved back in and punished those who had begun to cooperate. For a total of four times in three months, civilian and military forces moved into the same 17 hamlets, and each venture ended in failure for the same reason: the withdrawal of previously committed ARVN forces. Appeals by MACV and USOM advisors to their higher echelons got no action.

Subsequent pacification projects were clearly military in objective and method. In mid-1964, the MACV Sector Advisor and USOM Representative were asked to approve the release of barbed wire and pickets that had already been installed in 32 hamlets along the railroad in the province. The main purpose was the security of the railroad rather than protection of the people in the hamlets. No planning or coordination for economic and

social development had been attempted. Installation of wire and pickets was the only program activity.

By May, 1965, six pacification plans, mostly centered on securing Highway 1, had been started and given up.¹³ The Viet-Cong had extended its hold all the way to the ocean by early 1965, killing three economic cadres in the once peaceful fishing village of Cam An, near Hoi An, the province capital. Intense pacification efforts were conducted in the vicinity of the province capital after December, 1964, only to be answered by the Viet-Cong who shelled Hoi An itself in February, 1965.¹⁴

National and provincial authorities had begun to impose more careful completion criteria and inspection techniques following the November coup. Consequently, many hamlets were reclassified as not "complete," in terms of the more stringent six points of the New Life Hamlet Plan. The 450 completions (out of 537 hamlets at that time) were listed in the November report, based on pre-coup estimates.¹⁵ By April, 1964 the number of completed hamlets had decreased to 346. The deterioration of security and more careful inspections pressed the number steadily downward until only twelve hamlets were rated as completed in March, 1965.¹⁶

In November, 1964 one of the most severe floods in the

¹³ Interview with Warren Parker, USOM, 1965.

¹⁴ AID province report, Quang Nam, February, 1965.

¹⁵ AID province report, Quang Nam, November, 1963.

¹⁶ AID province report, Quang Nam, March, 1965.

history of the province submerged almost the entire lowland area for a week. More than 7,000 people are estimated to have drowned or starved in the following month.¹⁷ Government and American facilities were devoted to relief operations that clearly indicated the Government's concern for the people.¹⁸ When the floods receded, however, the Viet-Cong managed to come back more strongly than ever, and steadily increased until after the arrival of American Marines in Danang in March, 1965. Once again, the necessity for protection as the context for other public services was demonstrated in the aftermath of the flood.

E. United States Combat Forces: Pacification in the Danang

Special Sector

Within a few weeks after the Third Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) had established its position circling the air base in 1965, units were already moving steadily inland among the hamlets in northern Quang Nam. The Marines were assigned the role of pacifying the hamlets surrounding the air base to a depth of several miles. This area was designated the Danang Special Sector.

Coordination of all Marine operations in the I Corps area was effected through the establishment of the Joint Coordinating Council for Civic Action at Danang. The Council includes Viet-

¹⁷ Interview with Francis Savage, USOM, 1966.

¹⁸ USOM Representative, Warren Parker, and Francis Savage, his assistant, were awarded the Vietnamese Medal of Merit for their role in flood relief.

namese officers and officials of the National ministry of reconstruction, the United States Consul from Hue, MACV, USOM and USIS representatives. A permanent USOM Representative has been assigned as economic advisor to the MAF.¹⁹

After considerable confusion in the initial weeks, a pattern of village operations was worked out in close cooperation with the Chief of Hoa Vang district.²⁰ The District Chief himself chooses the villages and the sequence of the pacification operations.

Before the operation to secure a village, leaflets are dropped asking the people to get into the open fields for safety, so they can freely hit the Viet-Cong in tunnels around the houses and in hedgerows. After taking the village, the Marines operate a medical aid station for several months and train local girls as nurses, who take over as permanent staff. Food is handed out to those in need.²¹

Security inside the village is provided by province Regional Forces, while the Marines guard outer approaches. A quick census is made by pacification cadres and the village administrator begins to discover the other personal and public needs of the people. Commodities from USOM and CARE are provided for these individual needs.

¹⁹Col. Norman R.K. Stanford, "Bamboo Brigades," Marine Gazette, Vol. 50, No. 3. (March, 1966), p. 43.

²⁰Interview with Major Marc A. Moore, United States Marine Corps, former Battalion Operations Officer, III MAF, 1966.

²¹Ibid.

Marine construction equipment is used to set up building projects, and USOM materials are provided for the people to construct their own schools and dispensaries. The most popular innovations have been the playgrounds, public showers, and latrines.

After an initial period of popular caution, the populations of the pacified villages have begun to grow, with refugees from Viet-Cong areas moving into the protected area.²² With the Marines as a powerful spearhead, the pacification effort in the area appears to be well begun. As the villages are made safe, security duties are turned over to local Vietnamese forces, and the Marine units move outward from the secure villages into areas under Viet-Cong control.

F. Summary Evaluation of Pacification in Quang Nam

In addition to the evaluation that follows in Chapter XIII, a retrospect on the Quang Nam experience is appropriate at this point.

By the time the American advisors had been in Quang Nam long enough to understand the situation, the Buddhist crisis had monopolized the attention of province officials. After the coup, political instability and the consequent administrative paralysis continued through 1964 and 1965.

Given these unplanned events, it is unlikely that the management of pacification could have been adequate for its task.

²²Ibid.

It is surprising, in fact, that so much was accomplished-- apart from security programs (which had failed completely)-- in 1964.

The government fought the wrong kind of war in Quang Nam during 1963 by focussing on building fortress-like hamlets in the remote Duc Duc district instead of countering the comparatively weak subversion efforts among the hamlets along the coast. The hamlet construction cadres were not trained or skilled in identifying the secret Viet-Cong organizations within the hamlets. This task required well trained police and a good intelligence network which the province did not have. Instead, the province authorities (and the Americans) in 1963 settled for visible signs of pacification--fences and moats--instead of the destruction of the hamlet infrastructure of the communists.

Despite the arrival of more Viet-Cong regular force units in Quang Nam in 1964 (and North Vietnamese soldiers in 1965), the battle for Quang Nam was lost by the government to Viet-Cong forces recruited for the most part from within the province. It is quite possible that the plethora of economic and social programs carried out in 1963 and 1964 increased the strength of the Viet-Cong through providing the peasants more income for the communists to tax. Despite the persistent efforts of American advisors in 1964 to get troop support for comprehensive pacification efforts, it was not obtained.

The Marines provided substantial protection in the Danang special sector, but it came too late to conserve the key pacification resource in the villages: young men who will defend themselves and their families when armed. There was an abundance of such manpower in most of the hamlets as late as mid-1963. Now that manpower is in the service of the Viet-Cong and much of the hamlet population in the area is related by blood to these insurgents.

A second problem confronts the Marines: the peasants doubt they will stay to protect them. Repeated withdrawals by ARVN troops have taught the peasants to be leary of promises of protection.

In sum, the pacification of Quang Nam province, a realistic goal in 1962 and 1963, became all but impossible by late 1964. The insurgent forces control most of the province by a combination of terror, propaganda, kinship ties, and substantial military power.

III. SPECIAL PACIFICATION OPERATIONS

Many provinces conducted special pacification campaigns that were different in size and scope from the Quang Nam effort. Three such campaigns are described in this section of the chapter.

A. Long An Province

On the province level, probably the greatest attention was given to Long An, which borders the Saigon area (beyond Gia Dinh) on the south and southwest. Shortly before the

November revolution of 1963, this was one of the provinces in dispute as to the actual progress of its strategic hamlet program. It was established that the Viet-Cong did, in fact, dominate the area despite the hundreds of "completed" hamlets. They freely went through the hamlet gates without resistance and the people did not report the penetrations to the Government.²³

In January, 1964 Ambassador Lodge took a personal interest in the situation and marshalled the full resources of the nearby USOM, USIS and MACV elements in Saigon to help the Vietnamese evolve a plan and program. Teams of experts in propaganda, education, health, and agriculture were sent to make in-depth surveys on peasant attitudes, needs, and conditions. A top USOM Rural Affairs staff was placed in the province to coordinate the USOM portion of the campaign.

The Vietnamese leadership had other fish to fry, however. Recoiling from a second coup in three months, Quang Nam had had five different Province Chiefs in the first six months of the program.²⁴ In Saigon, the ministries were also changing management and were afraid to move until the political dust had settled. USOM experts stood helplessly by and urgently needed programs awaited approval and implementation by the stymied Vietnamese officials.

²³An example is given by Hickey, op. cit., p. 54.

²⁴Interview with David Shepherd, former Long An USOM Representative, 1965.

Thousands of tons of barbed wire and pickets, commodities, and building materials were sent to the province, but awaited approvals for distribution. Coordination among both Americans and Vietnamese was extremely difficult in the face of the large number of programs and the rapidity of buildup.

The greatest threat to the special Long An campaign came from the enemy. The Viet-Cong developed their own campaign against the special government effort, and demolished most of what the government had attempted.

The province went through four pacification plans in the next year, before its inclusion in a larger pacification enterprise: The Hop Tac plan.

By the end of 1965, limited progress was beginning to appear via three significant indicators: 1) Open Arms returnees were increasing; 2) Incidents were down; and 3) It was possible to recruit for government programs. However, only 76 hamlets were officially regarded as pacified in October of 1965, and the USOM Representative regarded this estimate as optimistic.²⁵

B. Hop Tac--A Regional Pacification Program

The mounting strength of the Viet-Cong around Saigon led to the development of an elaborate plan of pacification called Hop Tac. The scheme linked the provinces²⁶ surrounding Saigon

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ The Hop Tac provinces are: Long An, Hau Nghia, Go Cong, Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Kien Hoa, Gia Dinh, Phuoc Thanh, and Phuoc Tuy.

into a zone of intensive pacification activity involving coordination of various civilian and military agencies. Primarily American in its genesis, (first called PICA: Pacification Intensification Capital Area) a multi-agency team of pacification experts devised a large number of programs. In addition to the familiar projects in relocation, militia training, self-help, etc., new goals were set in these provinces for rural public facilities. Funds and materials were allocated for their construction. For example, in the field of health, the target was set for a well staffed maternity-dispensary for each village and a health worker for each hamlet.²⁷ USOM province Representatives worked closely with their various provincial technical services chiefs on the requirements and timing of these programs for their province situation. Clearly a new era in bi-national pacification coordination was being initiated.

Perhaps the most significant innovation of Hop Tac was the provision for a resources control system and a sizable quota of rural policemen to coordinate and execute the plan. Until Hop Tac, the police role had been largely ignored in the national planning for rural pacification.

Most officials have been cautious in their estimates of the extent of the success of Hop Tac. It has now become one of the four focal areas of pacification emphasis in the new 1966 format. But the consensus appears to be that considerable improvement

²⁷Taken from an undated USOM planning sheet (1964).

in planning and operational coordination was effected in the Hop Tac system was in the priority allocation of policemen his province received.²⁸

An internal coordination problem arose in provinces which had only part of their areas within the Hop Tac plan. Although an extra Assistant Province Representative was specially assigned to each province in the Hop Tac zone, American and Vietnamese province staffs found their pacification chores complicated by having to divide their attention between the special projects for the Hop Tac area, and those of the rest of the province.

C. An Giang Province: Variable Response in Pacification

In accordance with the strategy suggested in 1964 by George Tanham, one of the 1966 areas of intensive effort is An Giang province--a strongly Hoa Hao region in the western part of the Delta. The province is one of the most peaceful in Vietnam, and consequently, was for a long time among the lowest priority provinces for counterinsurgency assistance. The Tanham theory, as explained earlier, calls for massive economic aid in such areas in order to preempt the spread of insurgency and to utilize fully the massive American assistance available in the economic and social development field. Further, it was felt that such an area could serve as a successful example of government-people teamwork to the nation as a whole. Relocation

²⁸Interview with David Shepherd, Long An province, 1965.

measures, stiff controls, and large troop inputs will be unnecessary in the program. The suitability of An Giang for such a special program was persuasively argued by the USOM province Representative in March, 1965:

The province representative offers three principal reasons why An Giang enjoys relative peace as opposed to other areas even in adjoining provinces:

1. There is the cohesiveness and the political solidarity of the Hoa Hao people. This group comprises over 80 per cent of the population of An Giang. They are closely knit and especially loyal to the local Hoa Hao leaders to the extent that any VC cadre attempting to operate in the area have had difficult times and their presence is soon revealed by ordinary citizens to the provincial government.
2. There is the topographical factor and the military factor. To a large degree, An Giang consists of vast open rice fields where floating rice is planted. There are no significant forested areas where the VC may remain in concealment. VC activities affecting the province usually occur only in border areas. VC units operate out of other provinces where they have concealment and where they have some measure of political support. The VC are discouraged from many actions because of the constant patrolling of the border by Regional and Popular Forces under control of the Province Chief and by relatively prompt reaction by these forces to any VC attack.
3. There is a solid psychological factor; that is the provincial administration has been relatively successful in projecting a favorable image of the government and its activities to the people. The Province Chief and his officials make numerous trips to the districts, villages, and hamlets. Oftentimes the visits take the form of official dedication ceremonies featuring honor guards, bands, speeches, with flags and banners and the appropriate awarding of gifts, followed by an official luncheon. These tactics are effective in presenting the government in a favorable light and in creating a feeling of nationalism.

The province Representative feels that because An Giang has been so successful in keeping out the VC it should be included in the Hop Tac priority area or as a major oil spot in a separate Hop Tac area. This plan may

maximize the political potentials of the Hoa Hao people in the surrounding provinces. Priority should be given to An Giang in all economic programs. This would project the image of the government to the people and would be used as a model of what can be done when the people support the government and resist the VC.²⁹

In a previous report, the same USOM Representative made the relevant comment that the local Open Arms policy seemed to be winning back more dissident Hòa Haos than Viet-Cong.³⁰ This may suggest the need for pre-emptive economic, social, and political programs in areas not troubled by communist insurgency.³¹ The separatist tendencies of the Hoa Hao could perhaps be rechanneled into support of the central government if a carefully balanced policy of friendship with firmness is followed by Saigon. The indications appear to be that Saigon policymakers are more cautious than necessary about arming the Hoa Hao.

By March, 1966 the new plan was underway in An Giang. Economic and social development projects had been successfully conducted at a lower level of intensity, however, since 1962.

In addition to An Giang, there are other provinces similarly free of severe insurgency which may benefit from a comparable emphasis. Tuyen Duc, surrounding Dalat City, and Ninh Thuan, in the central coastal area, are both appropriate to this selective type of intensive pacification process.

²⁹ AID province report, An Giang, March, 1965.

³⁰ AID province report, An Giang, February, 1965.

³¹ Bernard B. Fall comments on Hoa Hao insurgency and its relevance for pacification in the Washington Post, 9 March 1966, p. A20.

IV. PACIFICATION CADRES

The pacification cadre, as the direct symbol of the Government presence in the village, has always been a vital factor in pacification. The constant evolution of the types and function of pacification cadres reveals the recurrent conceptual and administrative confusion of both the Vietnamese and their American advisors over the human means for accomplishing pacification.

A. Previous Types of Cadres in Pacification

Construction cadres. The young men hired to replace the regular civil servants (so they could return to their regular jobs) when American resources became available for the strategic hamlet program were not able, nor well trained, nor well led. Their low pay of 900 VN\$ monthly approximately describes their utility. As "straw bosses" to put up fences, they were passable, but few qualified for the demanding community organization and intelligence assignments.

In mid-1964, a plan similar to the economic cadre program of Quang Nam was prepared for Ninh Thuan province.³² The pacification officials had designed a comprehensive development scheme requiring higher quality and better trained cadres for its implementation. A five week training program was proposed.

³² An outline of the proposed Ninh Thuan program was issued by USOM Rural Affairs, "Training of Cadre for Economic and Social Development in Ninh Thuan Province," Memorandum No. 144-64 (Saigon: 6 July 1964). The writer visited Ninh Thuan in August, 1964, and discussed the plan with Vietnamese and American officials.

However, the absence of a national policy on cadres for development led to disapproval by Vietnamese pacification authorities in Saigon.

By the end of 1964, pacification officials in all areas had asked for more money to get better cadres. Out of the Hop Tac planning, a three-pronged cadre approach to the rural areas was developed: Mobile Action Cadre (MAC), Mobile Administrative Cadre (called GAMO, from the old French designation), and Political Action Cadre.

Mobile Action Cadre. The basic pacification cadre whose job was the organizing of the hamlet for defense and development were called Mobile Action Cadre. They were a higher grade type of the previous construction cadres. They were paid about 1500VN\$ monthly.

Mobile Administrative Cadre (GAMO). Reporting up through the channels of the Ministry of the Interior, the mobile administrative cadres were trained to administer a village in newly pacified areas until reliable indigenous replacements were ready to take over. Most of the cadres were paid well over 2000 VN\$ monthly.

Political Action Cadres. These cadres were oriented to the direct anti-communist agitation and propaganda functions. They were often armed, usually well trained. Their pay ran upward from 1500 VN\$ monthly.

It is perhaps significant that the three cadre roles were financed by separate USOM divisions and other United States agencies. The "three-pronged" approach enjoyed little coordination and suffered much confusion.

A great deal of rivalry and envy arose over disparate salary levels among the various cadre systems. In Quang Tri the Province Chief mixed each village team with the various types of cadres and assigned all cadres the same duties, in order to avoid conflicting networks. The cadres were encouraged in their work through pep talks by the Province Chief and his visits to their work in the field.³³ In Tuyen Duc and Quang Nam, refresher courses on various subjects were regularly given.³⁴ Care was exercised in several provinces to keep the cadres under the control of the provincial pacification bureau rather than directly under the District Chief.

The whole cadre system was seriously damaged in most provinces during 1964 and 1965 by the military draft. Some provinces lost a majority of their cadre forces.

³³ Interview with Dan Whitfield, USOM Representative, Quang Tri, 1965.

³⁴ Interview with Don Wadley, Tuyen Duc, USOM Representative, 1965.


B. The 1966 Rural Construction Cadre Teams³⁵

The confusion and conflict created by the 1964-1965 cadre policy was resolved at the end of 1965 by the fusion of previous cadre systems in a new group known as Rural Construction Teams. The most radical departure from the earlier system has been the recruiting and training methods. The personnel in previous cadre systems were sifted to locate the best qualified men for the new teams. The recruits are being trained at the Pacification Training Center in Vung Tau, which has the combined American backing of USOM and CIA. In February of 1966, 4,689 youth were started on a rigorous 13 week training cycle stressing revolutionary theory, political and psychological techniques, military training, and identification with the peasant and his problems. They are required to wear the "black pajamas" familiar in the South Vietnamese countryside.³⁶ They are taught to practice the "three withs": eat, sleep, and work with the peasant--as the first Civic Action cadres had been trained eleven years before.

Operating in armed teams of 59 men each, the cadres remain in a village for several months, getting to know the people and their wants and making friends. The teams have specially

³⁵ On March 9, 1966 the writer received word from official Defense Department and State Department sources that the American Mission in Vietnam is now calling the Rural Reconstruction Cadres by the name: Revolutionary Development Cadres. Presumably it is based on a change in Vietnamese terminology. The cadre functions, however, remain the same.

³⁶ New York Times, 22 February 1966, p. 2. See also 13 February, 1966, p. 4E.



Source: New York Times, 22 February 1966.

Figure 12. Rural construction team organization. February 1966.

trained elements including: medical specialists, a six-man census-grievance-team (to secure data for intelligence and to learn popular feelings about government policy), a six man civil action team, a six man economic development team, and three "propaganda action teams" of eleven men each.³⁷

The training goal is 42,000 cadres--an enormous increase over all the previous cadre systems combined. Many authorities doubt that it can be achieved, considering the critical manpower shortage in the nation.³⁸ However the higher pay--2500 VN\$ per month--could attract youth of ability, if protected from the draft. Although it is too soon to evaluate the program, obviously much more serious attention has been given to training, particularly motivation training, totalling about 200 per cent more instruction time than any of the previous cadre systems. The formidable test will be in the supervision of the teams and their ability to implement the new concepts in the context of the provincial government and local ARVN forces, both of which have indicated little interest or aptitude for peasant-centered, reformist perspectives in which the cadres have been trained.

The reader has probably noted the similarity of the motivation training given the Rural Construction Cadres and the orientation of the Civic Action Cadres recruited twelve

³⁷ Interview with Jerome French, AID, 1966.

³⁸ New York Times, 7 February 1966.

years ago (Also similar was the more recent Force Populaire).
It is presumably an indication of the influence of General
Lansdale and his team of advisors.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RURAL SECURITY SYSTEM

In Vietnamese-American pacification theory, the isolation and protection of the rural population from the Viet-Cong are dependent on the combination of external armed assistance, followed by the active participation of the peasants in their own defense. The components for the establishment and maintenance of a rural security system will be discussed in this chapter.

It is possible to divide Vietnamese security activity into three categories: 1) Elimination of Viet-Cong by search-and-destroy operations, 2) Protection and control of the population and its resources by police and military forces, and 3) Preparing and arming the peasants to defend their own communities. Pacification planning has included mixtures of all these methods, varying in the proportion at different times. As suggested earlier, the overemphasis of one method at the expense of the others, and inadequate coordination of the three methods, have hampered pacification in Vietnam. Despite official theorizing about a balance of the methods, many Vietnamese and American officers and officials have tended to lean heavily on only one of the methods in the deployment of resources at their command. In fact, each method can be taken as a pacification philosophy in itself.

The Hamlet Defense Apparatus: The Self-Defense Role

Physical defenses. The hallmark of the strategic hamlet campaign was the bamboo fence and spike-lined moats of the early period, before American support had provided wire and pickets. As was mentioned earlier, the drain on peasant resources in time and money was considerable, particularly in the poorer central coastal provinces. In some hamlets, the fences enclosed paddy land in order to enclose a particular peasant's home--thereby eliminating the necessity for its relocation. Fence perimeters as large as five kilometers were found in Quang Nam, necessitating far more than the two militia squads allocated for protection if adequate fire cover were to be provided.

Although many bamboo fences were tall enough and sturdy, they deteriorated rapidly because they were rarely properly treated against insects.¹ Barbed wire fences were never over five feet high and often were poorly strung. There had been no allowance for use of barbed wire aprons to add breadth to the obstacle (as was always used in military emplacements).² At some points, the moats would disappear to accommodate a field of rice the perimeter crossed, which then gave the effect of a typical

¹Bamboo poles that were alternately crossed in the "X" form, with upper ends sharpened and pointing out, provided a substantial barrier.

²In contrast, the "protected village" fences in Malaya, examined by the writer in 1963, were double and at least eight feet high, with frequently placed lateral strands about six inches apart.

cattle fence in the American midwest. Peasants often cut through the fence where it had interrupted a favorite pathway. By 1964, the writer observed numerous gateways that obviously had no movable obstacles for use as gates beginning at curfew.

The degree of attention to security procedures varied considerably with the extent of the Viet-Cong threat. The laxity of security in A zone hamlets in Quang Nam was notorious; whereas remote villages near the mountains maintained tighter procedures.

Civil defense organization. The cadres organized most of the population into various civil defense roles as watchers, reporters, messengers, and militiamen. The "showcase" hamlets, usually near the district headquarters, had all the trappings of Nhu's self-sufficient hamlet: first aid girls with white bags containing a few bandages, men with knives, clubs, a few shot-guns, and gongs for a warning system.³

Relocation. The costly delays and unauthorized relocations described in the previous chapter were more extreme examples of what appeared to be a pattern elsewhere. Unlike Quang Nam-- where the houses were usually located in a cluster surrounded by riceland--houses in the Mekong Delta hamlets were often strung

³The writer particularly recalls a visit in 1963 to a hamlet near the Thang Binh district headquarters in Quang Tin province. A two hour visit left the distinct impression that the roles were acted out as a courtesy to the District Chief for the benefit of visiting officials.

out along roads that had been built on top of the dikes created in the construction of canals. Such Delta hamlets have little high land on which there is room for clustering. When these agglomerations were created the peasants often became embittered over having to go great distances to their fields (Just as some had been forced to do in the earlier agrovilles).

The advent of the New Life Hamlet campaign brought a drastic reduction in relocation. The new rule of giving the peasant his option on moving, led to the relocation of only 700 families in Vinh Binh province in 1964, contrasted with 3000 in 1963.⁴ In Quang Nam, relocation almost came to a halt in 1964, after 8,063 removals had been made in 1963, (4,413 of which were not reported to USOM and MACV until March, 1964).⁵ Quang Nam' relocation in 1964 and 1965 was primarily a refugee activity, in which families were completely separated from their home communities (This will be discussed in Chapter X).

The earlier Diem policy of separating Viet-Cong related families from others in a hamlet recurred occasionally in the strategic hamlet campaign. Field investigations uncovered the practice in Quang Nam by late 1963 and it was a general policy in Vinh Binh up to the time of the coup.⁶

The methods of compensation for relocatees varied. The standard release agreements called for an average of 2000

⁴W. Robert Warne, in Tanham, War Without Guns, op. cit. p. 54.

⁵AID province report, 1 April 1964.

⁶Interview with Major Arthur Brown, former MACV Advisor, Vinh Binh, 1965.

piasters for house materials, 800 piasters for subsistence, and 200 piasters for new tools. Some provinces in lowland areas purchased materials and supplied them as needed in the situation. Others issued cash, depending on the value of the house, the distance moved, and the size of the families. In Quang Nam, the latter system was used in the Duc Duc campaign, with the amounts per house reduced in order to cover a greater number of relocations. In the rest of Quang Nam, a flat payment of 3,000 piasters was approved as a universal formula, further enhanced, after the long delays, by bags of wheat, corn, and a gallon of cooking oil. American representatives in Quang Nam were present at public relocation payments after the irregularities and delays were discovered.

The variant policies of forced versus optional relocation exemplify the problem of mixing the Malayan pacification approach with the popular support concept of the anti-Huk campaign in The Philippines which had no forced relocation and very little relocation at all. In the former, control is the sine qua non and in the latter, it is popular support. The imitation of the Malayan relocation pattern was poorly and incompletely done under the strategic hamlet campaign. In Malaya, new villages with complete public services were constructed and all families were relocated there and kept under careful control. Under the strategic hamlet program not all families were moved in some areas, and in others forcible removal was crudely executed. In the successor New Life Hamlet program the policy of relocation

remained, but it served, at best, to protect the individual family wanting to relocate, while undermining any serious effort at public protection and resources control. The purpose of achieving popular support by lenient relocation policies had violated the Malayan philosophy. In Vietnam, tightly controlled village stockades as in Malaya, would be impossible of implementation in many areas, but not in all. Food was prepared and served en masse under controlled conditions in Malaya. Although it would be unwise, if not impossible, to impose this regimen in Vietnam, particularly difficult areas might warrant the effort.

Communications. USOM's Public Safety Division has developed a network of two-way radios reaching from the hamlet level to the province headquarters. Transistorized HT-1 walky-talky radios are used for hamlet level use, with larger TR-20 models for village and district levels. Security decay has led to the destruction of much of the network.

District Chiefs have been very cautious about exposing the radios to capture by the Viet-Cong, who have used them to monitor province communications systems. In Quang Nam the radio system was completed at the very time that many of the districts had begun to withdraw the radios. The writer visited a district headquarters in early 1964 and found nine TR-20 radios--the sole rapid communications link with one-third of the district's villages--unused and safely stored.

In another district that had withdrawn many radios, one of the affected villages was hit by a Viet-Cong attack in November of 1963. Reinforcements reached the scene four hours later--after a youth had pedaled his bicycle for one and a half hours to warn the district headquarters.

In addition to the USOM radio input, MACV supplies several telephone units for intra-hamlet communications, along with flares and smoke grenades.

Militia. Called Combat Youth by the Diem regime, the squads of volunteer militia were reasonable well trained in simple tactics and use of weapons during their two week session. MACV advisors were in touch with the program regularly. Militiamen had a limited assignment: guard duty and patrols within the hamlet. As noted earlier, the gap between the end of their training and issuance of their weapons was costly in terms of hamlet security, their own confidence, and their capability with the weapon issued.

The village police chief was nominally in charge of the militia, working through hamlet chiefs. In 1964 when the lax security procedures of the hamlets were becoming obvious a move was made to train squad leaders, who were to be men of previous military experience, and who would be paid full time to oversee the hamlet security function.

As Combat Youth squads began to suffer numerous casualties, some provinces approved compensation to families of men killed

in action. A cash grant of 5,000 piasters (about \$60.00) and food was given the family of the deceased. Disabled militiamen were assisted by rations of wheat and cooking oil sufficient for several months.

The volunteer militia program was pre-empted in mid-1964 by the decision to escalate the militia volunteers into full-time Popular Forces components in order to provide better training and control. However, the delays in security clearance and requirements for further training kept most militiamen from being put into Popular Forces. Other factors reduced the size of the militia.

In the Delta in mid-1963, the abandonment of 200 outposts in order to make the troops more useful through mobility, left communities around the posts without protection, thus aiding the Viet-Cong effort. After the 1963 coup, many District Chiefs played it safe and withdrew weapons and radios from insecure hamlets. In Quang Nam, Combat Youth from seventeen hamlets turned in their weapons in a single month under propaganda pressure from the Viet-Cong. In Vinh Binh, over 500 weapons were returned to the province during 1964, and the number of Combat Youth dropped by 50 per cent as the possibility of effective self defense lessened before increasing communist strength.⁷

⁷Interview with W. Robert Warne, State Department, 1966.

In 1965, there has been an effort to conserve the remaining Combat Youth and include people of all ages and sexes into the new Home Guard. Armed with grenades and various weapons, the Home Guard is a rebirth of the strategic hamlet civil defense groups described above.

The policy of arming hamlet people for their own self-defense had been implemented from the first with distinct ambivalence by the Diem regime, which was especially suspicious of the Highlanders. Diem even maintained that American Ambassador Durbrow and the Michigan State University team advised him against arming a village guard because they would be communist controlled.⁸ The fear of communist capture of arms in the less secure hamlets led, in 1963, to the issuance of single-shot shotguns and old French weapons in those areas instead of the MAP-supplied carbines. Thus, where the best weapons were most needed, they were not allowed. Diem's caution was also rooted in a fear of Hoa Hao and Cao Dai strength. Since the 1963 coup, traditional distrust of the Hoa Hao has still kept low ceilings on Popular Forces in some provinces slowing pacification.⁹ The special irony in this position is that Hoa Hao areas have generally been among the most secure (as noted in Chapter VII).

⁸ Warner, op. cit., p. 132.

⁹ Interview with Source Number 57, USOM, 1966.

Popular Forces and Regional Forces

As the immediate respondents to most Viet-Cong rural harrassment, the Popular Forces have been the front line troops in much of the insurgency. Recruited to defend their own villages they receive six weeks of training and then return to the platoons in their home villages.

Province and District Chiefs have repeatedly misused these forces by taking them out of their villages for special missions. Quang Nam had an elite "strike force" comprised of Popular Forces units which made a brilliant record. Actually, they were serving in that role as an unofficial augmentation of the Civil Guard.

The Civil Guard, or Regional Forces, has played an important role in pacification, particularly in provinces with few ARVN units. Civil Guard units, however, have often been tied down by post and bridge duties that keep them from pacification. Civil Guard units are kept in the province and recruited from local sources.

Since the coup, Popular Forces have been brought under the command of ARVN units operating in their area. As a result, there have been cases of the repositioning of Popular Forces troops outside their jurisdiction, leaving their home villages unguarded. In Hau Nghia province, the USOM Representative reported "the propensity of the ARVN Battalion in Trang Bang district to sit on its collective duff while using Regional Forces and Popular Forces for search and clear operations."¹⁰

¹⁰AID province report, Hau Nghia, 30 March 1965.

Popular Forces training.¹¹ In 1964, Frank Scotton, an employee of the United States Information Service, began developing a training plan for village defenders markedly different in mood and results from the conventional training system and similar to the training of the Force Populaire (See Chapter V). In Quang Ngai, working with GVN officials and other United States advisors, he has applied the basic principles of motivation training devised by Mao Tse-Tung. Helping the fighter see clearly why he is fighting is fundamental in the training.

Nothing is taken for granted in training. Every key point is reviewed in the words of the student through bull sessions after class. Trainees go to class as a unit. Communication with the instructor is through their squad leader. His mediating role enhances his position with his men, and reminds them of their image as a team, a close-knit fraternity.

Heavy stress is laid on the communist teaching that the fighter is the protector and friend of the people. The rules for soldierly behavior--right out of Mao's book--are carefully studied.

Results have been remarkable. As fighters, the specially trained units have performed well. One unit killed more Viet-

¹¹Data for this section was secured from interviews with Frank Scotton in 1964 and from an unpublished manuscript by him entitled, "Revolutionary Warfare and Motivation Training," (Washington: June, 1965). A description of Scotton's program is given by Malcolm Browne, op. cit., Chapter XIV.

Cong in a month than the nearest government main force division in the same period. Intelligence from civilian sources has doubled where these units have been stationed. Many villages have requested units for their areas.

In 1965 these techniques were being extended to many provinces. Results on a more grand scale are not yet in, but performances to date appear promising. The key success factors are quality control and communication in training. Nothing is allowed to go by half understood. As the psychologists might say: the training has been internalized.

Scotton has also worked on similar training programs for smaller units to penetrate the Viet-Cong areas as assassination teams and prosecutors-executors for peoples' courts against known Viet-Cong officials and terrorists.

Intelligence Systems

Good intelligence is important to any form of warfare, but it is most essential in counterinsurgent operations, where the primary task is the identification and isolation of the enemy forces so they can be destroyed or captured.

Under Diem there were several intelligence networks-- including military, political, special secret police, National Police, etc.--but much of the activity was geared to helping the regime sustain itself against potential non-communist threats to its power. There was little sharing of data provided by the different networks, who often were assigned to spy on each other. After the fall of Diem, MACV provincial intelligence

advisors helped province security authorities set up province intelligence centers, in which the data from various agent networks was received and correlated.

Viet-Cong infiltration of military and civilian government organization is so pervasive that major military operations involving Vietnamese units rarely get results, the enemy having fled the target area before the attack. All intelligence activities are conducted in the unsure atmosphere of possible communist access to data on government agent networks. One of the most difficult and delicate tasks necessary for success in pacification is the improvement of intelligence on personnel in the government apparatus itself.

The roots of any intelligence system for rural pacification are obviously among the hamlet communities. The critical point in keeping contact with a hamlet may come when a small Viet-Cong work team is recruited or established in the hamlet. Such teams become the nucleus of a larger communist infrastructure and the first task of the communist organization is the severing of information flow--by assassination and intimidation--to higher government echelons. The hamlet Construction Cadres employed during the strategic hamlet campaign had neither the training nor the support of skilled police elements in their areas to identify the Viet-Cong village and hamlet organization. Thus the hamlet fences were often constructed with "the fox still in the henhouse."

The new cadre system appears to be more qualified by ability and training to handle the problem of discovering the Viet-Cong organization, and more National Police are available to maintain and expand the intelligence systems started in the villages. In the final analysis, the flow of intelligence is dependent on the other elements of the pacification system, particularly the belief in the reliability and adequacy of the government to protect the cooperating community.

The Police and Resources Control

The National Police system has maintained sections in the various province capitals since Independence. However, the regular presence of the National Police (hereafter, Police) in the rural areas is a new development related to the tripling of the Police to a ceiling of 72,000.¹² Until 1964, each village usually had an untrained security official who performed minimal police functions. Eventually every village is expected to have several trained members of the National Police, assisting in counterinsurgency activities. The three primary counterinsurgency duties are: 1) implementing material and human resources control, 2) developing intelligence networks leading to discovery of Viet-Cong organization, and 3) control of the Combat Youth.

A serious problem affecting recruitment has been the lack of a guarantee that the recruit will be returned to his own

¹²See Chapter IV, p. 64.

province.¹³ Many local village police chiefs have, however, qualified for status as National Police and have been trained and returned to their own villages. In Quang Nam, the first 60 village police chiefs began training in the summer of 1964.¹⁴

USOM Public Safety and the National Police had tried experiments with population and resources control methods as early as 1961. At Nhatrang 52 instructors were given one month of training in order to teach the control system to all Police, but approvals for the program at that time could not be obtained from USOM or the Government. The strategic hamlet campaign was launched without a coordinated resources control program, partly as a result of the conflict between USOM/Rural Affairs and USOM Public Safety on the question of the methods of control (see Chapter V).¹⁵

Population control. Often with the help of Popular Forces or Regional Forces, Police teams carry out the family census program. This involves completing a family history form, (see Figures 13 and 14), particularly regarding Viet-Minh and Viet-Cong background of the family. A picture of the entire family is made and a print is posted prominently in the house so that routine checks can be made against it to detect missing

¹³AID province report, Binh Tuy, 30 June 1965.

¹⁴Interview with Charles Sloan, USOM Public Safety Advisor, 1964.

¹⁵Interview with Source Number 4, USOM, 1965.

members who may be with Viet-Cong units. Normally, and for best results, this activity has been keyed with the establishment of government control at the beginning of the pacification process. Coordination with the Rural Reconstruction teams, who also assist the Police in census taking, is of vital importance.¹⁶

The identification card system has already been noted in Chapter IV (see also Figure 15). Peasants are not allowed to leave their home villages for an extended period without a visa signed by the village police chief or by the hamlet chief. The visa and identification card must be carried by the peasant if he is working away from home.

Material resources control. As the National Police has grown in manpower, increased emphasis has been given to surveillance of the flow of goods, particularly regarding materials of direct utility to the Viet-Cong methods used including checkpoints and searches. The Hop Tac area has been the focus of resources control efforts, but other provinces are beginning to feel the effects of the program through the continuing Police buildup and improved coordination with other armed forces units. In An Giang province, a major river and canal control operation began in April, 1965, with the participation of the National Police, the Navy, and Regional Forces.¹⁷

¹⁶Details on National Police techniques in resources control may be found in E.H. Atkins, Jr., The Police and Resources Control in Counterinsurgency (Saigon: US Operations Mission, 1964), a Training Manual, Chapters V-X.

¹⁷AID province report, An Giang, 30 April 1965.

VIỆT NAM CỘNG HÒA
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

TỈNH PROVINCE	ẤP HAMLET						
QUẬN DISTRICT	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 33%; padding: 2px;">KHÓM QUARTER</td> <td style="width: 33%; padding: 2px;">LIÊN GIA INTER-FAMILY GROUP</td> <td style="width: 33%; padding: 2px;">SỐ NHÀ HOUSE NUMBER</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="height: 20px;"> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>	KHÓM QUARTER	LIÊN GIA INTER-FAMILY GROUP	SỐ NHÀ HOUSE NUMBER			
KHÓM QUARTER	LIÊN GIA INTER-FAMILY GROUP	SỐ NHÀ HOUSE NUMBER					
XÃ VILLAGE							

SỔ GIA ĐÌNH

FAMILY BOOKLET

HỌ, TÊN GIA TRƯỞNG
NAMES OF CHIEF OF FAMILY

..... **NGÀY** **THÁNG** **NĂM 196**

DATE

GIA TRƯỞNG KÝ TÊN
SIGNATURE OF CHIEF OF FAMILY

KIỂM THỊ
CHECKED BY

LIÊN GIA TRƯỞNG
CHIEF OF INTER-FAMILY GROUP

KIỂM THỊ
CHECKED BY

ẤP TRƯỞNG
HAMLET CHIEF

<p>TỚI Ở NGÀY ARRIVED ON</p> <p>NHÂN SỐ NGƯỜI , NUMBER OF PERSONS</p> <p style="text-align: center;">KIỂM NHẬN ATTESTED BY</p> <p style="text-align: center;">..... NGÀY 196</p> <p style="text-align: center;">DATE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">QUẬN TRƯỞNG DISTRICT CHIEF</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">PHÂN DÀNH DI CHUYỂN GIA ĐÌNH RESERVED FOR TRANSFER OF FAMILY</p> <hr/> <p>XIN DI CHUYỂN NGÀY TRANSFER REQUESTED ON</p> <p>ĐẾN TRANSFER TO</p> <p>NHÂN SỐ NGƯỜI , NUMBER OF PERSONS</p> <p style="text-align: center;">KIỂM NHẬN ATTESTED BY</p> <p style="text-align: center;">..... NGÀY 196</p> <p style="text-align: center;">DATE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">QUẬN TRƯỞNG DISTRICT CHIEF</p>
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..... Official Family Booklet in the size as issued by the National Government (front).

Figure 13

BẢNG GHI THÂN NHÂN ĐẾN TẠM TRÚ RECORD OF RELATIVES FOR SHORT VISIT TRONG THỜI HẠN TỪ 2 TỚI 30 NGÀY FROM 2 TO 30 DAYS (DO CHÍNH TAY LIÊN GIA HAY ẤP GIA TRƯỞNG GHI) FILLED IN BY INTER-FAMILY GROUP CHIEF OR HAMLET CHIEF				
TRANG TRONG NUMBER PAGE				
NGÀY ĐẾN DATE OF ARRIVAL	HỌ TÊN NGƯỜI TẠM TRÚ NAMES	SỐ CĂN CƯỚC NGÀY, NƠI, CẤP ID No. AND DATE AND PLACE OF ISSUE	Ở ĐẦU ĐẾN VÀ LÝ DO ARRIVAL FROM WHERE AND REASON	NGÀY RỜI ĐI DATE OF DEPARTURE
.....



PHÂN GHI NHÂN SỐ THAY ĐỔI RECORD OF CHANGE IN NUMBER OF PERSONS	
NHẬN SỐ THÊM, BỚT NUMBER OF PERSONS ADDED OR SUBTRACTED	KIỂM NHẬN ATTESTED BY
SỐ NGƯỜI CŨ NGƯỜI PREVIOUS NUMBER OF PERSONS + THÊM (1) ADDED - BỚT (1) SUBTRACTED SỐ NGƯỜI HIỆN TẠI NGƯỜI PRESENT NUMBER OF PERSONS	NGÀY DATE ẤP TRƯỞNG
(1) XIN GHI ĐÚNG HỌ TÊN TỪNG NGƯỜI RECORD FULL NAMES OF EACH PERSON	



LÝ LỊCH CÁ NHÂN TRONG GIA ĐÌNH INDIVIDUAL DESCRIPTIONS OF FAMILY MEMBER		SỐ NUMBER
1) HỌ TÊN NAMES	
2) BÍ DANH ALIASES	
3) NĂM SANH DATE OF BIRTH	
4) NƠI SANH PLACE OF BIRTH	
5) CHA FATHER	
6) MẸ MOTHER	
7) GIẤY KHAI SANH (HAY GIẤY THẺ VỊ KHAI SANH) SỐ BIRTH CERTIFICATE NUMBER	
LẬP TẠI DELIVERED BY	NGÀY DATE
8) NGHỀ NGHIỆP PROFESSION	
9) SỐ QUỐC GIA DANH BỘ (NẾU CÓ) NUMBER OF NATIONAL BUSINESS REGISTRATION IF ANY	
10) THẺ CĂN CƯỚC ĐỘC NHỰA SỐ ID NUMBER	CẤP TẠI ISSUED BY
.....	NGÀY DATE
11) TỜ KHAI CĂN CƯỚC SỐ OLD ID PAPER No	NGÀY DATE
12) LIÊN HỆ VỚI GIA TRƯỞNG RELATIONSHIP WITH CHIEF OF FAMILY	
PHÂN DÀNH GHI VIỆC DI CHUYỂN CÁ NHÂN RESERVED FOR INDIVIDUAL TRANSFER		

BẢNG GHI NHỮNG NGƯỜI VẮNG MẶT RECORD OF ABSENCES DO CHÍNH TAY LIÊN GIA HAY ẤP TRƯỞNG GHI FILLED IN BY INTER-FAMILY GROUP CHIEF OR HAMLET CHIEF				
NGÀY ĐI DATE OF DEPARTURE	HỌ TÊN NGƯỜI VẮNG MẶT NAMES OF ABSENT	ĐI ĐẦU DESTINATION	LÝ DO REASON	NGÀY TRỞ VỀ RETURN DATE
.....

reverse.

Figure 14

VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-HÒA REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM BỘ NỘI-VỤ DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR		THẺ CĂN-CƯỚC IDENTIFICATION CARD		
		Số : No _____		
Họ Tên Bí danh	Names Aliases	Ngày, năm sanh	Date of birth	
		Nơi sanh	Place of birth	
		Cha	Father	
		Mẹ	Mother	
		Nghề nghiệp	Profession	
Địa-chỉ	Address			

Height Cao : 1 th	Im	Dấu vết riêng : Distinctive marks :
Weight Nặng :	Kg Kg .	
	Ngón trỏ trái Left index	ngày Date 196
	Ngón trỏ phải Right index	

III. 14. Sample of 1961 type Identification Card (machine laminated plastic and safety paper); front and reverse views.

In Quang Tri province an ad hoc resources control operation called "Protect the Rice!" was conducted in April, 1965. Intelligence reports had indicated that local Viet-Cong units were building warehouses in the nearby mountains to store rice to be secured from a massive tax collection program from the district. Pacification cadres and Popular Forces, totalling 500 men, were sent to the harvest areas to help the peasants and to protect them from the Viet-Cong. The operation was considered a success.¹⁸

The Marine Amphibious Force of Danang participated in similar "at-the-source" resources control in Quang Nam in September, 1965. Calling it "Operation Golden Fleece," 10,000 Marines blanketed the area outside Danang during the rice harvest and prevented Viet-Cong tax collectors from exacting their toll. The success of the operation led to similar control efforts in Quang Tin (Chu Lai area) and Quang Ngai.¹⁹

The seriousness of the resources control problem is shown by the complex system of economic controls the Viet-Cong themselves exert over the population. Major economic warfare is underway, even in the cities. George Tanham cites an example of its complexity: "Through the use of faked companies and falsified customs receipts, the Viet-Cong have gained possession of gasoline, medical supplies, and other materials."²⁰

¹⁸Information obtained from an interview with Dan Whitfield, USOM Representative, Quang Tri, 1966.

¹⁹Interview with Major Marc A. Moore, formerly US Marine III Amphibious Force, Danang, 1966.

²⁰Tanham, War Without Guns, op. cit., p. 136.

Rehabilitation centers. In each province, the Ministry of the Interior operates rehabilitation centers, which are prisons both for Viet-Cong detainees and criminals convicted of ordinary crimes. USOM Public Safety has a prison advisor to assist the Vietnamese in developing a more advanced prison system. Many detainees are Viet-Cong sympathizers. After the November coup, 10,000 detainees, apparently non-communist victims of the Diem government, were released. The concept of rehabilitation through teaching of skills has been introduced through USOM encouragement. Segregation of prisoners by type of crime was also initiated.²¹ In Quang Nam, the USOM Public Safety Prison Advisor guided the USOM Representative in proposing several improvements in prison conditions. Tools for rehabilitation, musical instruments, materials for dispensary, extra food, and clothing were supplied by arrangement with Vietnamese authorities. The goal of the program was to change the view of the internee-- particularly the political prisoner--towards his government, his confinement, and his own self-image.

Regular Forces and Civil Relations

Tendencies of the commanders of regular force units to interrupt or avoid pacification operations have been noted in this study several times. The conventional military formula of "find, fix, and destroy," while by no means inappropriate to many situations in the Vietnamese conflict, has a quite

²¹Interview with Frank Walton, former Chief, USOM Public Safety, Vietnam, 1965.

different functional goal in contrast to units for pacification.

However, the absence of troops for pacification roles may be less damaging than the presence of troops who are not properly trained to deal with the civilian population.

From every section of Vietnam, USOM Province Representatives have reported problems from the presence of ARVN Regional Forces in populated areas. Some war damage to villages is, of course, unavoidable, but ARVN and American reliance on artillery and air strikes--in the absence of foot soldiers to protect the people--has been a costly factor in popular support of the Government.

The pressures of war and mounting role of the Army in public life may explain, but does not excuse, the extremes to which armed forces personnel sometimes go. At times they would appear to act "above the law." This report, for instance, was received from Quang Tin: "A high incident rate of stealing, robbing, raping, and obtaining free meals in the rural areas has not endeared the population towards ARVN or Regional Forces."²²

In a report by a USOM Province Representative commending the popularity, bravery, and efficiency of the Popular Forces in his area, he commented as follows on ARVN:

There are some reports of ARVN atrocities; for example, on February 19, a company leader killed a draft dodger in Ben Soi district town. He disemboweled the boy, took his heart and liver out and had them cooked at a restaurant

²²AID province report, Quang Tin, 15 February 1965.

in Ben Soi. The heart and liver were eaten by a number of soldiers. . . . Many civilians witnessed this atrocity.²³

The results of the presence of mechanized, heavily armed, and poorly disciplined troops are well known to Americans who have served in rural Vietnam. The hundreds of army trucks that daily roar up and down the narrow roads inevitably take their toll from the populace unaccustomed to motorized traffic and untrained in public safety precautions. Apparently little if any effort has been made by the government to restrain such drivers.

There is always a danger that the armed forces may become so separated from the people--in the minds of the soldiers and the civilians--that they will be looked on as a special privileged class. The signs of this tendency are abundant in Vietnam, and they are the death knoll of any effective pacification effort designed to win and control the people.

A highly placed USOM field administrator and former career Army officer has stated the problem as follows:

The military in a given action, concerned mainly with killing as many of the enemy as possible, is likely to give little consideration to the psychological impact of an action on surviving civilians. . . . The fact that today no rural area of Vietnam may be considered safe from devastating Vietnamese/U.S. military action is considered a major hindrance to pacification.²⁴

²³AID province report, Tay Ninh, February 1965.

²⁴Interview with Source Number 61, former Regional Director, USOM, 1965.

The involvement of American forces in direct pacification efforts has produced impressive civic action programs to win the trust of the people. These cannot, of course, substitute for the behavior of Vietnamese troops, or the Americans themselves who have occasionally mistreated the citizenry.

The sheer magnitude of American, Korean, Australian, and indigenous Vietnamese troops inevitably has strained the economic and social equilibrium of the nation. The military potency of the insurgent forces demands the presence of ARVN units in the rural areas. But the success of pacification requires that there be survivors to be pacified and that the pacified peasantry be kept secure from the depredations of friendly forces as well as the enemy.

However, there are signs of hope in the civil relations being developed by MACV forces and by ARVN. In mid-1965, MACV issued a ten-point directive cautioning troops in protection and respect of non-combatants. ARVN quickly followed by issuing the same directive to their units. The continuing test will be the ability to implement these precautions in the face of mounting forces and more combat operations.

Summary Comment

The heart of pacification, as repeatedly noted in this study, must be the protection of the peasant. The formidable apparatus represented by the many security programs described in this chapter is reduced to absurdity when paralleled with the lack of security in almost every hamlet in South Vietnam.

The harshest criticism of the government and its advisors is that so little has been done with so much in the way of armed forces.

The programs and armed forces that have been created in Vietnam are neither adequate in quality nor properly inter-related for effective application in a particular pacification campaign. The Vietnamese armed forces appear to be well trained in weapons techniques but are poorly prepared to behave properly among the peasants. Planning and management of resources control programs, relocation and communication systems are uniformly inadequate. Despite a plethora of worthy concepts, individual program quality and proper integration of all programs into a cumulatively productive pattern are lacking. The title of this chapter notwithstanding, a rural security system is the urgent need, but not yet a reality, in South Vietnam.

CHAPTER IX

POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROGRAMS

All pacification activities have, or should have, a degree of political and psychological impact. But the direct goal of information and propaganda programs must be the changing of attitudes and behavior. The purpose of Chapter IX is to review programs of this nature, particularly in their role as instruments for pacification.

The Political Strategy: The Fulfillment of the Vietnamese National Revolution

Preceding chapters have indicated that South Vietnam's leadership has talked much and done little about real revolution. But the peasants may never be quite the same after the melange of personalist and communist ideas persistently propounded in the hamlets.

Honest political expression has been inhibited by the Viet-Cong, as it also was by the Diem regime. Under Diem the people were pressured both to vote, and to elect the candidate endorsed by the regime.

Despite the claims of apathy of the peasantry on political questions, there is considerable evidence that popular involvement in local political issues is enthusiastically welcomed at the hamlet level when the opportunity to participate is given.

For example, in Binh Dinh, province during the Diem regime, so much interest was shown by the peasants in their selection of Republican Youth representatives that the Province Chief favored moving immediately towards local self-government through making all village councils elective (instead of appointive) as soon as possible.¹ In 1962, the Province Chief of Kien Hoa encouraged the honorary elders' councils to keep a measure of their previous political functions as a means of having some form of elective representation in the village.²

Exuberance over the 1965 elections for Provincial Councils further indicates the increasing popular demand and capacity for grassroots participation in local political issues.

Province Councils. In May, 1964, as a gesture towards local popular participation, the Government authorized creation of Provincial Citizens' Councils to "cooperate with the Province Chief in the administration of the province."³

Reports from USOM Province Representatives following the elections indicated general popular enthusiasm and a high rate of participation. In Ninh Thuan, two characteristics new to South Vietnamese elections were noted in a report as especially appreciated by the population: 1) It was not compulsory to vote; and 2) One was free for the first time to vote for any candidate

¹Related by Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam"; op. cit., p. 270.

²Ibid., p. 545.

³Office of the Prime Minister, Document Decree No. 203, b/NV, translation by Public Administration Division, USOM, 15 May 1964. (Mimeographed.)

on the ballot.⁴ Highlanders also actively participated in the elections for the provincial councils, and many were elected to serve as councilmen in provinces with a majority of Highlander citizens.⁵

At the national level there are unmistakable signs that powerful political elements are demanding greater participation in the governmental process. In April, 1966 Buddhist demonstrators secured a commitment from the reformist-minded Ky government to hold national elections for an assembly within five months.

National elections in the summer of 1966 would probably be premature in the light of poor security conditions and the lack of grassroots political organization among the parties. However, the establishment of a representative government in South Vietnam, if it were effected, would possibly supply the political context necessary for successful pacification. Or, conversely, more changes of officials could destroy the progress which appears to have been made since mid-1965.

But, for better or worse, the policy of encouraging, and responding to the demand for, revolutionary political and social change had become the guiding concept for pacification programs and propaganda themes by late 1965. Orderly revolution as the counterinsurgent "cause," despite its perils, may foster the peasantry and key elites the confidence that they are

⁴AID province report, Ninh Thuan, May 1964.

⁵AID province report, Phu Bon, May 1964.

building a life worth defending--for their nation and for themselves as individuals. Without this hope as a motive force, no pacification effort based on popular support could possibly succeed.

Pacification and the Administration of Justice

When the insurgency began to be felt in force by 1959, the rural areas had no legal mechanism or police system adequate to the threat. For centuries villagers had settled their disputes within the extended family framework or before the village council. Above the village level the civil court structure was and is little used by peasants. Several "Justices of the Peace with Extended Competence" are under appointment at the district level, in larger provinces, to handle criminal and civil cases that go beyond the village councils. At the province level a legally trained judge paid by the Ministry of Justice hears civil and criminal cases.⁶

Diem went around this civil court structure by issuing Decree 10/59 (noted in Chapter IV) which created Exceptional Military Tribunals to deal with insurgent crimes. Once security was established through the strategic hamlet program civil rights and democracy were to be restored (see Chapter IV, p. 76). However, Decree 10/59 was not always judiciously applied. The centers for Viet-Cong were full of people

⁶Interview with Bernard B. Fall, 1966.

detained after only the most perfunctory hearings. There was no set policy on how these detainees would qualify for release. As a result the centers kept receiving more prisoners after each military operation, until the facilities were overcrowded. After the 1963 coup, 400 of the 600 detainees were released, after it was determined by further inquiry that they would not be dangerous if returned to their communities (see also Chapter VIII, p. 188).

Sir Robert Thompson, head of the British advisory team, argues that legal policies for insurgency must rightly be severe, but above all they must be effectively and fairly applied.⁷ An unenforceable law, or one which penalizes innocent members of a community, may hurt the government effort.

In South Vietnam, the judicial system needs a great deal of expansion and increased power before it can play a useful part in providing the rule of law in the countryside. The support of the peasant could more easily be secured if the objectives of law and order were undertaken concomitantly in the pacification program.

Training for Local Officials

The Diem regime had begun conducting courses to train hamlet and village leaders by 1960, although at first the

⁷Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 53.

resources for the operations had to be locally provided.⁸ The enormous effort of training the hamlet leaders during the strategic hamlet campaign was partially lost by the grassroots political turnovers occasioned by the 1963 coup which led to the removal of Diemist leaders. Training was renewed under the New Life Hamlet program and had been increased in duration to as much as 30 days in some provinces. The Agency for International Development estimated that a total of 25,000 village and hamlet leaders had been trained in Vietnam by the end of 1965.⁹

In Quang Nam, the new leaders elected after the coup received ten days of training in subjects (see Appendix) that were more administrative than political. Much attention was given to helping the official learn what services his province government could render the hamlet. During June, 1964, Viet-Cong agents, apparently part of the trainees, bombed the dormitory of the training center, killing three committeemen and wounding others. The importance of the program in the eyes of the Viet-Cong was demonstrated by this act. Also, it illustrates the dangers of free elections prior to true pacification in the community where the elections are held.

Many American officials associated with pacification have raised doubts as to the wisdom of forming hamlet-level administrative structures. The established legal status of the village

⁸Finkle, op. cit., p. 79.

⁹United States Agency for International Development, Office of Vietnam Affairs, "The Aid Program in Vietnam," (Washington, D.C.: December, 1965), p. E2.

permits collection of taxes and the conduct of larger projects at that level than the hamlet could undertake. Considering the shortage of qualified leaders and the cost of an added layer of government, the focus on the village level would probably be a sound administrative policy. The Viet-Cong local organization is centered on the village rather than the hamlet level. In 1964, leader training in Quang Nam was provided for village officials as well as hamlet officials, in contrast to the national program designed only for the latter.

Propaganda and Information Media and Programs

Rallies and demonstrations. Under Diem and after, cadres of the Information Service and Civic Action Directorate held meetings throughout the rural areas. As noted in earlier chapters, these meetings tended to be formalistic and not of interest to the participants. The disparity of the high morality preached in the name of personalism and the actual Government practices had reduced the credibility of the entire propaganda effort. Too, the information programs were competing with skilled rivals in the Viet-Cong cadres. The obtuse themes of personalist philosophy and remote national issues, of little interest to the peasant, were endlessly repeated in long meetings. James Hendry observed a village meeting in 1959 at which the villagers were informed that they would have to learn six points of Government policy if they were to be admitted to the village headquarters in the future. The points demanded that the North

Vietnamese Government: 1) Let more refugees come South; 2) Reduce the size of their army; 3) Quit terror in the South; 4) End economic monopoly by Communism in the North; 5) Quit forcing people to praise the regime in post cards sent south; 6) "Must assure the same democratic liberties in their zone as those existing in the South."¹⁰ This unreasonable requirement made by a district information cadre, indicates a lack of appreciation for the peasant's dignity and interests that was typical of the Ngo regime. The contrast of the foregoing example of Diemist themes with the communist use of simple and local issues meaningful to the peasant is obvious (compare the five communist themes in Chapter III, p. 33). American public affairs advisors and Vietnamese officials have given increasing attention to improvement of the content of the Government presentations in rural areas.

Many media other than formal meetings and protest rallies have been utilized for reaching rural audiences. The major media projects are discussed below.

Hamlet information booths. Almost every hamlet in Vietnam has a small, covered structure where posters and newspapers, supplied by the Vietnamese Information Service, may be read. Sometimes the information center is a small house, furnished with

¹⁰James Bausch Hendry, The Study of a Vietnamese Rural Community (Saigon: Michigan State University, Vietnam Advisory Group, 1959), pp. 304-305. (Emphasis added).

benches and a table.

These booths were built at the urging of village information cadres during the days of Diem. The Viet-Cong often demolished the structures which they attacked as a symbol of the government tie to the hamlet. In Quang Nam, the information booths were often poorly located in the hamlet and the posted materials were rarely up to date. The condition of the structures suggested to this observer that they were rarely used and little appreciated by the hamlet people. They were the empty symbol of community deference to external authority.

Agitprop teams. Special armed teams enter contested areas for agitation and propaganda among the peasants. These "agitprop" teams serve as bearers of news from non-communist areas and are contacts for intelligence data. They circulate among the peasants, engaging in conversation with individuals and small groups, as well as holding meetings. Their contacts often provide valuable intelligence data. In Quang Nam, lack of good motivation training and field supervision have hampered the effectiveness of these teams. The remoteness of the operation makes supervision a serious problem. The need for the discipline supplied by sound motivation training is paramount for this type of operation.

Drama teams. Many provinces have fielded drama teams, each with about ten actors and musicians, who give short dramas,

sing, weaving in political points at every opportunity. A traditional art form in Vietnam, these roving teams are much in demand in the hamlets. In Quang Nam, the drama team program was developed in response to popular request. The peasants asked the Government to entertain them as the communist drama teams were regularly doing. The sole Popular Forces team could not fulfill all the invitations, so others were added.

In Quang Tri province, the drama teams are scheduled at the request of the pacification cadres, to help encourage support for the program. The three teams in Quang Tri work hard to communicate with the particular villages where they perform. Team members arrive in the area early enough to learn the special slang and professional words of that particular hamlet and make jokes based on the local jargon. Often they are accompanied by the Province Chief, who makes a short speech as part of the program.¹¹

Since 1965, the Ministry of Psychological Warfare in Saigon has assisted these teams with material for their presentation. The drama groups are one of the best media for reaching the rural areas because of the long established tradition of such groups, the poverty of entertainment opportunities in rural Vietnam, and the flexibility possible in playing to the immediate interests of the local audience.

¹¹Interview with Dan Whitfield, former USOM Representative, Quang Tri, 1966.

Hamlet movies. Nearly every province Information Service has at least one movie projector and many films for hamlet showings. Using a gasoline generator for power, the movie team plays to fascinated audiences and always includes propaganda films as well as entertainment. The movie program was expanded in Quang Nam in 1964, using USOM miscellaneous funds and added equipment and films from USIS. Monthly hamlet showings were planned, but equipment breakdowns caused abbreviated schedules.

Despite the universal popularity of the medium, comprehensive plans for blanketing the rural areas of Vietnam with regular showings have not been made. A growing library of films for showing is available as a result of a complete motion picture production system provided by USOM during the late Diem period.

Newspapers. Mimeograph machines for each district were provided through the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) by USOM Communications Media Division (now merged with USIS and MAC Psywar agencies into the Joint United States Public Affairs Office--JUSPAO.)

In 1965, the district newspapers were superseded by province-wide papers, usually on a bi-weekly basis. Twenty-four of these papers are in circulation and more are planned. Nineteen are regularly funded by the Psywar Ministry, with others assisted by JUSPAO and the American Military Civil

Affairs Program (MILCAP).¹² The value of the provincial newspaper extends well beyond the propaganda content alone. The regular distribution of a newspaper is a tangible affirmation of a functioning government at the local level. It permits variant political self expression important and necessary for grassroots participation.

Radio broadcasting. Although several radio stations had operated in larger cities, more isolated provinces, bounded by mountain ranges, had no reliable service. In 1963, Phu Yen province secured a used 250 watt former United States Army transmitter from USOM Commedia, who assisted in the installation. With USOM province funds, the station was staffed, and began to function as a vital part of the pacification effort in the province.

In 1964, a second transmitter was installed in Quang Nam province and geared into the VIS province program. Special programs for the Open Arms campaign, youth, women, and farmers, were broadcast every day for four hours. News of approvals of self-help projects was regularly featured. Buddhist, Cao Dai, and Catholic faiths were allotted weekly broadcast periods.

Six other local stations were also installed, but a major expansion of larger stations was started in 1965. The new network, ultimately to involve twelve stations, will cover all

¹²Interview with Theodore Liu, United States Information Agency, Vietnam Working Group, 1966.

of Vietnam. By February, 1965, nationwide distribution of individual radio receivers for hamlet families (supplied by United States assistance through JUSPAO), was nearing 100,000.¹³

Many of these radios are sold through a project with the National Agricultural Credit Organization (NACO) to farmers for \$20.00 US. The funds go to build the loan capability of NACO. Tuyen Duc province began the NACO radio sale system in the summer of 1965 and has sold 1200 sets, mostly to individual families. Applications to purchase were distributed which required the buyer to promise not to sell them in the market, at the risk of confiscation.¹⁴ Reports from many provinces indicate a strong popular interest in the radio distribution program. In July, 1965, a program to reach the special tribal audiences of the Highlands via their own languages was initiated by United States Special Forces in Pleiku.¹⁵

Until 1965, there was a costly lack of clear policy towards building of local radio stations in Vietnam. The decision to construct twelve stations is a move in the direction of much-needed provincial communication that deals with province-level items of interest. Early policy led to the emphasis on two or three major stations for the whole country, necessarily without the local programming content that interests a rural or urban audience.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Interview with Don Wadley, USOM, 1965.

¹⁵AID province report, Pleiku, June, 1965.

Television. In February of 1966, television began to be used as a tool of counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Sharing the role of entertaining United States troops, (on separate channels) the Vietnamese programs will be beamed eventually to approximately 3,500 sets positioned at secure and frequented rural locations. Vietnamese production and technical crews are being trained.¹⁶ In all, seven stations are reported to be planned for construction by Vietnamese authorities and JUSPAD. Initial telecasting has been via micro-relay to an airborne American transmitter plane.¹⁷

The first proposals for television had been submitted in 1954 by the Michigan State University Group for the purposes of: 1) bringing the image of the Government to the village; 2) literacy training; and 3) teaching of agricultural techniques.¹⁸ Although possibly premature at that time, the utility of television for nation-building purposes, particularly as related to rural insurgency is currently quite significant. Transistorized sets will facilitate distribution beyond limited electric power systems, and local peasants who have had little or no image of their national leadership will be able to see them "in action" via television. The other points made by the Michigan State University Group in favor of the medium as an educational

¹⁶Interview with Theodore Liu, USIA, 1966.

¹⁷New York Times, 8 February 1966, p.19

¹⁸Interview with Wesley Fishel, former Chief, Michigan State University Advisory Group to Vietnam, 1965.

device are equally valid.

The "Open Arms" Amnesty Program (Chieu Hoi)

A counterinsurgency concept new to Vietnamese thinking was introduced in March, 1963 as a parallel with the strategic hamlet program. The Open Arms campaign was rooted in the successful experience of the Philippine amnesty campaign in which favorable conditions were granted for the voluntary self-surrender of the Huk insurgents. Magsaysay's policy towards the Huks as Defense Minister had been "all out friendship or all out fighting." Returning Huks were resettled on land of their own and supplied with equipment for farming. In effect, Magsaysay had made it both easy and attractive to become loyal to the government. To be successful, the program requires the good faith of the Government and thorough indoctrination of the spirit of acceptance toward returnees in the Government armed forces and officials.

The Government made elaborate plans for hamlet level cadres to work through Viet-Cong families to encourage the guerrillas to return.¹⁹ Under Diem, and in the aftermath of the coup, the program suffered from administrative dislocations, with only a few local provinces showing progress.

In the last six months of 1965, the American troop buildup, higher Government morale, and the return of the

¹⁹Times of Vietnam Magazine, Special Chieu Hoi Issue, Vol. V, No. 43, 27 October 1963, p. 9.

Lansdale team (members of whom had first introduced the idea) brought new vigor to the program. In all, 132 million leaflets and safe-conduct passes were dropped over Communist areas and broadcasts were made from aircraft and radio stations.²⁰

Grassroots distribution of letters from returnees to families with Viet-Cong sons and fathers and visits to the families by cadres have also been carried out.

The returnees (called Qui Chanh) are utilized as guides for their knowledge of the Viet-Cong. They participate in public gatherings in which they explain why they left the communists. The influx of refugees has included whole families of returnees many of whom cannot return to their own villages located in communist controlled areas. In Phu Bon (and a few other provinces), the Open Arms officials built a special hamlet for such families in order to insure their safety from Viet-Cong reprisals.²¹

The mounting number of returnees appears to confirm the confidence of American officials who are claiming success for the program. Since mid-1965, an average of 1000 returnees a month have come to the government side, and the number for January (1672) and February (2011) of 1966 broke previous monthly records.²² However, it is not so clear that these increasing numbers of returnees are being adequately rehabilitated.

²⁰AID province report, Bien Hoa, February, 1966.

²¹AID province report, Phu Bon, April, 1965.

²²Interview with Theodore Liu, USIA, 1966.

for reintegration into their home hamlets or elsewhere. It must be made clear to the families of as yet unrepatriated Viet-Cong that their sons and husbands will be well treated on their return.

The urgency and potential significance of a successful Open Arms policy have been missed by many Vietnamese and American officials. Given the enormous numbers of South Vietnamese citizens presently allied with the Viet-Cong (for whatever reason), the recovery of these peasants for the national cause must be made one of the central tasks of the pacification enterprise. The return of properly rehabilitated individuals and families to a normal life in their communities, without their suffering a social stigma or acts of recrimination, would be both a humane and realistic overture that could lead to a massive switch in peasant loyalties (assuming the government would also be providing protection to these communities).

Rewards for Captures of Viet-Cong Leaders

In Quang Nam province, a propaganda campaign was initiated to encourage submission of information about key Viet-Cong officials that would lead to their capture. Leaflets were circulated indicating the rewards for information helping the Government seize Viet-Cong province, district, and village officials. The amounts went as high as 100,000 VN\$, and would be paid only if the person apprehended had been announced as "wanted" or could be clearly established as a Viet-Cong

official. The program was patterned after the reward systems used in Malaya and The Philippines against communist insurgency. In both of these countries some of the very highest communist leaders were apprehended by the system. In Quang Nam, however, changes of Province Chiefs and USOM Representatives led to a loss of interest in the program.

After the bombing of the American Embassy in 1965, USOM Public Safety worked closely with the National Police in an anti-terrorist campaign involving payments of 50,000 to 100,000 VN\$ for information on terrorists. Police officers involved in the transfer of such information also got twenty per cent of the reward. Several terrorists were apprehended by the program.²³

Reward programs must be meticulously administered to insure that the informing party does, in fact, get the reward-- rather than only officials who transmit the data. It is unfortunate that the system has not been adopted by the Vietnamese government for nationwide implementation. The seemingly large, rewards offered are actually a very small price to pay for the apprehension of key officials in the Viet-Cong system.

The Role of JUSPAD in Province Operations

The combined American information and propaganda agencies, united into JUSPAD, conduct a wide range of support activities

²³Interview with Donald Bennett, former USOM Public Safety Advisor, 1965.

in the province, many of which have been noted above. These Americans work closely with Vietnamese province officials-- military and civilian--concerned with propaganda. Their field staff has grown steadily since the formation of JUSPAO in May, 1965, numbering 37 representatives at regional and provincial levels.²⁴

For several years, USIS--and later, JUSPAO--had distributed Huong Que, a monthly magazine pointed to the peasant and his needs. The present distribution level is 350,000 copies for the publication. Free World magazine--also published in Vietnamese--is distributed (250,000 copies monthly) to most secondary school students.²⁵

The increase in United States forces has brought an upsurge of the teaching of English by Americans to Vietnamese, using materials developed by the Vietnamese-American Association (which is related to USIS). Marines have reported considerable interest in the English classes they have conducted in the villages of the Danang Special Sector.²⁶ Such informal contacts help to alleviate some of the tensions caused by the enormous American troop concentration in certain areas of Vietnam. This special Vietnamese-American problem had become very serious in early 1966. More systematic attention to the problem is needed.

²⁴ Interview with Theodore Liu, USIA, 1966.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Interview with Major Marc A. Moore, United States Marine Corps, 1966.

Summary Evaluation

The persistent dilemma deterring more effective political and psychological programs in South Vietnam is the lack of a favorable government image to project through the many media systems available. If this problem is solved, the extension and operational improvement of the various media should not be too difficult.

Special attention should continue to be given to making propaganda and program themes relevant to expressed peasant needs. The mechanical and insensitive performances endemic to many province programs could be revised through careful training of cadres to instill greater identification with the peasant and greater skills in adjusting the message to the mood of the local community.

Political and psychological programs should be planned and administered in close coordination with all other pacification programs, all of which should have some relevance to political goals. Too often the psychological impact of economic and social operations has been lost by preoccupation with problems of approvals, logistics, and construction. Every economic and social operation should be psychologically "packaged" by proper introduction to the affected peasants and by actions to insure their involvement and identification with the project and the government as their partner.

Provincial planning for psychological operations should be in terms of a comprehensive design for what will be done in

each specific village, noting appropriate special emphases needed, security conditions, and the amount of time probably required for success. Too often a certain number of drama teams or movie showings are scheduled with the primary goal of keeping them busy. The number of presentations becomes the orientation in planning and reporting, and the target of changing the loyalties of a single area is forgotten. Planning is worthless and reporting is irrelevant if they are not concerned with what is happening as a result of multiple pacification inputs on a community-by-community basis.

CHAPTER X

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMS

Economic and social development programs in Vietnam since 1954 have been numerous and varied. This chapter is concerned with rurally-oriented programs developed or amended to speak to the peasant situation in the atmosphere of mounting insurgency. Many other significant projects for economic and social development in Vietnam, not addressed to the rural areas, will be omitted.

The provincial technical services of the government endured greatly increased administrative burdens as enormous amounts of materials and money arrived in the provinces for economic and social programs. When the counterinsurgency buildup began in 1962, many technical services had only one or two men as their professional staff and perhaps a few clerks. There had never been enough budget for gasoline and automobile maintenance. Many unused vehicles could be found stored in garages, waiting for next year's maintenance allowance from Saigon so they could be put in operation again.

Security conditions further weakened the rural operations. Many officials were reluctant to travel in certain areas. Rural development programs were not new to Vietnam. The national Civic Action Commission, allied by 1962 with the Directorates of Information and Youth as the Secretariat of State for Civic

Action, had been promoting community projects on a shoestring budget, without the influence of United States advisors.¹ However, the Civic Action cadres had been spread thin after the intensive efforts in the former Viet-Minh areas and Land Development centers. The local Republic Youth organization was regularly utilized for volunteer labor in these rural community projects.²

By late 1964, in Quang Nam (and many other provinces,) the national ministries finally authorized large local field staffs for agriculture, animal husbandry, and other technical services to carry out the ambitious new programs. Ironically, by this time the Viet-Cong had gained control of most of the lowland areas in Quang Nam, and the large extension staffs then available could not fully be utilized.

Arrival of American and other allied technicians, engineering teams, and military civic action programs further complicated the operation of economic and social programs. During January and February of 1965, booming construction projects had inflated costs of local materials in Long An by 40 per cent, seriously affecting the buying power of the regular peasant consumers.³ In Quang Nam, high prices paid by an American contractor for broken rock used in road construction

¹Described in Chapter IV.

²Donnell, "Politics in Vietnam," op. cit. p. 262.

³AID province report, Long An, February 1965.

around the Danang air base forced a year's delay in the building of a key province road. The new and higher rock prices in the bids submitted to the province did not conform to the obsolete formulas of the Public Works Ministry in Saigon, which were based on earlier low prices.

Self-Help Projects

Following the pattern set by the Civic Action cadres of 1954, the strategic hamlet program included the offer of community self-help projects with each completed strategic hamlet, usually amounting to 20,000 to 50,000 VN\$--depending on the wealth of the area. Part of the government contribution was often supplied in materials. The projects were supposed to be the idea of the hamlet people, selected by them from different projects discussed in an open meeting of citizens. Usually the project was a school, bridge, road, meeting house, or something else useful to the whole community. After careful, and usually repeated, explanation of the program by pacification cadres, the hamlet committee filled out a form describing the project desired. It listed what the people were willing to give in volunteer labor and locally available materials and what they wanted from the Government. The proposal was forwarded through the District Chief for final approval and release of funds by the Self-help Committee and the Pacification Bureau.

In order to speed the process of approval and release of funds, Tuyen Duc province sent a joint team (American and

Vietnamese) directly to the hamlets to examine proposals and project sites in the presence of the people. Visiting about ten hamlets a week, the team issued the money on the spot and prepared release orders for the hamlet to draw materials from the province warehouse.⁴

In 1964, as the MACV Subsector (District level) advisory teams began to arrive in Vinh Binh province, approvals for self-help projects in one remote district were made by the District Chief and the MACV Subsector Advisor, instead of the Coordinating Committee at the province level. Decentralization of decisionmaking has permitted greater flexibility and speed in approvals and inspection.

Inspection. Corruption and low quality of construction were problems everywhere. Various control systems were developed. In Binh Dinh, the USOM Province Representative, a sturdy former agriculture extension specialist, tested the quality of a cement wall by grasping the blocks with his powerful hands and pulling. If the wall broke, it had to be rebuilt. Similar, but less muscular, inspections were conducted by most representatives as the best means of insuring quality construction. The most universal construction malpractice was use of an insufficient ratio of cement to sand. Regular visits to each construction site by economic cadres were necessary

⁴Interview with Don Wadley, former USOM Representative, Tuyen Duc, 1965.

as building progressed.

In the smaller provinces, field checks by the USOM Representative were not so difficult to maintain. The large numbers of projects in major provinces, amounting to several hundred at a time, made inspection a major chore requiring a considerable staff.

If inspection was not carried out by Vietnamese and Americans, corruption invariably occurred, either by acts of officials or by community leaders. Multiple contacts within the various communities were the safest means of keeping down corruption. Announcements of project approvals on the local radio, noting exact amounts, tended to discourage pilfering by the various levels of middlemen.

Self-help projects were sometimes "rigged" by various technical services chiefs who wanted their own programs featured. Meeting halls were requested in more than forty of the initial sixty projects submitted in Quang Nam. Field checks indicated that over-eager information cadres had influenced those preparing the applications for the cadres to have facilities in which they could conduct their rallies. Most of the structures were never built because the people did not really want the halls. Hendry notes that Information Service officials were pressing the people to build information booths and centers in Khanh Hau (Long An) as early as 1959.⁵

⁵Hendry, op. cit., p. 250.

SELF HELP STATUS
-PROJECT TOTALS-

15 AUG 64

PROJ No	PROJ. CATEGORY	APPRVD	CMPLTD	U/CNSTRN
1	SCHOOLROOMS	1684	527	897
2	BRIDGES	424	153	193
3	ROADS	649	331	213
4	MARKETS	434	158	139
5	PUBLIC HALLS/HLT & VILL. OFFICES	872	645	151
6	MATERNITIES/DISPENSARIES	692	374	113
7	SERICULTURE CENTERS	5	-	4
8	SMOKE HOUSES	274	8	-
9	WAREHOUSES	289	111	163
10	BLACKSMITH SHOPS	274	4	1
11	SEWING CENTERS	28	1	20
12	TOOL STORAGE SHEDS	276	61	105
13	PIG PENS			
14	CHICKEN COOPS	307	88	41
15	DUCK HATCHERIES	1510	3	1504
16	FISH PONDS	706	193	66
17	WELLS, HAND DUG	2095	1138	805
18	IRRIGATION CANALS	48	25	19
19	DRAINAGE CANALS	73	13	60
20	DAMS/RESERVOIRS/CSTRNS/DIKES	249	58	87
21	CULVERTS	745	223	267
22	BARBER SHOPS	272	108	39
23	GARDENS (SCHOOL, COMMUNITY)	868	36	51
24	RICE DRYING COURTS	1280	511	500
25	WINDMILLS	57	14	14
26	HAMLET LIGHTING SYSTEMS	33	9	12
27	PRIVIES	766	277	438
28	LIVESTOCK RAISING	869	298	273
29	AGRIC. MACHINE PROJECTS	558	11	11
30	TREE PLANTING/ORCHARDS	358	70	11
31	TNG & DEMONSTRATION CENTERS	28	15	1
32	LAND CLEARING	108	88	19
33	BRICK FACILITY	13	7	4
34	FISH NETS	21	20	1
35	KILNS (BRK, CHR COAL, LIME, TILE)	10	-	4
36	DOCK/LANDING FACILITY	26	18	7
37	PLAYGROUND COURTS	518	385	1
38	WATER PUMPS	57	21	14
39	LOAN FUNDS (HAMLET, VILLAGE)	56	16	-
40	SAWMILLS (LUMBER)	2	-	-
41	FISH BOATS/FISH BOAT MOTORS	5	2	3
42	THRASHING FLOORS, CEMENT	27	3	21
43	LIBRARIES	13	8	-
44	COMPOST PITS	50	35	-
45	SLAUGHTER HOUSES	1	1	-
46	SEWAGE LINES	1	-	1
47	REPAIRS OR IMPRVMTS TO PUBLIC BLDGS, BRIDGES, ROADS, OFFICES, HALLS	646	372	260
	<u>TOTALS:-</u>	<u>18277</u>	<u>6440</u>	<u>6533</u>

Figure 16.
USOM Self-Help Programs

VINH BINH PROVINCE

SELF-HELP STATUS

21 August 1964

NO.	PROJECTS	APPROVED	COMPLETED	UNDER CONSTRUCTION	NOT YET STARTED	REMARKS
1	School Rooms	93	30	33	30	New Classrooms Improvement
		33	51	22	10	
2	Bridges	24	12	6		
3	Markets	7	4	2	1	
4	Public Halls/Offices	4	3	1		
5	Maternities/Dispensaries	7	6		1	
6	First Aid Stations	2		2		
7	Pig Sties	7	6		1	
8	Poultry Raising	3	2		1	
9	Fish Ponds	2		1	1	
10	Wells, Hand-Dug	162	88	36	38	
11	Irrigation Canal	8	6	1	1	
12	Culverts	108	105	1	2	
13	Hamlet Lighting Syst.	1	1			
14	Privies	1	1			
15	Docks/Landing Facilities	1	1			
	TOTAL	514	315	106	93	

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Figure 17. Self-help status report Vinh Binh Province.

(Quang Nam Province)

ẤP _____ XÃ _____ QUẬN _____ DATE APPROVED _____
PROJECT No. _____ PROJECT DESCRIPTION: _____

CONTRIBUTION		COMPLETION DATE SET _____
BY LOCAL PEOPLE MANDAYS	BY GOVERNMENT PIASTRES	BY PEOPLE
OTHER:	COMMODITIES	INSPECTIONS : (DESCRIBE SITUATION) AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN. USE BACK OF CARD IF NEEDED
	A, TOTAL PIASTRES BY GVN	1. DATE _____ BY _____ CONDITIONS
	B.	2. DATE _____ BY _____ CONDITIONS
		3. DATE _____ BY _____ CONDITIONS

Figure 18. USOM staff control card for self-help projects.

As a precaution, the USOM Rural Affairs office forbade use of self-help funds for construction of information booths.

One of the most serious failures in self-help developed as a result of government inability to supply key materials that had been promised the hamlets. Early in 1965, many provinces had approved projects that could not be supplied with cement because of a mistake in the procurement and delivery system. Facing the onset of the rainy season, when no work could be done, the Government and USOM were not able to deliver materials that had been committed.⁶

In sum, self-help programs required considerable and repeated administrative attention. Self-help failed in some provinces because authorities did not assign enough people to the task. Other provinces rushed into the program (at the urging of USOM in Saigon) without an adequate administrative system for promoting, processing, supplying, and inspecting the projects. In Tuyen Duc, the USOM Representative estimated that one-half of all staff activity was concerned with the Self-help program alone.⁷ Although this amount of time is not inappropriate, considering the significance of the program, most provinces gave much less time to self-help.

The political significance of Self-help is shown in occasional Viet-Cong reaction to such projects. Peasants were permitted by the Viet-Cong to receive a Government-financed school built by a contractor, but were threatened against

⁶AID province report, Ba Xuyen, March 1965.

⁷Interview with Don Wadley, USOM, 1965.

building a school on a self-help basis which would be a joint effort with the Government and as such would strengthen the identification of the people with the regime. Most province representatives agreed that self-help schools were better built than those turned over to a contractor because the people took pride in them. The school was then, in fact, their school, not the Government's. They would thus be much more prepared to defend it, it was reasoned.

Self-help projects, if properly promoted and administered, represent perhaps the simplest and surest way of discovering and meeting the conscious needs of the peasants. The program has suffered more from poor administration than any other factor.

National development planners would add to the utility of self-help projects by authorizing village-level, as well as hamlet-level, projects. Many popular projects--upper level elementary schools, bridges, roads, and market places--need to be done at a higher level of management than the hamlet.

It is appropriate to guide and reconcile certain community self-help project planning with larger district and provincial systems (such as roads), but the basic role of the project as an uninhibited expression of popular will must be insured. Time, energy, and money expended by the people for projects they do not want may retard, rather than advance, the pacification objective.

Training Centers

By the use of Mobile Action Cadres and special technical services extension personnel, many improved agricultural, home, and health techniques were brought directly to the peasant. Another important means of introducing these improvements was the operation of provincial training centers, where farmers were brought for short periods of training on specific subjects. In 1965, Quang Tri built a training center and approved a budget for its operation. The center has been in constant use for the training of health cadre, 4-T clubs, civil servants, and farmers. It includes a mess hall, sleeping facilities for 100 men, a film room, and farming plots for demonstrations.⁸

In Tuyen Duc, an abandoned United States Special Forces camp at Dam Pao was used as a training center beginning in 1964. Unable to get approval for the project in Saigon, the USOM Representative used his personal funds until the Asia Foundation assisted the center with 400,000 VN\$. Eventually USOM Rural Affairs was able to get Vietnamese budget approval for the center and eight others like it in other provinces. At Dam Pao a staff of fifteen Highlanders was hired and trained to run the center.⁹ The accent at Dam Pao was on training Highlander farmers directly, instead of through paid extension cadres. Fifty men and twenty women were given thirty days of training in

⁸Interview with Dan Whitfield, former USOM Representative, Quang Tri, 1966.

⁹Interview with Don Wadley, USOM, 1965.

a well rounded curriculum, and returned to share their knowledge with their hamlet.¹⁰

Training centers for non-military purposes were late in appearing in the pacification programs, but have proved their worth where they have been built. Such centers should be kept flexible in the content of their curriculum and the length of courses offered. Rather than being a substitute for extension cadres who carry on a similar process of education within the hamlet, the training center can supplement the extension work by further training of leadership discovered by the extension worker.

Public Works Projects

Many of the most popular self-help projects fall in the classification of local public works. The government provincial Public Works Section was concerned with major roads and bridges, but usually gave little attention to lesser projects not funded from its own ministry in Saigon. USOM province representatives had great difficulty in focussing the interest of these province sections towards the hamlet level projects. Proper planning of local roads and bridges requires correlation with the design of the larger provincial road system. Also, engineering problems sometimes require expertise beyond the capability of hamlet people.

¹⁰Ibid.

The incorporation of many Public Works functions within the Ministry for Construction (Pacification) may lead to better support by Public Works personnel of pacification projects in the provinces.

Rural electrification. A major program involving the Public Works Ministry began in 1964, with the first concentrated effort at rural electrification. USOM Rural Affairs had started several projects, using United States Government surplus generators. However, expert advice on installation was required, and a regular program of rural electrification was formulated in 1965, involving the Ministry of Public Works and USOM Public Works.

In Kien Phong province, the rural electrification project for Thanh Binh district town became a reality in May 1965. A 30 kilowatt and a 15 kilowatt generator were installed, providing electricity to 300 families. The project was approved in 1964 and the town awaited release of funds for the project by Vietnamese Public Works officials. The generators were received from USOM in Saigon and were stored in a warehouse. Finally, in April, 1965, the province government permitted the local cooperative to proceed on its own with the installation by borrowing money from other funds. In a few weeks the 100 families who had joined the electrical cooperative received electricity and the town had street lights. The mood of the town changed. There was more social and business

activity in the evening hours and the morale of the people was greatly improved.¹¹ The system operates four hours in the evening and one hour in the early morning. Security lights around the district headquarters are maintained all night.

Similar cooperative arrangements have been planned for Tuyen Duc, rural Nhatrang, Long Xuyen, and an area around Saigon. The effort was spurred by a special mission of rural electrification experts sent by President Johnson in 1965.¹² The wealth of the Delta area makes electrification possible on a public subscription basis through electrical cooperatives. Little attention, however, has been given to the need for electric power in the densely populated, land-poor regions of Central Vietnam. Electric power could be the base from which village industries could grow, through utilization of the seriously underemployed landless peasant.

Well drilling. Most of Vietnam receives a great deal of rain in the span of a year, but for some areas all of it comes within six consecutive months. Salt water intrusion further complicates water supply problems--particularly in the Delta region. A Rural Water Supply Task Force was formed in 1964 to bring potable water supplies to as many hamlets as possible.

¹¹Interview with Robert Traister, USOM Province Representative, Kien Phong, 1966.

¹²Washington Post, 23 September 1965, p. G6.

For years USOM deep well drilling rigs had been at work in Vietnam, slowly tapping subsurface water. In addition the Office of Rural Affairs developed a very simple water powered rig, called a "hydrojet," which could reach as deep as 200 feet. Rigs were sent to several provinces and three man teams were trained in their use, financed by local rehabilitation funds. In some provinces, such as Darlac in the Highlands, the rigs were an immediate success. In others, the extreme depth of the water veins and the presence of hard rock layers rendered the rigs ineffective. Later the Public Works Division of USOM took over the water program, funding it through provincial Public Works budgets.

Education Programs

By far the most popular program in the pacification campaign was hamlet school construction. Created with the help of USOM Education in Saigon, its goal was a school in every strategic hamlet. The hamlet school system is comprised of three types of schools: 1) nationally supported, 2) community-financed, and 3) privately operated. The national system rarely reaches beyond the main village town. Vietnam has a serious educational problem in the vast number of hamlets with substandard teachers and schools, or none at all. The Diem regime had built 2,534 elementary schools between 1954 and 1962, but most of these were at the village level. Hamlet

needs were far from met.¹³

In the new program, launched in 1963, 50,000 VN\$ and cement were allocated for each room of a two or three unit school. The hamlet had to provide a person to be the teacher who had at least five years education and who would be given a two month training course in teaching techniques. All costs of training, furnishings, textbooks, and a year's salary were covered by the province rehabilitation agreement.

Quang Nam received 42 classrooms the first year and 60 rooms each year thereafter. Through the Self-Help Program another 140 rooms were requested in 1964--to be built by the people, who received aluminum roofing, cement, and funds from the self-help program budget. Other provinces also developed local answers to the demand for schools. In Tay Ninh, USOM and United States Special Forces combined to help the people construct scores of self-help schools, with the hamlets supplying the teachers and salaries.

There were serious problems in locating teachers for illiterate highland hamlets, which resulted in many vacant schools. In Phu Bon, 26 school rooms had no teachers in early 1965, because the 600 VN\$ monthly salary was insufficient to attract teachers.¹⁴ Later in 1965, the monthly salary was raised, by agreement of USOM and the Ministry of Education,

¹³ Republic of Vietnam, Eight Years of the Ngo Dinh Diem Administration, op. cit., p. 422. The number of operating elementary schools in 1962 was 4,132.

¹⁴ AID province report, Phu Bon, January, 1965.

to 1400 VN\$. In 1966, they were further increased to 2500 VN\$.

More than 2500 classrooms had been built and 5000 teachers trained under the program from 1963 through 1965. The approved yearly rate for the next three years beginning in 1966, was 2500 new classrooms and 4000 teachers.¹⁵

At this rate of growth, which includes training of teachers already on the job and replacement of temporary thatch schools, Vietnam will soon have a much larger and better elementary school system. Unfortunately there are as yet no clear plans for resolving the disparity of pay between those teachers in the special hamlet program and the teachers in the regular national system.¹⁶

The massive hamlet school construction programs have added to the already critical problem of aspiring peasants who want their children to go beyond elementary school, and eventually into high school. In Quang Nam, 90 per cent of the junior high students who applied for admission to high school had to be turned away in 1964. School construction and teacher training must also be designed to serve these higher level educational needs. In education, perhaps more than any other field the social revolution shaking Vietnam is illustrated.

¹⁵ Interview with T.C. Clark, AID, 1966.

¹⁶ Interview with W. Robert Warne, State Department, 1966. See Appendix C, 1966 Quang Nam Agreement, section 02 Rural Education.

It is politically dangerous as well as wasteful to turn away qualified students from the rural areas. As yet little has been done to meet the increased demand for secondary education.

Health Programs

The first response of USOM Public Health advisors to the insurgent problem was the support of the Hamlet Health Worker Program in 1962. Funds were budgeted through regular USOM and Ministry channels for hamlet workers to receive 600 VN\$ per month. They were trained for one month under the Chief of Medicine for the province. The workers were taught to utilize 12 simple drugs that were supplied in a medicine chest to each hamlet. The recruitment and training of these workers developed at varying rates in different provinces. Quang Nam had nearly 300 workers certified on the national payroll by the 1963 coup (although they had not been paid regularly).

District dispensaries were being constructed across the nation at a steady but slow rate. These medical centers were supervised by a medical technician, with training approximately equal to five years of college. Theoretically the district dispensaries channel patients with more complex problems into the provincial hospitals, where fully trained doctors are usually in charge.

At the intermediate level of the village, little was being done through USOM Public Health programs until a massive reconsideration was undertaken by Vietnamese and American experts in

the summer of 1964. It developed in the discussions that the Vietnamese medical people were less interested in hamlet level workers and more interested in better trained personnel at the village level. This view had also been expressed in peasant demands from Kien Hoa and Quang Nam for more qualified workers. A special meeting of notables from the villages in Quang Nam produced the complaint that hamlet workers were not sufficiently trained to be useful.

As a consequence of the policy shift towards village-level emphasis, which had been encouraged by the new Public Health Division management in USOM, a program was launched to upgrade village facilities through construction of a combination dispensary and maternity clinic, staffed by a certified midwife and a village nurse with one year of training. It had been discovered that the district dispensaries were too far removed to be utilized by most patients.

The new philosophy was apparently both a step towards higher quality medical care and a response to a felt need of the rural population. The hamlet level workers were also retained.

The shortage of doctors in rural Vietnam accrues partly from the fact that 450 of the nation's 750 doctors serve in ARVN (thus caring for less than 1/40 of the population).¹⁷ Many of the other 300 physicians are in Saigon. Quang Nam, for

¹⁷ Interview with Dr. Archer Dillard, formerly USOM/ Public Health, 1965.

instance, had two doctors in 1964, and both were primarily administrators. Quang Tin, with a population of 350,000, had none.

Other allied nations have placed seven surgical teams into provincial operating suites built by USOM. The first surgical team arrived in 1964. Twenty-eight surgical suites, one to each of the larger provinces, have been built since construction began in 1962.¹⁸ The major problem has been in locating doctors and nurses to staff the new facilities. As previously noted, American nursing advisors will be advising in the management of provincial hospitals by mid-1966.

Serious problems still beset the health programs in 1965. Delays in payment of salaries and delivery of medical supplies hampered operations. Training was far from adequate. However, indications of progress towards creating a national system of care, insufficient though it may appear by western standards, are beginning to be evident.

Military civic action projects in medical care have presented a recurrent problem in the province health program. "Sick calls" by armed forces in the villages have often been conducted without prior consultation with the province Chief of Medicine, who is technically responsible for all medical care in his province. There is a great need for more careful

¹⁸United States Agency for International Development, The AID Program in Vietnam, op. cit., p. E1.

correlation of these medical civic action programs with the regular system of medical care.

Despite a substantial outlay of funds and a wide variety of rural programs, the health system of Vietnam has yet to become an integrated and effective operation even in terms of the minimal care it has been intended to provide. There has been a reluctance by Vietnamese officials to replace or improve the quality of the hamlet level health worker who is usually poorly trained. Relatively simple problems of regular pay for field workers has not been solved. The rapid turnover of health ministers and USOM Public Health chiefs may be both a symptom and a cause of the problem.

The unbalanced distribution of physicians in favor of the ARVN forces is particularly illogical in the face of the critical shortage of doctors to care for the casualties among the Popular Forces, who still bear the brunt of the war-- along with their civilian neighbors.

Relief and Refugees

Highlanders. Only a few years after more than 900,000 refugees from North Vietnam had been assimilated in the South, a new exodus began within the South among various Highlander tribal groups. By 1961 and 1962, as the Viet-Cong began to increase their demands for food and manpower, whole villages and tribes began to move towards the Government side. From 1962 through 1965 more than 7,000 of the Bru tribe of Quang

Tri province had been resettled in safe areas. Special agreements for assistance at first had been provided through the old Land Development Program. Later the province release agreements had included housing materials, food, schools, and tools. The Civilian Irregular Defense Group program, under Special Forces, encouraged Highlanders to come into safe areas near their camps.

Lowland resettlement. As the Viet-Cong increased their buildup in the lowland areas, displacing Government control there, a mounting tide of refugees moved toward the more secure province and district towns in order to escape the Viet-Cong. Also, the increasing vigor of Government and allied military operations in 1965 further swelled the number of displaced people. At first the peasants had fled the communists. Now they were caught in the middle of military operations, and many chose the protection of the Government. AID has maintained that the enormous flow is predominantly from fear of the Viet-Cong terror, and that it is, in fact, a favorable sign for the Government.¹⁹ Although both the Viet-Cong terror and allied bombs and artillery are undoubtedly contributive to the problem, the refugees probably found the "friendly" government firepower the most troublesome. It has, however, become a serious administrative burden. The size of the dislocation, reaching

¹⁹ Testimony by David Bell, Director of AID, before United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, NBC Television, 4 February 1966.

SOUTH VIETNAM

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

JANUARY 23, 1966

TOTAL OF REFUGEES FROM COMMUNISM **782,697**

REGION I

REFUGEES FROM COMMUNISM	RESETTLED REFUGEES	REFUGEES RETURNING TO NATIVE VILLAGES	REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
QUANG-NGAI	5,218		5,218
QUANG-NAM	19,421	11,916	12,787
- NGAI	82,873	19,181	4,894
- TIN	14,111	5,000	
- TRI	14,350	4,260	3,286
THUA-THIEN	8,856	4,833	4,023
TOTAL:	164,820	45,190	20,967

REGION III

REFUGEES FROM COMMUNISM	RESETTLED REFUGEES	REFUGEES RETURNING TO NATIVE VILLAGES	REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
BIEN-HOA	11,962	4,413	7,049
BINH-DUONG	15,253	899	14,654
BINH-LONG	1,568	336	1,232
BINH-TUY	9,523	8,516	1,007
GIA-DINH	4,927	2,357	2,070
HAU NGHIA	8,005	3,899	4,906
LONG-KHANH	11,600		11,600
PHUOC-LONG	3,633	1,459	2,174
PHUOC-THANH	3,544	3,159	387
PHUOC-TUY	1,518		1,518
TAY-NINH	14,654	7,863	8,791
VUNG-TAU	1,537	1,003	8,534
LONG-AN	14,295	6,340	8,223
TOTAL:	104,597	40,244	64,353

REGION II


REFUGEES FROM COMMUNISM	RESETTLED REFUGEES	REFUGEES RETURNING TO NATIVE VILLAGES	REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
BINH-BINH	125,202	31,259	97,943
BINH-THUAN	7,438	2,824	4,614
DARLAC	25,551	15,864	9,687
KHANH-HOA	19,856	1,714	18,140
KONTUM	22,293		20,845
LAM-DONG	8,371	4,853	3,418
NINH-THUAN	20,382	20,229	153
PHU-BON	15,154	14,640	494
PHU-YEN	44,659	4,722	40,517
PLEIKU	8,367	7,763	6,604
QUANG-DUC	7,205	1,984	5,221
TUYEN-DUC	3,784	1,393	2,391
TOTAL:	312,210	100,695	7,448

REGION IV

REFUGEES FROM COMMUNISM	RESETTLED REFUGEES	REFUGEES RETURNING TO NATIVE VILLAGES	REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
AN-GIANG	5,803	5,422	109
AN-XUYEN	14,118	10,034	1,269
DA-XUYEN	12,372	8,370	4,202
DAC-LIEU	9,585	3,543	6,042
CHAU-DOC	4,669	3,628	1,041
CHUONG-THIEN	10,449	4,366	6,083
BINH-TUONG	79,269	12,627	47,816
GO-CONG	5,990	2,960	3,039
KIEN-GIANG	9,897	6,189	3,708
KIEN-HOA	8,485	6,320	426
KIEN-PHONG	3,719	2,621	1,098
KIEN-TUONG	6,498	3,076	3,422
PHONG-DINH	6,336	1,547	5,389
VINH-BINH	8,495	3,200	5,215
VINH-LONG	14,567	8,104	6,463
TOTAL:	201,061	82,085	49,620

TOTALS

- TOTAL OF REFUGEES..... 782,697
- RESETTLED REFUGEES... 268,214
- REFUGEES RETURNING TO NATIVE VILLAGES..... 72,035
- REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS..... 442,448



LEGEND

- MORE THAN 20,000 REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
- MORE THAN 8,000 REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
- MORE THAN 5,000 REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
- LESS THAN 5,000 REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS

USOM/PUB. ADMIN. DIVISION

Figure 19

nearly 800,000 people by the end of 1965, far exceeded the preliminary USOM predictions of 100,000 (see Figure 19). Criticism against USOM and the Ministry of Social Welfare has come from the General Accounting Office of the United States Government²⁰ and from the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees.²¹ Critics have noted the gross underestimation of the size of the problem and the inadequate measures for rehabilitation and resettlement.

In contrast, a generally favorable report on the administration of the refugee problem was made by the American Council on Voluntary Agencies, after a delegation had visited Vietnam in October, 1965. In the report they complimented the prompt action of military civic action units in seeking out and caring for the refugees.²² They further commended USOM for the flexibility of its provincial operations network, and stated that the situation is in "good hands."²³ A number of voluntary agencies and church mission groups, some of them active in Vietnam for many years, have rendered significant refugee aid, in close

²⁰Washington Post, 19 December 1965, p. A5.

²¹Ibid.

²²American Council on Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Report on Vietnamese Refugees and Displaced Persons, (New York: October, 1965), p. 4.

²³Ibid., pp. 9-10.

cooperation with government efforts.²⁴

The refugees are divided into two types: 1) those temporarily displaced for a few weeks or months, and 2) those who have no hope of returning to their homes. The former may become "refugees" while an operation is underway in their area, returning to their homes when the shooting has stopped.²⁵

The more permanently displaced persons are often women, children, and older citizens (whose abler males may be in ARVN or with the Viet-Cong). Rehabilitation programs for these peasants are essential, but difficult to provide. Often there is no land ((in the new location) available for them to till. By January, 1966, refugees were consuming 50,000 tons of rice monthly--imported from the United States because of the shortage in Vietnam.²⁶ Imaginative efforts to rehabilitate these refugees and motivate them towards enthusiasm for the government cause have not been attempted. Even though it is a difficult problem, it could be thought of as a great propaganda and humanitarian opportunity.

The Economic Emphasis: Agriculture Programs

Agricultural production has been the economic touchstone of South Vietnam's past, and most planners have looked towards

²⁴A complete list of the various agencies and their programs can be found in the Report. Ibid., pp. 25-41.

²⁵In Quang Nam and Quang Tin the writer has interviewed temporary refugees who refused to build houses and be resettled--waiting only for the war to go elsewhere so they could return to their homes.

²⁶David Bell, NBC Television, 4 February 1966.

the nation's future development in terms of what the fertile soil can grow. Extensive experimentation in rice varieties had been started as early as the end of the last decade.

Improved rice varieties were under development to bolster production in the rich Delta region, because increases there could mean much more total rice production than in less fertile areas, such as Central Vietnam. In 1962, emphasis on greater production for the nation as a whole became a secondary goal. The target became the producer rather than how much he produced. The crowded and less productive areas of Central Vietnam began to receive more attention--not for their great agricultural potential but to make the lot of the individual farmer better by improving his meager output.

Land reform. As noted in Chapter IV the Diem regime turned away from land reform at the very time its emphasis might have helped in the insurgency. Little was done by successor governments, although General Khanh made a gesture towards the program by doubling the time allowable for repayment by the farmer of the piece of the land.

The Ky government reopened the campaign for land reform by pledging to redistribute the more than 300,000 hectares of riceland still in its possession.²⁷ A more immediate and concrete indication of commitment to land reform was expressed by Ky in

²⁷ United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Vietnam Conflict: The Substance and Shadow, op. cit., p. 6.

September, 1965 when he personally presided over the presentation of land titles to Highlanders in Tuyen Duc province, after many years of broken promises by other regimes.²⁸





It is premature to assess performance or the prospects for land reform, but it is clear that the ownership problem in the Delta is still a vital issue, and one which could be turned to the advantage of the government by massive redistribution. American advisors have given great emphasis since mid-1965 to the implementation of a land reform program.


Fertilizer. In the summer of 1963, USOM and the Ministry of Agriculture arranged for a massive distribution of fertilizer to the residents of all completed strategic hamlets in Central Vietnam. The formula allocated enough fertilizer for up to ½ hectare (over an acre) of rice land per farmer. In Quang Nam, the amount was changed to enough for 1/10 hectare so that some of the limited supply could reach each farmer. The results were as good as test plots had indicated they would be. The farmers were sold immediately on chemical fertilizers, and a larger distribution was planned for the spring crop. The first distribution was complicated by three types of fertilizer that were separately bagged and required both mixing and repeated applications. The second distribution was pre-mixed and it went to the entire province--except in a few completely Viet-

²⁸Interview with Don Wadley, USOM Province Representative, Tuyen Duc, 1965.

SOUTH VIETNAM

1964 FERTILIZER PROGRAM

-  1. Fertilizer sold at half the subsidized price on free credit basis.
-  2. Fertilizer given on grant basis.
-  3. Fertilizer sold through commercial outlets at full subsidized price-credit only in a few 'clear & hold' hamlets.
-  4. Fertilizer sold at full subsidized price on free credit basis.



Source: USOM/
Agriculture, Saigon

Figure 20

Cong areas. The result was a record crop in Quang Nam. Similar results were obtained in other provinces. Unfortunately the fertilizer had not been ordered in the United States to coincide with timely delivery for application to the crops. Much had to be stored for several months until the next growing season. The question mark in Quang Nam, where Viet-Cong control was rapidly growing in 1964, was whether the fertilizer had helped the communist rice collections more than the prestige of the Government. There was at that time no mantle of security to protect the bumper crop from the Viet-Cong in most areas.

The Fertilizer program was made nationwide in 1964, (see Figure 20). In the Highlands it was given out free, while in the central lowlands, where it was in its second year (as a program), the fertilizer was sold through the National Agricultural Credit Organization at half price, with credit available. In the wealthier areas (in the Delta and around Saigon) it was sold at a favorable price, in some cases without credit.

The Pig-Corn Program. A severe shortage of protein in Central Vietnam was the target of a program to supply improved varieties of pigs to farmers. American corn was supplied for feed at minimal prices. Devised jointly by USOM and the Ministry of Agriculture, three provincial services worked together on the program: Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and the National Agricultural Credit Organization (NACO). A local Pig Program committee was formed. The Agriculture extension people handled much of the educational effort; the Animal

Husbandry Service provided proper medicines; and NACO arranged the loan to the farmer. The loans would be repaid when the pigs were marketed. USOM furnished eight bags of cement for each pig sty. Although the program had been specially designed to aid poor peasants, many of the 250 families selected the first year were middle class peasants. In Thanh Nam hamlet of Dien Ban district (Quang Nam) the village chief explained to the writer that owning three pigs was a big investment which poor families did not want to risk. Some poorer families asked for only one pig. They also were the most reluctant to borrow money under the Pig-Corn plan. In other hamlets the program was welcomed and more people applied for pigs than could be accepted. NACO cadres were alert against hamlet officials who favored their own kinsmen in the selection of families.

In order to service these families, NACO and the Animal Husbandry Section were authorized larger field staffs. Saigon had not provided for this administrative increase, but miscellaneous funds from the provincial agreement permitted it.

In Thua Thien and Quang Tri provinces, more than two thousand families were included in the program. Despite problems of overextension and high loss from disease (from 25 to 35 per cent of live pigs delivered), the programs prospered. A major crisis arose in 1965 when corn shipments to Thua Thien were interrupted for several months and the pigs (and people) went hungry.²⁹

²⁹AID province report, Thua Thien, April, 1965.

Extension programs. Many locally developed programs were designed to augment farm income. In addition to activities described in Chapter VII, improved sugar cane and sweet potato cuttings were distributed in many provinces. Garden seed distribution also helped balance the diet of the average farmer with a variety of vegetables. A quality boar was given by USOM and maintained by each of the 64 Young Farmer's clubs in Quang Nam in order to improve the scrawny native pigs. After the disastrous flood in November, 1964, several hundred roosters were distributed to help rebuild and upgrade flocks. Village libraries were provided each Young Farmer's club. Books on farm and home improvement ideas were the main items in the collection.

Irrigation. A wide variety of projects was related to irrigation. Most large provinces had an Agricultural Hydraulics Office that dealt with the construction and maintenance of dams and irrigation systems. In 1965, 24 miles of canal were completed and 42 dams were built or reconstructed in Vietnam by the Agricultural Hydraulics Directorate.³⁰ Wells were drilled and many canals were dug or cleaned out as self-help projects (see Figure 16 for data up to mid-1964). USOM supplied surplus food for labor compensation and cement. Water pumps were always much in demand. Many were supplied, usually

³⁰ AID Far East Bureau, Agriculture Factsheet on Vietnam, 24 February 1966.

to peasant cooperatives who purchased them through commercial channels (data on the number of pumps was not available).

Staff. Perhaps the most significant efforts have been the extensive training of farmers in new methods and the building of sizable extension staffs. As yet no solution to the depletion of trained personnel by the armed forces draft had been reached at the end of 1965. Secretary Agriculture Orville Freeman noted with disdain the drafting of a top agricultural researcher when he visited Vietnam.³¹ The authorization in 1964 of 800 new agriculture extension field positions in South Vietnam marked a revolution in the development of extension capabilities.³² For the first time many districts had two or more agricultural and animal husbandry workers to assist the peasants by teaching them better methods. The key problem has been to find the men who are free from the draft so they can stay on the job.

Other Rural Economic Projects

Fishing. Many villages live entirely by fishing and the crafts associated with it. Increasing attention had been given to the needs of fisherman through the provision of nylon filament for the weaving of nets and the hiring of cadre to introduce "fish farming" via ponds stocked with tilapia fish. The

³¹New York Times, 12 February 1966, p. 11.

³²Tanham, War Without Guns, op. cit., p. 92.

improvement most wanted by fishermen was diesel motors for their fishing boats. The introduction of the Japanese-made Yanmar diesel engine was such an instant success that fishermen were paying twice the price to corrupt government officials for them.³³ The fraud was discovered in 1962 and the program has been discontinued. A planned renewal was delayed by various difficulties stemming from Japanese-Vietnamese negotiations over war reparations. The delays have been costly in the good will of the fishermen, who have shown willingness to buy the engine at almost any price.

Village industries. Self-help projects have assisted many small industries already operating--from saw mills to barber shops. Several sericulture centers, such as the one in Quang Nam, are helping rebuild silk production in Vietnam. Quang Nam had begun building a small industries training center for the improvement of design and techniques in order to meet market demands in pottery, weaving, marble carving, and brick making. The project was based on a survey in Quang Nam made by a USOM specialist. However, the program was rejected by the Central Pacification Bureau in Saigon because no national program as such yet existed.

Small industry development, particularly in areas where land is scarce, is an urgent and neglected need in Vietnam.

³³Interview with Robert Schoettler, USOM fisheries advisor, 1962.

Underemployed refugee camps exemplify the same problem. Unlike the USOM Agriculture, Education, and Health Divisions, USOM Industry has not geared its advisory program to a rural emphasis. Large scale projects have been the industrial emphasis in Vietnam. A major research effort on feasibility of various projects in each province would be a productive beginning.

Summary Evaluation

An impressive array of programs for rural social and economic development has been fielded by the joint efforts of Vietnamese and American planners since 1962. Somewhat less impressive has been a prominent absence of cohesive provincial or national economic and social planning in these programs. USOM program planners were interested in economic feasibility of projects in the pre-insurgency period. When the counter-insurgency emphasis grew in 1961-1962, more comprehensive and long-term planning considerations were increasingly ignored by USOM. The present course of program development in South Vietnam is geared to the input of as much aid as possible, with little regard for how the programs will be financed after the insurgency hopefully is defeated. Other problems in planning and scheduling will be discussed in Chapter XIII.

PART IV

NATIONAL PACIFICATION SYSTEM

SYNOPSIS

In Part IV the supporting national apparatus for province pacification programs is described and analyzed. Bi-national and multi-national coordination problems are discussed, and United States inter-agency administrative mechanisms are considered.

In Chapter XII, Sector Affairs units in the United States Military Assistance Command are reviewed, with attention to organizational and personnel matters. Chapter XII also deals with the impact of counterinsurgency activities on the structure and function of the United States Operations Mission (AID) to Vietnam, with particular focus on the organization and staffing of the Office of Provincial Operations.

CHAPTER XI

THE NATIONAL PACIFICATION SYSTEM

The intimate and absolute control exercised over the provinces by the Saigon government necessitates at least a summary examination of the pacification system at the national level. Almost all field officials, American and Vietnamese, tended to live by the doctrine that Saigon and the ARVN Corps commanders were responsible for many of the provincial administrative problems.

Pacification Organization Within the Republic of Vietnam

The Strategic Hamlet campaign had been run from the Presidency for six months before it was announced in February, 1962 that the campaign would be under an Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets (IMC).¹ The Committee was largely a figurehead, engaging in the "post-decisional participation" typical of the regime. Its secretariat provided the liaison for USOM Rural Affairs and MAAG. When the Diem regime fell, the Central Pacification Committee (CPC) became the equivalent body for policy. It too, rarely met, and its Permanent Bureau for New Life Hamlets provided the appearance of program coordination on the Vietnamese side. In fact, however, there was no

¹Osborne, op. cit., p. 27. The Committee included representatives in Education, Defense, Rural Affairs, Civic Action, and Interior.

strong central policy as with the Ngos. Under Diem, policies were implemented or rejected once they found their way to the Presidency--although this sometimes could take many months. After Diem, the Permanent Bureau moved very cautiously between the titans of the various Army commands and the heads of ministries. By June of 1964 it had begun to tighten controls on the highly flexible spending policies encouraged after the November coup by USOM Rural Affairs--to the grief of provincial officials and advisors. Eventually a national plan and budget for pacification emerged.

The creation of a Deputy Premier for Pacification was a move by General Khanh to give status and power to the pacification effort, but the office involved only theoretical concern with pacification.²

In October of 1965, the Rural Construction Board was formed to supplant the previously less active Central Pacification Committee as the policy body. The Ministry of Rural Construction served as an administrative arm of the Council, headed by Major General Nguyen Duc Thang. In early 1966, further powers were given to the Ministry and the name was shortened to Ministry of Construction.³

²Interview with Erland Heginbotham, USOM, 1966.

³As noted previously, in March, 1966 the American Mission in Saigon had begun calling the "construction" program by the new term: "revolutionary development."

The considerable resources of the Public Works Ministry were transferred in the new framework, and urban programs were added. The newly renamed Construction Board was comprised of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister for Defense, the Corps commanders, and the Ministers of Health, Education, Agriculture, and Reconstruction.

Planning policy is relayed by the Corps commanders to Construction Boards at Corps level. In the Corps boards, Division commanders and Province Chiefs are involved, and provide the policy link to the province.⁴ Some divisions also have pacification offices connecting them to regular units and province operations. The intrusion of the Corps and Division as additional administrative levels has slowed and complicated the provincial programming and operations functions. Relocation funding was held up in several provinces in 1965 by Corps level insistence on close control.⁵

Two key pacification positions under the Minister of Construction have emerged: a director of pacification programming and a director of cadre training. The rapidly evolving national structure has both limited field responsibility and increased field resources. The vital training function--described previously--is now solely in the hands of the national ministry.

⁴Interview with John Helble, Department of State, 1966.

⁵Quang Tri in I Corps is an example. Relocation payments were delayed several months while waiting for Corps inspection and approval. Interview with Dan Whitfield, formerly USOM Representative, Quang Tri.

Considerable progress in programming within the ministries has been made. Multiple funding sources and receipts systems are replaced by increased use of regular funding channels. Some of the province level flexibility has necessarily suffered.

The United States Mission

As the Head of the Country Team, the Ambassador is the senior American official in all pacification, as well as diplomatic, matters. The Mission Council reports to him and is comprised of MACV, USOM, JUSPAO (which includes USIS), the Embassy, and CIA. All these agencies report to their Washington headquarters, but always with the knowledge of the Ambassador.

A specialized committee was formed in 1962 to deal with counterinsurgency problems, entitled: Committee for Provincial Rehabilitation (COPROR). Representatives of all agencies were involved and theoretically coordination problems were settled there. COPROR had no secretariat, and coordination usually resulted from less formalized, and more frequent, inter-agency contacts.

A special Psychological Operations Committee (Psyops) was appointed in 1964 to facilitate coordination in this special arena. In 1965, the Information and Psychological Warfare elements of USOM, MACV, and USIS were united in closer coordination as JUSPAO. MACV psywar elements are operationally attached to JUSPAO, but not detached from MACV command. (See Figure 22). The Mission Psyops Committee continued policy control over JUSPAO, but the joint operations were under the direction of the head of USIS.

UNITED STATES MISSION VIETNAM




Figure 21

Figure 22

JOINT UNITED STATES PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (JUSPAO)




Figure 22

By fall of 1965 a special counterinsurgency team had been assembled under General Lansdale who was personally attached as a special assistant to the Ambassador. Much of the liaison with the Government of Vietnam on pacification policy appeared in early 1966 to be through this group headed by Lansdale.

The increasing necessity for coordination within the American Mission was expressed in the assignment of the Deputy Ambassador to this role.⁶

Regional coordination. In 1963, the Senior Advisor of the I Corps area requested the formation of an American coordination committee for the four province regions. Monthly sessions included all MACV sector advisors, USOM Representatives, the USIS Director from Hue, and the Consul from Hue. The primary function of the meetings was the interchange of information on programs and problems.

Bi-national Coordination

The history of Vietnamese and United States coordination indicates radical shifts of practice, ranging from the intimacy of the early Lansdale and Michigan State roles to the formalized and distant relations after 1956.

In 1961, Diem was pressured to form a National Security Council in order to decentralize his personalized command of the Armed Forces and give the United States Mission a formal

⁶Shaplen, Robert, "Letter from South Vietnam," New Yorker, 12 March 1966, p. 60.

high level organism with which it could coordinate.⁷ After a few meetings, the Council was never heard from again. The Americans went back to advising each other at that level. Ironically, in the critical early years of the insurgency (1958-1961), the Americans had no actively functioning advisors either at the very top (the Palace) or at the grassroots. The lowest echelon MACV advisor was at the Division level in 1961.⁸ As noted earlier, USOM Field Service advisors had been proposed at the province level in 1958, but were rejected by Diem.

In 1964, USOM created a Rural Affairs liaison officer who operated primarily in the New Life Hamlet Bureau. A USOM social development expert was assigned as special advisor to the Minister of Social Welfare.

At the Corps level, USOM and Vietnamese military and civilian representatives were made a part of the Corps Rural Construction Boards in 1965. The most continuous operational liaison was maintained at the province level and--for MACV--in the subsector. There was no formal vehicle for high level United States-Vietnamese consultation. Meetings were conducted on an ad hoc basis.

In 1964 (when the writer was in Saigon), the single USOM liaison advisor to the New Life Hamlet Bureau was charged with

⁷Donnell, "Politics in Vietnam," op. cit., p. 222.

⁸Interview with Joseph Taylor, AID, 1965.

handling USOM problems from 44 provinces. Complete backstop staffs for the various regions existed in MACV and USOM, but there was no accepted counterpart relation for systematic decisionmaking on the mounting administrative and program problems. From the province point of view, the massive Saigon staffs of the two nations were not providing the support necessary for successful field operations.

Gradually, coordination in Saigon improved to the point that Joint Financial Management Teams were formed to visit the various provinces and resolve program problems on the spot. These mobile teams were the first genuine relief from the operational confusions created by the complicated rules and rigid interpretations that have been endemic to traditional Vietnamese bureaucracy.⁹ But many 1965 province reports continued to indicate the need for decisive and faster supportive action from Saigon.

American combat forces. The presence of more than 200,000 American combat troops by early 1966 necessitated a special agreement between the Government of Vietnam and the United States. The arrangement recognized the independence of command by each nation of its own forces. Joint operations were conducted by ad hoc planning, in which command was not transferred by either side. By early 1966, the arrangement, unusual in military history, was working well.¹⁰

⁹AID province report, Binh Tuy, December, 1964.

¹⁰Interview with Source Number 72, USOM, 1964.

Free World Assistance

The influx of assistance from approximately 30 nations has been both a welcome and administratively challenging input. This aid from nations allied with South Vietnam has been officially referred to as "Free World" assistance by official Americans. Korean, Australian and other military units have been coordinated with MACV via a joint operational organization on the same level as the MACV commander. MACV serves as the basic support system for all foreign military units in Vietnam.

Among civilian agencies--such as the various Free World surgical teams--USOM provides administrative support in the form of interpreters, housing, etc. In fact, most Free World aid is a coordinated part of the larger USOM input--in part because the participating countries do not usually have comparable overseas support systems for aid operations. Formal programming of Free World Assistance projects is always finally negotiated and formally announced, of course, by the Vietnamese Government, as the host country.

CHAPTER XII

INTRA-AGENCY PACIFICATION STRUCTURES:

USOM AND MACV

The creation of the MACV and USOM networks of provincial advisors and representatives was only part of the massive buildup of American assistance mechanisms that was in full swing by 1962. This chapter will survey the national-level changes, primarily as they are relevant to provincial operations.

I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE USOM APPARATUS

Some of the technical divisions in USOM had begun to revise their programs by 1962, but the most radical change in USOM was the innovation of the Office of Rural Affairs and Counterinsurgency (later shortened to Rural Affairs).

The Office of Rural Affairs

The Office of the Assistant Director for Rural Affairs was responsible for "coordinating the planning and implementation of the USOM Counterinsurgency efforts."¹ Although the technical divisions were not under the command of the Assistant Director, his recommendations regarding their programs carried great weight in determining their shape and priority as related to

¹United States Operations Mission, Organization and Functions Manual (Saigon: April, 1963).

counterinsurgency. Most of the technical divisions had not yet reoriented their normal development projects, and considerable conflict developed between Rural Affairs and the divisions.

The Rural Affairs Office had several special project advisors for development and promotion of the Pig-Corn Program, Women's Affairs, Self-Help, The Open Arms Campaign, and Hydro-jet Well Drilling. A public health specialist in the Office served as liaison with the Public Health Division and province representatives. These projects sometimes overlapped the subject areas of the special divisions. The Rural Affairs Office took the position that certain urgent projects could be better implemented by Americans who were operationally assigned to the project rather than through the slower channels of the regular USOM-Ministry advisory apparatus.

Much of the attention of Rural Affairs personnel was given to implementation of the strategic hamlet campaign, most of which was not directly related to the other USOM divisions. Clearly, however, USOM had not yet begun to function in the new counterinsurgency mission as a fully coordinated whole.

The November revolution was followed by the departure of Assistant Director Phillips for personal reasons. During the critical period when the Vietnamese Government was constantly reshuffling itself, the Rural Affairs Office was without a permanent head.

In June, 1964, seven months after Phillip's departure, George Tanham, previously with RAND Corporation, arrived to

become the Associate Director for Operations, a position which involved higher rank and theoretically a stronger role in coordinating rural operations involving the technical divisions in USOM.² In a few weeks James Killen became Director of USOM. Killen almost immediately questioned the role of the Office of Operations, and soon changed its name to the Office of Provincial Operations. Killen's primary objection to provincial activities at that time was the heavy involvement of Americans in performance of duties that he felt should be carried out by the Vietnamese Government. He opposed release of commodities and approval of funds by USOM Representatives and he promoted the theory that the Vietnamese should be pressured to do these things for themselves. In a 1964 discussion he argued:

When we decided to maintain a quick counterinsurgency effort, it turned out we had to put ourselves in the part of the Vietnamese. . . put our people in the countryside and give them resources and tell them that 'you do the things the GVN should be doing for the people in the countryside.' Are we wise in thinking in terms of perpetuating a situation. . . in thinking that we should continue to do for the Vietnamese government things it should be doing for itself? Are we seeing some strengthening of Vietnam as a result of our efforts, or are we institutionalizing an excessive dependence on the USOM representative to do things they should be doing for themselves?³

²The structural changes within USOM may be traced by comparison of the USOM organization charts in the Appendices.

³Office of Provincial Operations, "Transcript of IV Corps Regional Meeting of Province Representatives," (Saigon: USOM, 26 September 1964), p. 5. (Mimeographed.)

One USOM Representative expressed the position of most provincial personnel by saying that the USOM Representative had done much to aid the Province Chief in accomplishing his job:

There have been five Province Chiefs during my tenure in Vinh Binh Province. All were very reluctant to make decisions and very reluctant to make field inspections. The key is to have all leaders identify themselves with the people. My role is to encourage the Province Chief to get out and meet the local people and solve their problems. We have given him the capability of taking initiative because of the resources we have provided him. We have not made decisions for him. We point out problem areas and what he can do to correct them. I have seen more growth of decision making on the part of the Province Chief, not more dependence on the USOM Representative.

We have brought more and more problems to him, particularly in civilian areas. We have provided continuity when new Province Chiefs have been assigned. We have provided action by having materials and commodities on the spot. We have given him control of his own resources. Previously he had a minister to patrol these resources from Saigon. We have given him coordination of these resources.⁴

The director continued to oppose the previous provincial operations role, eventually removing the leverage which USOM Representatives had enjoyed by the responsibility to approve commodity and fund releases. These differences on administrative and program policies and personal harrassment of Tanham by the Director led to Tanham's resignation in December, 1964. Province Representatives with problems that needed strong support from their superiors in Saigon continued to get little

⁴Remarks by W. Robert Warne, Ibid., pp. 7-8.

assistance from them during this period of top-level conflict.

After Tanham's resignation, Killen reduced his former position to Assistant Director and Samuel Wilson was appointed.

Regional organization. The increase of field personnel in 1964 had led to the formation of regional offices in the four Corps areas. Province representatives were expected to work through these facilities for most problems related to Saigon. The technical divisions attached field personnel to these offices. There were advisors from almost every USOM Division who travelled among the provinces working outward from the regional base. Killen had brought these regional offices directly under the Office of Director. The Assistant Director for Provincial Operations was reduced to a "Chief of Staff" status, without line command over the regional offices. Killen further weakened the position of Assistant for Provincial Operations by creation of three new Assistant Directors, one of whom took over logistics activities that had originally been in the Office for Rural Affairs.

Killen felt the quality of the Provincial Operations personnel was inadequate for their role. He envisioned it as more advisory and necessitating a considerable background of managerial experience.⁵ After an extended reappraisal of the role of the Provincial Representative, during which scores of

⁵Interview with James Killen, former Director, USOM, 1964.

experienced men were released as not appropriate for another tour, the position grade was escalated from an FSR-5 to an FSR-3. A recruiting effort both in and outside AID was pointed towards finding former mission directors and deputy directors to head the regional offices.

The Office of Provincial Operations had lost many of its special projects programs, most of which were transferred to the appropriate technical division. However, new staff positions were created to bolster the programming of specifically provincial operations, such as Open Arms, Self-Help, Relocation, etc.

Killen favored the buildup of village police and emphasized the role of the Public Safety Division. He opposed the large size of the mission (as he had done in other missions) and tried at first to reduce the staff.⁶

Most Province Representatives agreed that Killen's policies seriously hampered their function. Although he often spoke of pressuring the Vietnamese towards doing things for themselves, he had taken away the American leverage in the province by removing the necessity of American approvals at the local level. In sum, his conventional approach to development activity did not appear to fit the requirements of the Vietnamese situation in 1964 and 1965. He did, however, integrate the divisions of USOM into a more smoothly functioning mechanism in which all divisions were actively supporting a single policy.

⁶San Francisco Chronicle, 6 February 1965, p. 1.

The reappointment of Ambassador Lodge in July, 1965 coincided with the removal of Killen, and his eventual replacement by Charles Mann, AID Director in Laos. In the fall of 1965, USOM began to make plans for a massive buildup in USOM personnel and the USOM Representative approval for funds and commodities was restored for the 1966 agreements. In February, 1966, the position of Assistant Director for Provincial Operations was redesignated Associate Director for Field Operations, with responsibility for direct supervision of the regional offices as well as provincial operations.

Personnel Selection for Provincial Operations

The initial selection of the Rural Affairs personnel included a wide range of sources and types. Many were former military officers; some were from technical divisions of AID; some had worked for other government and voluntary agencies.

Rufus Phillips did much of the initial interviewing personally, and sought to find people who were specially qualified in human relations skills such as ability to work under pressure and difficult circumstances, and experience in effecting administrative change and results in programs. Great emphasis was placed on capacity to deal with persons of another culture, particularly in being able to "empathize" with the counterpart's situation and problems. Finally, a sense of service and a desire to accomplish were considered essential motivations.

USAID VIETNAM




Figure 23. USAID Vietnam.

MAP OF VIETNAM SHOWING LOCATION OF FIELD-BASED USOM EMPLOYEES




Figure 24.

In 1964, large numbers of personnel were recruited by normal aid methods and by secondment from the Army. Many retired officers were hired--most of whom had Far Eastern experience.

Some of those initially recruited by Phillips were not permitted to return under the Killen administration (although several eventually went back after Killen's departure). In the effort to upgrade the maturity and quality of the Province Representatives, higher level former military officers were recruited, and more stringent criteria were applied for selection. Several men with city management experience were recruited, in the theory that local government experience would be useful in the local government of Vietnam as well. The problem of retaining and recruiting qualified men had grown acute by mid-1965, when the terms of those whose families had been evacuated in early 1965 were being released.

Technical Divisions

The buildup in the USOM technical divisions had begun with a major enlargement of the Public Safety Division in 1962 and 1963. It included more police advisors and personnel responsible for the radio communications network which was planned to tie the lowest hamlet to Saigon. The development of field advisory staffs by all the divisions began in 1964. The addition of technical personnel for operational responsibilities further increased the field staffs. In 1965, a complete framework for refugee administration was organized. By December, 1965, more

than 800 Americans and 200 Filipinos and Chinese were employed by USOM.⁷

The size of the Public Safety and Public Health Divisions had increased to the point in early 1966 where each Division was headed by an Assistant Director. The Agriculture Division also had begun to multiply its staff in 1966 by recruiting province level technicians in addition to those stationed at the Corps level.

International Voluntary Services. The young volunteers of IVS were employed in several ways relevant to counterinsurgency programs. The two emphases of IVS were agriculture and education. There were a few volunteers also working in Public Health. The various USOM divisions usually arranged with the Vietnamese Government for the volunteers to be related to a provincial or regional agriculture service or a school. Several IVS men were assigned to the Rural Affairs programs for special projects and others became Province Representatives.

Possible Effects of the USOM Staff Increase

Some high-level administrators expressed concern in late 1965 over the enormous buildup of personnel for 1966. One key administrator informed the writer that the tendency of the increase would be to take the activities out of the hands of the Vietnamese at every level.⁸ He further commented that one of

⁷Agency for International Development, AID Program in Vietnam, op. cit., p. 1.

⁸Interview with Source Number 33, AID, 1965.

the causes of the buildup was USOM's fear of complete United States military take-over of all American operations in Vietnam, which was desired by the military. The logistical requirements for supporting USOM field staffs have multiplied under the new system and have further increased the size of Saigon support staffs as well.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MACV

The enlargement of MAAG began with an increase from 327 to 685 during 1960. Before then, MAAG had been scrupulously held to the ceilings of the Geneva Agreement. The growing insurgency, however, forced the enlargement. In 1962, MAAG was subsumed under MACV which by then included various air support and other units as well as more advisors. By then the American advisory effort began to get much closer to the actual prosecution of the war through the presence of regimental and battalion advisors.

The Sector Advisory Role

Perhaps the most significant innovation, in terms of military advisory roles, was the assignment of Sector Advisors to assist Province Chiefs in pacification matters. (As noted earlier "sector" refers to all military activities within a province or a specially designated military area.) The emphasis in selection was on mature men with considerable military experience. Few of the Sector Advisors had served in an advisory role before, although

almost all had previous combat and command experience. By 1964, training included military assistance techniques and usually three months of language.

The appointment of Civil Affairs Advisors for each Sector team eased the pressure on the Sector Advisor in his responsibilities concerning non-military matters. Unfortunately, these men were not usually highly qualified, often seconded from other regular corps and given a few months of civil affairs training. They were by no means career specialists in civil affairs.

Jordan notes three problems associated with the advisory role in Vietnam: 1) lack of command, 2) absence of family, and 3) shortness of tour.⁹ The field-oriented character of the advisory mission and the sheer size of the advisory input precluded the presence of families. In the earlier years, up to 1964, families had been permitted, and tours were longer, but increasing terror forced evacuation of all dependents in February 1965. The consequence of one year tours was a constant cycle of change, in which the advisor usually achieved mastery of his job and rapport with his counterpart just in time to begin thinking of his new assignment in the United States.¹⁰

Lack of American command was a problem experienced by many advisors. A General Officer associated with MAAG for several years in Vietnam once explained to the writer that he believed

⁹Jordan, op. cit., p. 162.

¹⁰A perceptive account of military advisory problems in Vietnam is given by Robert Shaplan, "Letter from South Vietnam," New Yorker, 16 April 1965, pp. 166-189.

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM SAIGON, VIETNAM

1965




Figure 25.

United States command in Vietnam was essential for victory.¹¹ Men in Vietnam who had previously advised in Korea were acutely aware of the difference between the two situations, particularly in the absence in Vietnam of leverage to back up persuasion (viz., control of the Korean commander's gasoline and ammunition ration). While direct American command would appear to be unrealistic in the light of the intensive Vietnamese nationalism, it would probably enhance the advisory role to supply more direct control of some of the American material inputs such as was done in Korea.

Reporting. A great deal of the Sector advisory staff's attention was given to reporting. In 1964, vast amounts of data were being sent from the sector level. Sector Advisors have estimated to the writer that as much as 60 per cent of their time was spent preparing specific reports. Prior to the fall of Diem, the upper levels of the MACV system had encouraged optimistic reporting on pacification. This was clearly sensed at the sector level, resulting in the widely varying estimates regarding pacification between military and civilian field reporters.

The Office of Sector Affairs

A special office in Saigon had been opened to focus on the problems peculiar to the Sector Advisors, which often were related to problems of civil administration rather than purely

¹¹ Interview with Source Number 38, former MAAG Commanding General, 1965.

military matters typical of the other advisory roles. Regional reporters kept up with their particular areas and regularly made field visits. In 1964, however, the Office was primarily oriented towards reporting for its own sake. No control system or bi-national channel assured that reports requesting action would receive a reply.¹²

The sector team and the larger advisory system. Communications with Saigon by Sector Advisors always went through the Senior Advisors of Division and Corps, under whom the sector was subsumed in the chain of command. The sector activities were often more remote from standard military problems than the ARVN itself. The Senior Advisor of a Division, for instance, was closer to activities of his junior advisors in his own divisional framework than the Sector team attached outside the ARVN system.

The tensions between the province chiefs and division commanders were often reflected in the relations between the counterpart advisors. In this administrative milieu, the Sector Advisor's effort to help his Province Chief clear a road block in Saigon was confronted with a double filter at Corps and Division that did not always facilitate action in Saigon. Further, the ARVN-oriented Senior Advisor at Division

¹²This observation is based on numerous contacts in 1964 with Sector Advisors, who made such "request for action" reports, and with regional reporters in the Office of Sector Affairs who admitted that such reporting was not action-oriented.

had to write the Sector Advisor's efficiency report, although the Division was usually operationally isolated from many of the complex social, political, and paramilitary problems, confronted daily in the Sector.

The Sector and Subsector system, numbering about 2000 men, was only a small part of the massive MACV advisory component in early 1966.¹³

Special Forces. American Special Forces teams operated independently of the advisory command systems in which their various camps were located. By 1964, pressure from Division and Corps Advisors led to the coordination of Special Forces operations with the American Senior Advisors at the Corps level.

American Combat Forces

As noted in Chapter VII, American forces entered directly into pacification campaigns in the Danang Special Sector (a part of Quang Nam province) and elsewhere. By early 1966, the Marines had given a great deal of attention to intensive civic action projects--so much in fact that some observers feared they had inhibited provincial government participation in the pacification effort.¹⁴

Another complication arose from the arrival of combat forces. Some observers felt the attention of MACV was drawn

¹³Shaplen, "Letter" (12 March 1966), op. cit., p. 60.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 93.

from its previous focus on advisory problems to the American combat units. In a survey of sector advisors, complaints against the diversion of interest from the concerns of pacification by MACV superiors were widely voiced.¹⁵ Although the previous military background of MACV superiors would naturally orient them towards the more familiar American combat operations, this could lead to avoidance of the central task of achieving victory through reliance on Vietnamese forces and particular focus on pacification as a comprehensive military, political, social, and economic process.¹⁶

¹⁵Interview with Source Number 72, USOM, 1964.

¹⁶Idem.

PART V

PACIFICATION IN VIETNAM:

AN EVALUATION AND A THEORY

SYNOPSIS

Chapter XIII is an effort to offer a positive critique of previous and current pacification policies and programs in Vietnam utilizing earlier chapters for most of the analysis. In Chapter XIV a theory for pacification in Vietnam is suggested, followed in Chapter XV with a proposed management control model for implementation of the theory.

The theory and model have been formulated with attention to both the failures and successes of previous efforts, and the social, political, and administrative parameters in the Vietnamese situation. The concept of the fulfillment of an orderly, indigenously motivated social and political revolution is proposed as the motivational source for the pacification enterprise. National policies consonant with reform and orderly revolution, and based on various proposals of Vietnamese nationalists, are presented as a "platform" on which pacification policy would be built. Administrative and procedural reform is also discussed--vis a vis pacification requirements.

The proposed role of the United States in the pacification effort is elucidated, including specific recommendations for more effective use of manpower, money, and materials.

More meticulous attention is given to province level pacification operations, including control systems and procedures.

CHAPTER XIII

EVALUATION OF PACIFICATION

Previous chapters have indicated many of the problems and failures associated with pacification. Chapter XIII is an effort to evaluate pacification as a whole process which involved many component programs. Continuing with the provincial perspective of other chapters, the first section will deal with inspection and the problems of field evaluation.

I. INSPECTION AND FIELD EVALUATION

The accent on the strategic hamlet campaign had been on rapid expansion in order to bring an early conclusion to the conflict. There was little room for thorough inspection and evaluation of progress. Inspection staffs were small and the methods of inspection were elaborate and time consuming. The field inspectors were never able to cover adequately the areas assigned them. Provinces had no officially constituted inspection staffs, and the result was that operationally committed individuals--the cadres, district chiefs, and province chiefs--did most of the inspection.

As has been noted, breathtaking goals set by the Presidency were often reported as reached by the provincial authorities who used the trick of "imaginative" reporting. Few officials at any level felt they could afford to report unfavorable results.

Such an atmosphere hardly encouraged thorough evaluation among provincial administrators. By October, 1962, observant officials were alarmed at the lack of inspection and increasing signs of program inadequacies.¹

Inspections by Province Chiefs, who were often accompanied by Sector Advisors and USOM Representatives, tended to be formalized and they did not permit the depth analysis of the hamlet situation needed to ascertain the real security status. For occasional higher level visitors, the Province Chief or District Chief had showcase projects geared for "inspection readiness" at all times--as noted earlier.

As the New Life Hamlet campaign got underway in 1964, more stringent and frequent inspections were attempted, but there was still a shortage of inspection officials. In 1965, procedures were instituted to tighten inspection methods and control by Corps and Division headquarters. Hamlets could not receive economic and social aid until they had been certified by a Division inspection team as "pacified." Sometimes the consequence was program delays of several months because of overworked inspection staffs.²

However, the methodology and criteria for inspections were improved to the point that many hamlets were reclassified

¹The writer was present at a Vietnamese I Corps briefing in October, 1962, in which a frank appraisal of problems was given and the need cited for more inspection teams.

²In Quang Tri province the USOM Representative informed the writer that refugees from the Viet-Cong could not be aided because the hamlet in which they had sought refuge had been declared by inspectors as not yet pacified.

as "not pacified" through closer scrutiny. Increased Viet-Cong activity was another important factor in the downgrading of pacification accomplishment in many hamlets.³

American advisors faced similar shortages of time and transportation in their inspection efforts. The most remote and least visited hamlets were often those which urgently needed checking. The advent of helicopters for Sector use increased field visits but usually shortened the duration at any single location--especially in less secure areas. Helicopter crews were cautious about long stays in any one place. Again, inspection performance suffered.

As noted earlier, optimistic reporting was not only a Vietnamese phenomenon. Top level encouragement in MACV was easily coupled with the encouraging statistics provided by local Vietnamese. The bad news was harder to find. Under Diem, Americans nearly always talked to officials who owed their jobs to the regime--not the local voters. American remoteness from contact with the peasant viewpoint was a critical problem in field evaluation, particularly among MACV advisors. Subtle problems of the existence of Viet-Cong village infrastructure and rigged elections were not easy for an American to discover, even if he spoke Vietnamese. It was much easier to check defense perimeters and weapons, and to listen to statistics from the local hamlet official. The most difficult evaluation problem

³See Figure 3, p. 78.

of all was the hamlet which tried to make peace with both sides by fulfilling the formal demands of the Government and secretly permitting the Viet-Cong free access.

However, field visits brought a surprising amount of data to the surface which indicated the inaccuracies of lower level reporting and poor quality control. On other questions, such as economic programs and local corruption in his area, peasants often commented with frankness, providing valuable data. Such spot checks in Quang Nam began to reveal an image of the hamlet program quite different from the reports to USOM in the province from official government sources.

Both Americans and Vietnamese needed a larger number of qualified personnel for field inspection, who were themselves not responsible to the regular administrative channels. The Permanent Bureau for New Life Hamlets in Saigon assigned inspectors on an ad hoc basis from their regular staff, mostly concerning questions of misuse of funds and commodities. But there was no regularly functioning system for program evaluation and review at the highest level.

Criteria for Local Security Evaluation

Demonstrated examples of Viet-Cong influence over "completed" strategic hamlets in Delat areas in mid-1963 eventually led to an intensive search for new criteria to determine whether a hamlet or an area could be called pacified. The revision of the six-point criteria, discussed previously, was a considerable improvement over the previous strategic

hamlet criteria. The weakest point was failure to identify and eradicate the Viet-Cong infrastructure. One common sense question often put by an American advisor got quickly to the point: Will the pacification cadre sleep in the hamlet? If so, it must be pacified. Other clues could be found in the number of men willing to bear arms or serve as officials, the amount of intelligence data volunteered by the people, and the trend in Open Arms returnees to the hamlet. Perhaps the best indicator was the demonstrated willingness of hamlet people to defend themselves in a Viet-Cong attack. However, one could not assume that no reports of attacks meant the hamlet was pacified, for Viet-Cong entry could have been tacitly permitted with no report to or by local officials because of fear of Viet-Cong reprisal.

Attention was also given in 1964 to more accurate classification of pacification status on a district and province level. The Vietnamese Government and MACV required monthly submission of a status map using these color symbols: dark blue, (pacified); light blue, (undergoing pacification); green, (cleared of Viet-Cong units); white, (unpopulated); red, (Viet-Cong controlled); and deep red, (Viet-Cong base areas). Unfortunately the classification itself prohibited accurate categorization of large areas in some provinces. In Quang Nam, ARVN would move its regiment around several districts, staying a few weeks in each place, but without concomitant systematic pacification efforts. Invariably the communist incidents would go down with

the ARVN troops present. This was taken as an improvement in the security status of the area and the map report would be changed. Then incidents would soar again when ARVN moved somewhere else.

Green areas thus "cleared", or free of major incidents, implied a security condition of positive Government achievement. There was no room in the classification for the truly contested area, ruled at night by the Viet-Cong, but by the Government during the day. This was the standard situation in most of Quang Nam and many other provinces in early 1964.

A feasible approach to assess the security status of a contested area must include a variety of information, particularly from observation and interrogation of the peasants. The "grapevine" usually kept the local citizens aware of where they could go and what they could do. Many officials relied on such local intelligence to determine their own activities and travel. But the maps sent to MACV and ARVN in Saigon did not reflect this data.

The subtle factors that are the ingredients of security are not always quantifiable, particularly in the marginal areas where the need for correct classification matters most.

For maps or any other reporting system to be useful a carefully constructed military-political-social-economic pattern for a given area would have to be developed, using a combination of overt and covert information systems. This would consider total behavior of the area including: 1) enemy

activity, 2) Government presence, and 3) peasant behavior.

Despite active American advisory efforts, inadequately coordinated intelligence and information systems have remained a serious block against the capability of province and higher level administrators to have an accurate picture of the field situation. Even the overt data on many government activities in a hamlet or area may not be known as a whole by province estimators.

On the American side, the problem of a new culture and language further removes the advisor from an easy assessment of a given community or district. The inadequately based interpretations, when neatly quantified, color-coded, and placed on a briefing board may appear as clear "evidence" on which top level American policymakers must rely to make far reaching decisions.

The inference of this section is that clearer criteria and a bigger and better mechanism for inspection are needed. An improved approach would involve comprehensive knowledge of the area being inspected, adequate criteria to determine the efficacy of the Government pacification program there, and freedom on the part of inspectors from administrative or other involvement with those in charge of the operation. The inspection criteria and field information available to the evaluator must each form a framework within which the bits and pieces of the inspection experience are fitted for a meaningful picture of the situation as it is and as it should be.

II. A SUMMARY CRITIQUE OF VIETNAMESE PACIFICATION EFFORTS

Considerable attention has been given to the strategies of pacification and their cultural context, (in Parts I and II) and to the content of specific programs and structures, (Part III). In the rest of this chapter, the writer will attempt to provide a meaningful summary of what went wrong in the pacification process and why, primarily from the provincial perspective. American advisory efforts will be discussed separately.

Four fundamental factors in the conflict in South Vietnam have undergone critical change since the strategic hamlet campaign was formally launched in 1962: 1) The Viet-Cong strength in the countryside has made a "quantum leap" from its position of early 1962; 2) The fragile political and administrative system of the Ngos was followed by two years of administrative and political chaos that drastically weakened the counterinsurgent effort; 3) Popular political and social upheaval in the aftermath of Diem's fall has provided both a vitality and a fluidity on the social scene; and 4) The counterinsurgent military capability was revolutionized by substantial American troop inputs.

Further, the feedback of previous pacification failures has changed the climate of peasant receptivity and capability in the creation of a rural security system. Repeated troop withdrawals have reduced the credibility of government promises

to protect the rural communities. Thus, pacification efforts and plans should not be judged outside the conditions of the period in which they were applied.

It is particularly difficult to evaluate individual program components of the campaigns by themselves. The right economic program at the wrong time may fail to function at all because it preceded adequate security preparations. Or the same program could be erroneously considered successful when, in fact, the fruits of the venture ended up strengthening the insurgent system by bigger communist tax collections.

Objectives in Pacification

As noted in Chapter V, Ngo Dinh Nhu and the Americans were not really saying the same things in describing the intent of the strategic hamlet program. The USOM advisors had hoped to duplicate the genuine and successful appeal to popular support which had won against the Huks in the Philippines. Nhu was apparently dreaming of a new era of popular support for the regime drawn from the grassroots by the same techniques of human engineering the communists had employed in China. Without the motivated and skillful apparatus of the communists, the "revolution" became an ordeal for the peasant and official alike, in which false appearances were offered and willingly taken for reality itself. There was neither security nor popular support.

By mid-1965 pacification operations showed the signs of lack of a coherent policy by the Vietnamese. Search and destroy

operations were widely practiced and resources control efforts were underway in some areas. Economic, psychological, and social programs were being used almost everywhere to obtain popular support, but these usually lacked adequate police or military protection to make a popular response possible. The Viet-Cong apparatus could be found almost anywhere.

Surveys conducted in several provinces during 1965 had begun to focus official attention on what the peasant wanted. The fundamental desire was always the same: protection. The unproductive admixture of high economic and propaganda input and part-time security support is shown in the following vignette from Binh Thuan province:

On February 23, the VC ordered 150 families of Tuy Hoa village to move out of their hamlets and return to their former homes by February 25. Ten families moved out. The province organized a rally of the people with both the Province Chief and the District chief exhorting the people to resist the VC demands. The people replied that it was a difficult decision to make as the government was only able to protect them in the day time and they were subject to the VC at night. Since the province does not have the capability to provide security in this area, it appears doubtful that the people will continue to resist the VC. The province plans to develop 48 self help projects for this quarter.⁴

Although much of the operational confusion may be a problem of poor management, the regularity of the lack of coordination suggests that policymakers in Vietnam have not accepted as pacification dogma the priority role of protecting the peasant. Experience has shown it is the only road to

⁴AID province report, Binh Thuan, February, 1965.

obtaining his support.

At the end of 1965, the new cadre training program appeared to be taking this problem into consideration. The new pacification cadres were operating in armed teams to insure the safety of the hamlet people and themselves as the cadres worked to win their confidence. This protection is the only platform on which the cadres can build the confidence which will lead to popular participation in self defense.

Protection has been projected as the fundamental precondition on which other programs of political participation and economic and social development may take place. These other areas have also been clouded by thinking in terms of ad hoc projects apart from an integrated plan. The considerable talk about revolution has yet to lead to a comprehensive plan for its motivation and implementation--particularly as a reciprocal process in which the grassroots community affirms and defines its revolutionary interests.

The Pacification Apparatus

Civil administration. The scope and significance of pacification in Vietnam necessitates the consideration of the entire government structure as the "pacification apparatus." Almost every ministry has some tie to the rural areas and thus either helps or hinders pacification by the way its officials operate in the field.

The physical and psychological devastation wrought by Viet-Cong terror among rural officials was complemented by a demoralization of the bureaucracy that was induced by the behavior of the Ngos themselves. Donnell comments:

Normative ambiguity and the Ngo's own Messianic political complex combine to induce such extremely important dysfunctional results as unreliable reporting from lower administrative levels and consequently unrealistic planning and decision-making at the top level. For provincial officials kept in anxiety about their standing with Saigon are afraid to report actual difficulties and reverses encountered in carrying out Saigon's orders and tend instead to submit optimistically slanted, statistically impressive reports which convey to the Presidency a false sense of official achievement throughout much of the country. In the strategic hamlet program this has been evident in the official eagerness to report quantitative gains and to produce "showpiece" hamlets and other projects which may symbolize dramatic progress to a VIP making a flying inspection trip but which often yield only artificial and temporary results.⁵

After the fall of Diem the bureaucracy continued to be paralyzed by the endless political shifts that imperiled positions of all officials of any consequence. These dislocations seriously affected provincial pacification operations by blocking effective decisionmaking in Saigon and at Corps levels, and particularly by forcing a top-to-bottom shuffle within the province itself. Many provinces changed chiefs as often as four or five times in a single year, beginning in 1964.

Corruption is another factor that hampers pacification in two ways. First, if the villagers do not get the money

⁵Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam," op. cit., p. 535.

intended for them, then the program is hurt. Second, it goes to the corrupt local official and everybody knows about it. In a Bien Hoa province survey, the people noted that all the officials had begun driving motor bikes and living in brick houses, where they had previously ridden only bicycles and had lived in ordinary houses.⁶ This local corruption is perhaps the most serious of all because it is the most visible to the peasant and confirms exactly what the Viet-Cong has been saying about the Government. Public executions notwithstanding, there was little evidence in early 1966 that the policy of eradicating corruption was being seriously implemented.

The vast amount of American aid channeled through the frail and antiquated government administrative mechanism has made it difficult to enforce anti-corruption programs. A great number of military and civilian officials at all levels are involved and would resist reform efforts.

Procedures and delays. The Saigon bureaucracy was still burdened with involved procedures and excessive delays in 1965. The quick response needed in emergency pacification programs was not yet a possibility. A great deal had been accomplished by USOM and Vietnamese planners to simplify funding procedures by 1965, but much more appeared to need correction. The comparatively routine operation of releasing payroll funds to the

⁶United States Information Service, "Rural Opinion in Bien Hoa Province" (Saigon: 2 July 1964), p. 6. (Mimeographed).

provinces was delayed in several major programs in 1965. The Vietnamese civil servant's pay check has a close relation to his performance level--as in any nation. Some provincial cadre systems have operated for periods of several months without any pay during 1964-1965.

There is urgent need for administrative studies at every level to pinpoint the bottlenecks arising from unbalanced work loads, ill-defined and circuitous decisionmaking processes, and lack of systematic responsiveness to trouble warnings coming up from lower echelons. South Vietnam's Government has been impacted with administrative demands probably unparalleled in the history of any nation. But the fundamental task of revolutionizing its level of efficiency to meet these staggering administrative requirements has hardly begun.

Responsiveness to the population. An abiding failure of the Government apparatus has always been its isolation from, and interest in, the peasant. Their pay and promotions come from above and that is where the reverent attention of the typical civil servant is riveted. The concept of the civil servant as public servant, responsive to the people, has yet to take hold in Vietnam.

Military forces. The relation of ARVN to pacification has been a constant problem. Although individual commanders have carried out successful pacification efforts (such as Duc Duc in Quang Nam and Phuoc Choau in Quang Tin), the overall pacification

performance has been poor. Prepared for conventional war, ARVN still lacks solid civic action orientation and training in effective pacification procedures. Some competent civil administrators and advisors prefer not to have ARVN around when pacification is underway. Coordination and long term commitment of forces, essential to pacification, have not been obtained, as a rule. Regular military commanders have refused to turn over command of ARVN forces to the Province Chief in whose area the units are operating, thus bifurcating the pacification responsibility. Following the concept of "search and destroy" in populated areas poses a serious problem for subsequent pacification efforts.

The problem of behavior and command of military forces extends beyond ARVN. Regional Forces and Popular Forces have had their problems with the population as well. Although the Province Chief usually commands all non-ARVN forces in his province, this does not mean these commands are coordinated. There are several types of local anti-guerrilla forces, not previously discussed in this study, which are under district and province command. In Long An, there were fifteen different types of armed forces in the province by 1965.⁷

Pacification Cadres. The cadre system was a neglected aspect of pacification until 1965, when the training of the

⁷Interview with David Shepherd, former USOM Province Representative, Long An, 1965.

new Rural Construction cadres began. The ten week course is a substantial improvement over previous cadre systems. The attention to the establishment of revolutionary elan in the greatly extended training period, and the assignment of the cadres in balanced teams with specialized components are highly realistic steps forward. The test of the success of the new system will probably come in its relation to existing, local administrative structures in the provinces whose personnel have not been trained in the spirit of reform that was inculcated in the cadres.

Planning and Scheduling

The persistent problems of overambitious and uncoordinated planning have often been cited in the study. Planning for pacification has usually been carried out against deadlines that prohibit the thoroughness of research essential to success. Planning has been project-centered instead of system-centered. The technical services coordinated with their own ministries and the military elements with their own chain of command. However, there has been little attention to the socio-economic status of the village, district, and province and how various new programs would meet the need of each community and the province as a whole. Also, there is still little correlation of these diverse programs in terms of timing, manpower, and financial resources. In fact, there has been little effort to build an adequate provincial mechanism for program coordination.

Allocation of manpower. The personnel needed for all pacification purposes has steadily risen each year. No comprehensive study of manpower availability for pacification programs has ever been made, however. In 1964 and 1965, key pacification programs were crippled by the ARVN draft calls. By the end of 1965, even the new Rural Construction Cadres had not been guaranteed immunity from the draft. The preeminence of military policy over a coordinated pacification approach to this problem reveals again the result of unreconciled objectives and their aftermath.

Management of more skilled manpower resources has also been capriciously handled, with skilled and one-of-a-kind technicians being assigned to positions unrelated to their specialties. The failures to secure adequate manpower for almost every program are testimony to the urgent need for a thorough study of the use and needs of Vietnam's manpower.

Scheduling. A key management problem in pacification has been the control and ordering of program inputs--in men, money, and materials--so that the correct resource in the proper amount arrives at the appropriate time. Many instances have been cited to show the high cost to the pacification process of improper implementation. The precision required for pacification operations, while hardly as technical as for the launching of a space satellite, may be just as important to the success of the pacification effort. The many human factors, and other

unpredictable elements characteristic of a less advanced nation, do not lessen the responsibility for realistic scheduling.

Economic planning. The reorientation of programming towards military, social, and political objectives has led to inadequate consideration of the larger or local economic significance of the pacification programs. The input of American armed forces and construction teams has raised local prices, as noted previously. Such inflation affects Vietnamese buyers as well as Americans and may be a serious problem for a government seeking social stability.

The national economic programs projected for quick returns may not speak to pressing but long term local requirements. More comprehensive planning based on local conditions is needed. This, too, requires economics experts and more adequate local data supplied by field research.

Increasing attention has been given to careful control of rural economic inputs in order to avoid strengthening the Viet-Cong position. Much of the pacification assistance prior to 1965 may well have aided the Viet-Cong more than the peasants who were the primary recipients. It is quite possible by an economic project to increase the Government stature in an area at the same time that it strengthens the Viet-Cong movement, through giving the latter access to food or medicine.⁸

⁸Charles Wolff, Jr., "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities" (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, May, 1965). Unpublished paper.

A long term economic problem in pacification planning has not been faced by Americans or Vietnamese. The enormous systems of Government field services, including thousands of teachers, health workers, extension experts, and physical facilities, have been financed by American-backed national projects. At some point, the capability of Vietnamese resources to assume these costs must be estimated and proper projections made.

Operations

Provincial operations have suffered from the traditional procedure-bound practices of many static bureaucracies. Local procedures to release funds for emergencies have been a constant problem. The greatest difficulties have come on large projects (such as relocation) requiring massive amounts of paperwork and approvals by the Corps pacification office. Lack of promptness and administrative flexibility have frequently taken the psychological thrust out of relocation payments, aid to families of deceased soldiers and officials, and battle damages.

Despite the seeming omnipresence in Vietnam of Vietnamese information programs, a surprising amount of Government assistance has reached the recipient without adequate psychological "packaging." Bags of wheat intended for families of wounded militiamen, pushed off the back of a truck by a roadside village with no explanation, may do more harm than good. Proper psychological exploitation requires "public relations" training of every member of the pacification apparatus.

A continuing weakness of the operations stage of the pacification process is the tendency to go ahead with unrealistic schedules at the expense of quality performance. As yet there has been no systematic effort to review progress and problems during the operational period in order to adjust schedules, resources, methods, or goals.

Most of the failures that occurred in the operational phase of pacification were rooted in poorly defined objectives, uncoordinated and unrealistic planning, and a governmental apparatus that was inadequately trained and staffed. The recurrent failures are also related to lack of management flexibility to adjust while operations are in progress. There is a lack of planning and evaluation in association with field operations in Vietnam. Too often each element has its own functional separation and a non-concurrent time frame, with all the planning "pre-natal" and all the evaluation post mortem. The need is for a fresh concept of all three as parts of a dynamic management activity in the field situation.

III. THE AMERICAN ROLE IN PACIFICATION

Preceding chapters have suggested some of the problems faced by American representatives in Vietnam. The role of American personnel has varied widely. By 1965, the advisory efforts were statistically overshadowed by the presence of combat forces and military and civilian support systems. The enormous American presence undeniably has increased American

leverage at the highest levels, although no agreements have been formalized to say so.

The direct role of United States Forces in pacification operations had just begun in mid-1965, and adequate perspective on their performance is impossible at this writing. However, the fundamental problem of maintaining internal peace is first of all up to the Vietnamese. The American combat forces may provide a shield behind which effective government administration may function, but substitution of an American government apparatus--civilian or military--would miss the whole logic of the pacification enterprise.

The equally unfortunate opposite of direct American rule has characterized the American military effort. Any advisor needs leverage in getting his points across and MACV has not had the power needed. Persuasion has its limits. Sector Advisors have had some control over the approvals for MAP equipment, but their influence through day to day approvals via the province release agreement has enhanced their position for a good hearing by the Province Chief on many other matters. All that most advisors to ARVN can do is ask for action from their senior advisor, who himself has similar limitations with his counterpart. Although joint command of ARVN units would be unwise from many viewpoints, other levers of influence could enhance military advisory effectiveness. Approval systems for MAP inputs at each level of command would probably be sufficient, and entirely

within the established tradition of the province release agreements.

In training for MACV advisory assignments, there is great need for emphasis on Civil Affairs studies. Sector Advisors need more preparation for their specific assignments and should be carefully selected in terms of capability to work in a civilian administrative context.

USOM Provincial Operations

Despite the changes of top level leadership and the removal of approval powers in the provinces, the USOM provincial system served a combination advisory and auxiliary role to the Government. In matters of pacification, the USOM chain of command could often get action from various Saigon government agencies where Province Chiefs had failed. This availability of an alternative channel, while not ideal from an administrative standpoint, was a pragmatic effort to overcome traditional Vietnamese red tape. The political and administrative upheavals during 1964 and 1965 further indicated the need for the alternate channels of contact, and at the same time reminded the Americans how far they were removed from control of the situation. Addition of field specialists in other USOM Divisions further improved the communication with Saigon. The USOM Representative usually encouraged the Province Chief to use more initiative in responding to local pacification problems. The presence of USOM helped the Province Chief share the heavy responsibility for innovative actions. His administrative

capability was usually increased, not inhibited, by USOM assistance.

Failure by top level Americans in the spring of 1964 to insist on correlation of new monetary and materials inputs through joint planning led to colossal blunders in the rushed schedules and unrealistic plans. The need for full communication and coordinated administrative and policy support at all levels of the American mission was demonstrated.

Further, USOM Representatives and MACV Sector Advisors often did not know what orders had been given by either the Corps commanders or the Ministry of the Interior until they had been carried out. Americans should have at least been informed of significant orders regarding pacification implementation prior to execution.

The changes in Province Chiefs and other pacification officials forced a heavy operational load on many USOM Representatives. As perhaps the only official with any experience in his position, he ended up pressing for policies that should have originated with the Province Chief. Other province representatives were operationally oriented from long years of such experience and sometimes preferred to "get things done by themselves," such as delivering commodities to a hamlet in the USOM truck. As James Killen often made clear, this was use of USOM administrative talent in an improper role. To the operator on the ground, it was sometimes the only way to accomplish certain missions.

Many USOM representatives had served in civil or military bureaucracy for years, and some had learned to get by with a minimum of effort and a good report. Others faced the frustrating administrative problems with a resigned attitude of getting as much done as possible--knowing it might not be enough.

For pacification in Vietnam, the 50 per cent or 75 per cent performance was not enough, however. The failure of USOM at all levels to have a clear understanding of, and demand for, quality and thoroughness in the pacification effort doomed the programs to failure. The Hop Tac campaign began as such an approach in 1964.

It is not clear, at this writing, whether American advisory inputs are adequately integrated with the Vietnamese pacification system to insure coordinated planning and operations. It appears that the upper level American advisors have had significant impact on the pacification strategy initiated in late 1965 but these new programs were only beginning at the province level.

Experience in pacification programs has shown that Americans have not used their influence enough to effect political and administrative reforms necessary for successful pacification.⁹ The many personal and parochial interests that have threatened to divert the announced revolutionary ambitions of every South Vietnamese regime since Diem, make successful pacification a

⁹For a cogent discussion of non-intervention and American aid see Montgomery, op. cit., Chapter VI.

near impossibility. More American pressure, skillfully and discretely applied, at hundreds of pressure points, may be able to move the Government towards its announced goals.

The Lansdale team has demonstrated a remarkable talent for personalized contacts among key Vietnamese, which is another important element in effecting change. Like most other human beings, Vietnamese leaders dislike formalized encounters over their individual or corporate misbehavior. Such costly episodes took place before and after Diem's fall.

Perhaps the greatest role that Americans can play in Vietnam is to provide steady pressure and support to keep the Vietnamese leaders at every echelon headed towards their own announced national goals of revolutionary change. AID has constantly moved in the direction of recruiting more able leadership for provincial representatives and providing these personnel with more in-service training. Most Provincial Representatives are trained for nine months in language and area studies before beginning their overseas tours, and more sophisticated training approaches were being developed in early 1966.

IV. CONCLUSION

The character and strength of the insurgent threat have forced a choice by Vietnamese leaders between capitulation to the communists or the radical reshaping of their own political and social system to speak to the demands of the peasants and the growing revolutionary political forces. Concomitant with

this revolutionary program must be an equally revolutionary change in the motivation and management of the Vietnamese government and armed forces.

Ironically, the enormous foreign aid inputs, the extent and complexity of the pacification process, and the efficient governmental system of the Viet-Cong necessitate parameters of performance from the Government far higher than that of other emerging nations. There is no room for mediocre operations with high graft tolerance and small doses of popular participation.

It may be that the revolution cannot be accomplished at all. But it is quite clear that the Vietnamese cannot do it without American help. And it is equally certain the Americans cannot do it alone. If it is to be done in tandem, improved management and better motivation training to implement revolutionary goals are the first tasks of both nations. The steady escalation of money, materials, and manpower inputs without adequate management can only increase the magnitude of American failure and prolong the agony and futile aspirations of the Vietnamese people.

CHAPTER XIV

A PACIFICATION THEORY FOR VIETNAM

Some of the following proposals appear to be already in the process of application in Vietnam.¹ The arrival of the Lansdale group in 1965 probably accounts for the increased emphasis on the political and psychological approaches described briefly here. Many of the approaches proposed by Lansdale are similar to what he and his associates tried in anti-Huk campaigns in the Philippines and in Vietnam 1954-1956. The political blood pressure of Vietnam is high and its administrative metabolism is dangerously low. The supreme test of the advisory input is to stimulate and stabilize the Vietnamese leadership, without supplanting or suppressing it. Only a skilled ringmaster can insure that the elephantine American presence in Vietnam does not overshadow the true stars of the show: the Vietnamese themselves.

So far, the pacification process has involved a plethora of programs, often worthy in themselves. These need integration through carefully defined and faithfully followed larger objectives. Secondly, the pacification system requires a more skilled

¹The writer assumes responsibility for the presentation of the proposals that follow. However, he has drawn freely on ideas, proposals, and programs from many sources, and has chosen to plan along lines that would augment the approach being attempted at the beginning of 1966.

government apparatus, equipped with stronger motivation and management methods commensurate with the enormous task of implementation which it faces. These pacification objectives and the means of their implementation are the concern of Chapters XIV and XV.

The Central Pacification Objective: A Revolution in the Life of the Peasant

Revolution has been an overused word in South Vietnam. The Ngo regime countered the communist claim to the term by its own "Personalist revolution." Subsequent regimes further abused the concept by their unfulfilled promises. As employed here, revolution refers to a process of fundamental, orderly change in the life of the peasant and his community. The revolution would also have national connotations of independence, conversion or expulsion of the communists, and the advancement of the nation as a whole. Misused as it has been in the past, revolution still appears to fit the mood of the young and the rising new leadership in Vietnam. The primary focus here is what most concerns the peasant.

The rural revolution would involve the establishment of peace and order to displace the insecurity of war and terror. It would give the peasant free and open political participation in local village affairs and eventually in all levels of political life. He would increase his standard of living by learning how to grow more food and by receiving, or

being able to buy, better seed, livestock, and fertilizer. His children would be assured a primary school education and possibly more. His health care would be improved through better trained staffs and closer facilities. He would be better protected from the extremes of his own government through guarantees of equality before the law, and he would be protected from corruption and other abuses by having direct access, through elected representatives and/or grievance and redress systems, to the highest levels of government. A land reform program would provide him with more equitable land distribution and legal title of ownership, in areas where serious inequities now exist.

An important aspect of these revolutionary goals as a platform for pacification is the method in which they would be achieved. The peasant would participate in the selection, planning, and establishment of effective security, schools, health facilities, etc. The revolution would not necessarily mean the abandonment of all his previous ways of living, except as the peasant desires.

The "new life" would be open to all South Vietnamese, so long as they pledged their support to the Government and its campaign to destroy the communist insurgency. There would be no division of communities by favoring those who supported the Government and depriving families whose kin were with the Viet-Cong. However, villages under Viet-Cong control or caught in a contest between the two sides would not receive

those types of assistance which, if used by the Viet-Cong would aid their war-making capability. The variability of programs to fit the security of areas will be discussed later as part of a province strategy.

The national pacification effort would focus on establishing complete control of the most heavily populated areas: around Saigon and to the South and West, which is the heart of the Delta, and in the populous valleys of Central Vietnam. In these areas complete resources control procedures would be followed along the expanding perimeter, with controls being gradually relaxed in the inner areas as the perimeter widens. Highland areas would not (and could not) be tightly controlled, but full support of self-defense programs among loyal tribesmen, assisted by Vietnamese and American combat forces, would keep the enemy dislocated. The intent would be to impede traffic on supply lines from the North that pass through the highlands and to seal more completely the support from the major population agglomerations in the Delta and central coastal regions.

The special province experiments in variable pacification emphasis described in Chapter VII, are appropriate to the theory. Such areas as An Giang would have intensive social, economic, political programs appropriate to the region. This could be expanded to include Ninh Thuan and Tuyen Duc provinces. The most insecure and heavily populated regions would involve forced relocation, possibly including whole villages, in the manner of the Malayan campaign.

The strategy would not mean total elimination of the insurgent threat. It would, however, deprive the enemy of access to his major food sources which are the heavily populated areas. Scattered communities could also opt for relocation, but even if not relocated, their assistance would probably not sustain the large Viet-Cong forces now in Vietnam. These units would be forced to retire to less populated areas and would probably be further reduced by high surrender rates under the pressures of food shortages.

From this stalemate, security for the vast majority of rural Vietnamese would have been obtained, and the war confined to less populated regions. In a sense, the insurgency would have become more "manageable," and at least more endurable for the country as a whole. Combined pressures of air attacks on the North and a slow but steady increase in the pacified zone might lead to a negotiated communist withdrawal.

Rehabilitating the Governmental Apparatus

The foregoing "platform" for revolution and the supporting objectives are neither new, nor a promise of a panacea. But even these modest goals would be quite unrealistic without a major renovation of the Government's apparatus in response to the problems analyzed in earlier chapters.

Recent developments in Vietnam, particularly since the beginning of the Ky regime in June of 1965, have demonstrated a willingness, even a determination among the leadership,

to reshape some of the antiquated machinery of government. The strengthening of the Ministry for Construction (pacification) is an example. Steady support and pressure by the American Mission, in league with the more progressive political and administrative leadership might go a great deal farther. In addition, major changes (some of them apparently in process of realization at this writing) would need to be made in the American Mission and the approach of many of its advisory elements.

The American advisory establishment in Saigon needs to be much more intimately involved in the problems and procedures of pacification that reach the Vietnamese national level. There should be a move at every echelon towards a combination of offices, operations centers, and report analysis units. This movement towards physical proximity should be enhanced by a studied effort at increased personal and professional intercourse among counterpart elements in civilian and military organizations. Offices concerned with the same functions should be under the same roof. Americans should spend more time talking about pacification problems to Vietnamese, instead of other Americans. The proximity and increased interchange need not affect command relations or usurp sovereignty. Inevitably it would improve communication. Americans should be guaranteed the right to know, at any level, changes in plans and policy and they should be privy to many decisions, particularly those which deviate from previous agreements. In short,

Americans should be consulted and informed on all significant policy matters, and proximity would help make this policy feasible.

Just as communication is improved horizontally at every echelon by greater proximity between American and Vietnamese, vertical proximity between echelons should be increased. Improved radio service has assisted in linking Saigon with field units, but a prompt response system on either Vietnamese or American side is still lacking. Reporting should be action-oriented at both ends. Procedures for approval of plans and emergency projects and for funding need to be studied carefully and streamlined and systematized so that processing delays are highlighted for extra attention. A management system for implementing pacification at every level will be further discussed in the next chapter.

Civil Service system. The procedural and decision-making failings of Vietnamese administration have been discussed previously. But a great deal could be done to revive the sagging morale and performance of the people in the system, particularly at the lowest level, by a fairer pattern of promotion, higher pay, and removal or retirement of the most corrupt and incompetent leadership. Regularity of pay and rewards for performance would do wonders for the system. The rewards could be tied to adoption of improved management techniques--starting with the pacification mechanism. These reforms could be carried out gradually by the strengthening of

the Civil Service Commission of the government and appropriate studies (assisted by American advisors) to develop the improved policy without disrupting the previous apparatus completely.

Training. The endless political indoctrination sessions of the Ngo regime served only to demoralize or bore most civil servants. Political indoctrination is needed, but it should be more along the lines of changing attitudes towards one's job and particularly towards the relation of the Government as servant of the people. Strangely, Dale Carnegie techniques might be quite useful--with proper amendment for the Vietnamese social system. Although one can expect too much in the effort to install revolutionary zeal, if it is combined with higher pay, hope for the individual's future, and the satisfaction of relevant involvement in significant national efforts, the value to the pacification effort is substantial.

However, it is essential to encase training in a total context of supervisory improvement. All echelons must receive training, both in the worthy cause and program of the revolution and in the particular techniques the civil servant can use to further that revolution.

The excellent training and team system of Rural Constructor cadres would have real possibility of success if permitted to operate in a revitalized Governmental mechanism. Without this larger context of administrative support the cadre program cannot be expected to succeed.

American training. A radical change in American advisory training should be geared to coincide with the training received by their Vietnamese counterparts. Attention to creating an attitude and capability permitting empathy for the Vietnamese revolutionary goals should be ingrained in the American advisor before he sees Vietnam. Motivation and human relations techniques should be tested and sharpened in laboratory sessions simulating Vietnamese administrative and social situations. In short, the American must share the sense of urgency of the revolutionary cause and be sufficiently equipped with language and other skills to nourish these attitudes among his Vietnamese associates.

Vietnamese armed forces. Such training is appropriate for every advisor at each level, particularly including those to be attached to regular military units. Perhaps the reorientation of the Vietnamese army leadership towards the populace is equal in importance to the reform of the civil system. The public relations skills of the National Police and Popular, Regional, and Regular Forces will make or break resources control, vis a vis popular support and tolerance, and the Open Arms program as well.

Joint Operations Control Network. In order to achieve full coordination, information, and prompt attention to field problems, a pacification operations control center should be established at every echelon from Saigon to each district, with

a prescribed reporting and control system uniform throughout the network. The Malayan control system, while overly complex in some respects, has continued to be used long after the emergency was officially declared to be over. Converted to a socio-economic development control network, the identical operations room and similar techniques were serving the new purpose in 1966.²

The complexity and enormity of the Vietnamese pacification effort call for a mechanism at least as efficient as the "operation rooms" of Malaya. With a simplified and rational management review and evaluation methodology inculcated in Vietnamese and American personnel, such a network could provide almost instantaneous sharing of field problems at whatever echelon must review them to achieve action. Dual communications systems could be maintained separately, but tied into a single headquarters at each level. However, the operational aspect of each center should be kept uppermost. Low level "telephone answerers" in such centers would reduce them to telephone exchanges.

Each center should be, in fact, a focus of data, plans, and progress on all activities subordinate to its echelon of responsibility. All intelligence activities would be focussed into an adjacent Intelligence Center, and the Pacification Bureau should be nearby as well. Armed Forces should be

²New York Times, 12 April 1965, p. 30.

coordinated through the same center or from a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) tied by a secure telephone line.

Provincial Pacification Administration

Efforts to decentralize decision-making and disbursing functions met with enough success in 1962-1965 to suggest a fuller application of the principle. Although general pacification planning guidelines and matching lump allocations could be released and approved at the national level, there should be more latitude to revise plans, programs, and schedules, as situations change, using the operations control network when higher levels were required for decision.

All armed forces operating in the province, including those of ARVN, should be under the command of the Province Chief, except in special Viet-Cong controlled areas. These could be designated as special military zones under ARVN.

Perhaps the most critical need is to emancipate the province from the control of Corps and Division commanders. The buildup of Corps-area staffs in USOM may be useful from an internal supervisory point of view. Many provincial representatives felt that the regional mechanisms, USOM and Vietnamese military (particularly the latter), only delayed and diluted the capability of Saigon to deal with civil problems. Regional "desks" with responsible officials in charge could sort out the field traffic at the Saigon level without the detour through Corps. The theoretical decentralization to Corps, in fact,

added to the administrative dilemma instead of simplifying it, particularly by strapping the Province Chief to Division and Corps commanders.

Logistics. Warehousing and transportation were non-existent in some provinces when USOM began its provincial operations. There is still a long way to go. To increase the flexibility of the provincial apparatus, warehouses should be built and stocked beyond projected program requirements (keeping in mind inventory limits on perishables). Emergencies, procurement delays, and irregular local building schedules are the "given" of pacification. Extra space in warehouses is needed in order to be prepared for irregular inputs and outputs. The benefit of a ready supply for the peasant community makes these extra investments worthwhile. Smaller district warehouses, within the reach of local transportation devices, can aid and facilitate direct pick ups of materials by the hamlets.

A Variable Province Strategy

A useful device for approaching pacification was suggested by George Tanham and Frank Trager in their concept of "three wars" in Vietnam.³ The black, gray, and white categories coincide with enemy, contested, and friendly areas. In planning a province (or national) program quite different guidelines must

³George K. Tanham and Frank N. Trager, "The Three Wars in Vietnam," Army, May, 1964.

be set for each.

Black areas are the special focus of ARVN operations, development of agent nets, and intensive Open Arms activity (usually via air broadcasts and leaflet drops). Agitprop teams may enter some of these areas for quick visits. Assassination teams, directed towards Viet-Cong officials can weaken the Viet-Cong Government structure. Gray areas are of many shades of Government control. In some places there is an alternation of control, almost by agreement, with the communists owning the night. The Viet-Cong may collect taxes, hold rallies, and conduct terror, but not with the complete freedom they enjoy in their areas of absolute control.

Surprise checkpoints for resources control, hamlet searches, and expanding agent networks should be projected for such areas. Economic planning must be selective, in an effort to control inputs to the communist system and to clarify the relation between loyalty and assistance. However, the latter can be a wooden rule and prohibit some creative thrusts for peasant appreciation and a "pre-pacification warmup." The gray areas have many government supporters who cannot show their hands, but can supply vital intelligence data. Most of this must be received, and can be rewarded, on an individual basis. Safe development inputs could include a school, if built on a self-help basis and if the area is secure enough for classes to be held. Visiting medical teams could aid even the grayest areas if drugs given out were consumed on

the spot. A wide variety of psywar activities would be an excellent preliminary liaison with the populace, particularly with armed support. Drama teams and movies would maintain a tie with hamlets on the list for future pacification. Province newspapers could be distributed in any gray area.

White areas, considered completely secure, would have the full force of political, economic, and social assistance. Regional Forces would be removed, and control of the area would be in the hands of the police and reduced Popular Forces. Hamlet and village officials would be elected. Full scale agricultural, community industry, and public works programs would be introduced where invited and economically feasible.

Planning and research. Little attention has been given to proper balancing of local community interests and broader province concerns in counterinsurgency economic and social programs. The Rural Construction Cadre Teams have Economic Development units which need to seek out relevant local data and have it matched by experienced and trained planning counsel at the province level. Many province Economic Sections have been little more than statistics collectors. They are needed for research support and long term planning counsel vis-a-vis the short term local projects. Province planning staffs must provide the larger rationale for the burgeoning programs. A hodgepodge of roads, that do not form a larger system and a hamlet school construction program that leaves

no higher schools for the new graduates to attend, can cause an expensive feedback from government programs. Manpower studies, economic feasibility surveys, and integrated provincial development studies can not only scuttle unsound project ideas in time, but can also open new avenues for useful programs.

Despite the proposed unity of all armed forces and civil agencies under the command of the Province Chief, the problem of effective correlation and scheduling of program inputs remains as the foremost challenge to pacification. Chapter XV will suggest a possible system for effective implementation.

CHAPTER XV

A MODEL FOR PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

The employment of integrated program management systems, using the techniques of interlocking networks and the "critical path" concept, has become routine in many government and industry circles. The Critical Path Method and Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) are two very similar and well known methods of integrated program management.¹

Essentially, these methods are the application of logic to an operational problem through a systematic and internally cohesive methodology. Steadily improved over the years, these methods have aided in the achievement of substantive savings in time, money, and manpower. This chapter is an effort to apply the heart of these concepts to the management of pacification in Vietnam.

The application of PERT to development programming is relatively recent. The Government of India and AID are using PERT in "Operation Hardrock," a minerals survey project. Development loans in India may eventually include a PERT-oriented implementation plan as a part of the agreement.²

¹The PERT concepts applied here are taken from PERT Guide for Management Use (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963).

²Interview with James Carson, formerly AID/India, Industry Division, 1966.

In March, 1966 a PERT specialist was sent by AID to Thailand to examine the possibilities for applying the method to rural development programming.

American implementation systems for the production of defense "hardware" are too complex and computer-oriented for direct application in pacification. The basic discipline and postulates of such systems, however, could be adapted to the pacification process.

In the proposed model an integrated management system would be applied only in those activities involved with pacification. The American reporting and program mechanisms would also be geared to the new system.

Introduction of the new method would require brief but intensive training of all officials who would be involved. The terms, concepts, and sequence of the management process should become ingrained as a way of thinking before operations begin. The fundamental value of such a system is, in fact, its internalization by participating officials.

The Methodology of Network and Critical Path Concepts

The management process involves several steps which form a cycle: 1) Establishment of objectives, 2) Development of plans, 3) Determination of schedules, 4) Evaluation of progress, and 5) Decisions and actions to revise activities in the previous steps, based on results of the evaluation.

Objectives.³ Overall objectives must be clearly defined and supporting objectives, in the form of specific programs and projects, should be itemized. Lower echelons would accept objectives and supporting programs from above and would formulate consonant local objectives. The planners would have to consider province-level programs by type of activity (education, health, agriculture, etc.) and also in terms of their interrelation with each other as scheduled for application in a given rural community (as in Figure 26).

Planning. The process of planning to realize the objectives involves assignment of tasks, estimation of manpower and resource requirements, ordering of the sequence of activities, and the estimation of time required for each activity. A network of activities (see Figure 27) is constructed, working back from the end objective to the starting point, correlating activities in the sequence necessary for their individual initiation and completion. An "event" denotes a point at which an activity is completed or begun. Each event in the network is numbered. No succeeding event may have a lower number than a predecessor event. Each activity receives minimum and maximum estimates of the time required for its completion. Activities that depend on other activities for their initiation or completion

³See Figure 26 for objectives specified through a work breakdown structure for a local pacification program.




Figure 26. Sample Work Breakdown Structure:
Hamlet Pacification Plan.




Figure 27. Sample Implementation Network:
Hamlet School Construction.

are tied together by events. An activity is portrayed by a line between two events. A "dummy" activity is simply a connecting line which does not represent a time lapse. An "interface" is an event which transfers responsibility for a plan to another part of the network.

The construction of a comprehensive network forces the relating of each event to others in terms of sequence and time necessary for completion. It shows the planner what time frames will be necessary in parts of the network to keep other parts from being delayed. Figure 27 illustrates very simply the importance of proper sequence in the construction of a school and the recruitment and training of a teacher. Although the local pacification cadre need not prepare a complex drawing such as Figure 27, he would need to perceive the importance of each of the paths of activity in the network necessary for success of the project. The "critical path" is the longest estimated time period from start to completion--computed by totalling all maximum activity times in the network. When a fixed completion date is necessary, then the network may be revised by changing the manpower or material inputs or revising the end objective. The planner does not, however, set calendar dates during the planning phase. This is reserved for the scheduling function.

Planning goals are set in terms of quantity, quality, time and cost. Activities would be estimated for cost just as it would for time--although war conditions and American aid make this factor less critical than time. Setting clear goals for quality in pacification is vital.

Scheduling. The selection of calendar dates within which the task will be done, must be based on the time lapse estimates of the plan. Scheduling must involve consideration of the availability of men, machines, and materials for the specific project during that time. Schedules must fit into each other in terms of the use of shared resources. Local holidays, rice harvesting periods, and the rainy season are examples of scheduling factors in Vietnam. The planning and the scheduling functions are interdependent at all times. If the schedule cannot permit what the plan calls for, the plan must be changed. The schedule cannot vary the sequence of the work. There can be only one approved schedule for a plan at one time.

Evaluation of progress. The most dynamic function of the integrated system is the use of a continuous flow of relevant data on results and forecasts. The reports need not detail events that had been calculated in the plan and scheduled. It is only necessary to receive simple confirmation that the schedule is being fulfilled, or that it is not and for what reason. The system should be able to supply indicators showing future difficulties by evaluating problem points to determine their influence on other parts of the network.

Information that leads to revision of schedules for delivery of materials, training, and funding may affect other components in the network. Relevance, accuracy, and timeliness are essentials of integrated management reporting and evaluation.

Pacification Operations and the Implementation Model

A PERT system in Vietnamese administration would be difficult if not impossible, given the inadequacies of administration, lack of coordinated command, and highly filtered communication between the provinces and the central government. Assuming these problems could be ameliorated, many other cautions would need to be taken. However, given the complex elements in pacification programming, an adequate implementation system is essential to meet the objectives.

If the specialists in charge of introducing the system attempted to mirror the complexities of computerized systems characteristic of the United States the effort would fail. The basic concepts could be applied, however, even at the lowest levels, using picture symbols to convey the sequential and coordinative aspects of a simple low level system. Compared to engineering programming in the United States the range of error in planning and estimation would be large--amid the unpredictabilities of the conflict and the less precise social factors affecting every facet of the system. However, PERT requirements for correlating all the events of the network and the allocation of resources to meet estimates for each activity would greatly increase planning accuracy over previous attempts. Most relevant, however, would be the flexibility of the system to adjust its planning errors made obvious as the campaign develops.

It is also true that a PERT-type system would probably be a very bad failure or a substantial success. It could not be done half-way. Again, this is precisely the character of program management essential in the pacification enterprise.

A large staff of inspectors and monitors at the beginning of the system would be essential to discourage false and irrelevant reporting--and slow decisionmaking in response to requests from the field.

The endemic tendency towards centralized planning and policy-making could lead to abuse of improved field control, inhibiting the limited but vital democratic participation of peasant communities in the choice and pacing of projects. Extra effort would be required to keep the two way flow essential for a truly responsive government apparatus.

With properly trained personnel and protection from elements threatened by the innovation, a PERT-type management system would bring unparalleled flexibility in the use of the meager manpower supply. Cadres and support personnel could be placed in the locations where extra effort was needed. More efficient and simplified flow systems for funding could gear releases to match the requirements of work plans approved by the year or quarter. The plan and its schedule would be a single blanket authorization for many of the routine budget items. The only changes of these items would be those requested through the reporting system. If an official was reticent

about reporting his failings, the funds and materials stacking up at his door by uncorrected schedules would remind everyone of his failure.

Thus, such an integrated implementation system would have the complementary virtues of automatic handling of routine budget matters, as well as the flexibility to develop revised policies, plans, and schedules where required.

The repeated failure of pacification programs can usually be explained by poor timing, unclear objectives, and uncoordinated use of resources. The undefended hamlet, whose trained men are without arms, its moats without fences, and its own radio safely stored in the district headquarters, could be avoided. The crucial confluence of activities into a single event (see Figure 28) that technically puts a hamlet on its own defensively must have received all the inputs of supporting networks or it only invites defeat. It is in tiny administrative failures like this that hamlet after hamlet has stepped away from the government side to the Viet-Cong.

Using Figure 28, the province-level schedulers could apply the prescribed sequence for establishing a security system to insure that sufficient arms and fence materials, etc. are supplied the village at the proper time. The province pacification bureau would visualize its larger scale province-wide tasks in a similar manner, treating each of the villages plans as part of a comprehensive security system for the province as a whole. If an aspect of the program was forced to be decelerated (such as




Figure 28. Sample Implementation Network:
Hamlet Security System.

non-availability of fence materials or weapons) construction and training schedules could be revised and completion dates changed.

In the frightening context of unstable politics and Viet-Cong omnipresence, some form of comprehensive, coordinated, and reliable management implementation must be developed if the considerable resources of the Government and its allies are to be properly utilized. A PERT-type implementation system, if conscientiously applied in concert with other administrative changes, could be pivotal in the pacification enterprise.

CHAPTER XVI

CONCLUSION

This study has closed with the subject of research in medias res. It was that way three years ago when the study began. But there is a significant difference--from the American viewpoint. The Vietnam problem has become a virtual dictator of domestic and foreign policy. It has introduced the average American to his first sustained awareness of revolutionary war.

Inside the Government, Vietnam has helped focus attention on the need for a methodology and personnel to cope with the conflict. The conventional systems for economic and military assistance have revealed serious gaps in American preparedness for its role in Vietnam and similar conflicts.

While the United States has traditionally declared its public support of democratic institutions abroad, the concern for political development has been "a purpose without a policy."¹ The policy use of political development has been narrowly expressed in stopping communism or as a means to the furtherance of economic development.²

¹Robert A. Packenham, "Political Development Doctrine in the American Foreign Aid Program," World Politics, XVIII (January, 1966), p. 210.

²Ibid., p. 213.

The failure to evolve and articulate an adequate raison d'etre for political development raises deeper questions. There is a question as to any serious American desire to share knowledge of its democratic institutions and expertise. Liberals and conservatives, often so passionately interested in the preservation of certain aspects of the free society for domestic consumption, have largely ignored an active American role in the fostering of democratic institutions. Too often the American role in Vietnam has been defended or rejected on the grounds of national pride and prestige rather than responsibility towards development of a free society.

Whatever the reasons for this failure in national purpose, the deeper meaning of the Vietnam problem may be its challenge to Americans to reexamine the gap between a love of their own democratic institutions at home and concern for the growth and survival of such institutions abroad. The knotty problems of pacification are intricately intertwined with the issues of political development and intimate American involvement. These pose a challenge to the thoughtful American to ask some basic questions of value and obligation--questions that transcend the easy legalisms of "self-determination" and "non-intervention."

What is the proper defense of democracy? Is there a better choice than purely military intervention or the once easily purchased coup d'etat? The sophisticated methodology and quasi-religious motivation of communist insurgency are

pressing the West for a more sustained and creative response.
This is the larger context for the problem of pacification
in Vietnam and the American role in its implementation.

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APPENDIX

MAY, 1964

APPENDIX A
QUANG NAM PROVINCE

DISTRICTS	AREA	VILLAGES	HAMLETS	POPULATION	DISTRICT CHIEFS	STAFF
Hoa Vang	38,480 ha.	19	73	95,277	1st Lt. Nguyen Hong Son	138
Hieu Duc	75,840	6	31	16,636	1st Lt. Vuong Ba Thuan	
Dien Ban	26,878	23	105	136,369	1st Lt. Ngo Tan Cuc	
Dai Loc	30,800	9	77	56,311	Capt. Do Ngoc Thuong	
Thuong Duc	384,320	3	25	17,651	Capt. Pham Van Tri	
Duy Xuyen	23,960	16	61	73,565	Lt. Pham Kim Anh	
Que Son	41,720	18	76	66,001	Capt. Doan Thanh Van	
Duc Duc	24,560	11	49	50,041	Capt. Vo Van Chon	
Hieu Nhon	18,110	9	40	59,890	Capt. Than Trong Sinh	
Totals		114	537			
SECTION	TY	SECTION CHIEFS		No. STAFF	BUDGET	
30 Education	Tieu Hoc	Le Huy Huyen		504		
31 Medical	Y Te	Dr. Nguyen Van Quy		208		
32 Agricultural Hydraulics & Rural Works	Thuy Nong va Cong Tac Nong Thon	Buu Co		27		
33 Agriculture	Nong Vu	Vu Van Hung		17		
34 Animal Husbandry	Muc Suc	Ho Duc Con		23		
35 Laco	Hop Tac Xa & Nong Tin	Nguyen Duc Lam		42		
36 Forestry	Lan Vu	Hoang Dinh Yen		15		
37 Fishing	Ngu Nghiep	Tran Khac Tin		3		
38 Public Works	Cong Chanh	Le Tung Mai		178		
39 Economics	Kinh Te	Hoang Giao				
40 Campaign & Propaganda	Lien Doan Tuyen Van	Nguyen Van Chau		77		
41 Information	Thong Tin	Nguyen Duc Lanh		48		
42 Construction	Kien Thiet	Le Tung Mai		12		
43 Land	Dien Dia	Le Chi Thanh		23		
44 Security	Noi An	Le Dinh Chieu				
45 Youth	Thanh Nien	Nguyen Bao		21		
46 Tax	Thue Vu	Nguyen Duy Han		19		
47 Post Office	Buu Dien	Nguyen Huu Dau		6		
48 National Police	Canh Sat Quoc Gia	1st Lt. Pham Van Pho		258		
49 Treasury	Ngan Kho	Nguyen The Vien		13		
Province Chief		Major Nguyen Dinh Thiep		128		
Deputy Chief for Finance & Economy		Le Huu Chat				
" " for Administration		Nguyen Xuan Va				
" " for Security		Capt. Le Ngoc Uyen				
Chief of Cabinet		1st Lt. Phan Phung Anh				
Personel Section Chief		Duong Duc Tan				
Document Bureau Chief		Dinh Bach Don				
Administration Section Chief		Van Quy Dien				
Finance Section Chief		Tong Tu				
New Life Bureau (for Rural Affairs)		Bui Gia Le				
Political Bureau		Le Dinh Chieu				
Rural Restoration Bureau		2nd Lt. Le Xuan Kinh		41		
Highlander Bureau		Le Huu Chat				
Medical Education & Social Action Bureau		Le Van Thai				

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AGREEMENT RELEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM	1. AGREEMENT NO. 27 (CY 64)	2. ORIGINAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	ANNEX	REVISION NO. SHEET 1 OF 5 SHEET

I. Objectives of the Activity:

The purpose of this activity is to continue to assist the rehabilitation of the province of QUANG NAM primarily through the construction, consolidation and improvement of NRL hamlets for the rural population of that province for the period May to December 1964.

This Release Agreement is only a partial CY 1964 funding and may be revised upward if necessary at a later time. Certain items still in the planning stage and under the jurisdiction of various GVN ministries have not been included in this Agreement. Upon promulgation and approval of these plans, this Release Agreement may be amended to include the additional items.

II. Responsibilities

A. OF AID

1. USOM will furnish the amount of U.S. owned local currency as set forth in Table 1, technical advice in the establishment of the NRL hamlets and in the economic, cultural and social development of the population of these hamlets. USOM will also furnish assistance in kind in support of this project, types and quantities to be determined at a later date.
2. The USOM Provincial Representative will be a member of the Province Coordinating Committee with joint responsibilities as set forth in para II B.3 below.

B. Of the Government of Vietnam

1. To designate the Province Chief of QUANG NAM Province as Activity Manager for this operation. The Activity Manager will be responsible for the development and implementation of this activity.
2. The Activity Manager will submit to the Central Pacification Committee (one copy to USOM Rural Affairs Program Office) monthly reports of the status of the activities herein listed in accordance with a standard procedure to be established.
3. A Province Coordinating Committee composed of the Province Chief, the USOM Provincial Representative and MAC/V Sector Advisor shall be responsible for commitment of funds for the purposes herein listed and for certifying expenditures as reasonable and proper and in accord with the release agreement.

AGREEMENT NO. 27 RELEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM	1. AGREEMENT NO. 27	2. ORIGINAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	(CY 64)	REVISION NO.
ANNEX	SHEET	SHEET
	2	OF 5

III. Local Currency Budget

T A B L E 1

ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES OF LOCAL CURRENCY

(Control of obligations will be maintained in terms of the items listed in this table. Variations of up to 20% of the budgeted amounts for each item except Unforeseen Expenses are authorized by the Provincial Committee without amendment to this Agreement so long as the total budget is not exceeded. Increases in individual items must be compensated for by equivalent decreases in other items.)

Item Number and Description	Action Plan	Piaster Financing (VN\$)	
		GVN	U.S.
01. <u>Relocation</u> 4,116 families estimated moved in 1963 but not paid x 2,000VN\$ average allowance per family. 3,000 families estimated for relocation in 1964 x 2,000VN\$ average allowance per family	A-A-4A	<u>14,232,000</u>	
		8,232,000	
		6,000,000	
02. <u>Highlander Resettlement</u> 400 families to be resettled and to be provided subsistence, housing materials, tools, PL 480 foodstuff (bulgur, corn and oil) and essential government services as needed and available.	A-A-4B	<u>1,976,710</u>	
03. <u>Mobile Cadre</u> Salaries for cadres computed as follows: a. 22 Team leaders x 2,000VN\$ x 8 mos. b. 198 Team members x 1,500VN\$ x 8 mos. In the event that the Provincial Committee can recruit competent cadres for less than the maximum authorized salaries, it may use the remaining funds to hire additional cadres. The function of the Mobile Cadre is as defined in the Pacification Plan.	A-A-1	<u>2,728,000</u>	
		352,000	
		2,376,000	

AGREEMENT RELEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM	1. AGREEMENT NO. 27 (CY 64)	2. ORIGINAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	ANNEX	REVISION NO. SHEET 3 OF 5

III. Local Currency Budget (cont'd)

Item Number and Description	Action Plan	Piaster Financing (V\$)	
		GVN	U.S.
04. <u>Armed Combat Youth Training</u>	A-A-3B	649,300	
a. 1,231 Youths x 20VN\$ x 15 days training		369,300	
b. Retraining: 2,000 Youths x 20VN\$ x 7 days.		280,000	
05. <u>Self-Help Projects</u>	A-A-6		9,000,000
Projects for 300 IRL Hamlets x 30,000VN\$ average per project. Projects for individual hamlets may be greater or less than 30,000VN\$ providing that at least 300 projects are completed.			
06. <u>Supplementary Provincial Development Program</u>	A-A-8	1,000,000	
First installment. Budget may be revised upward at a later date. The purpose of this budget item is to permit the Provincial Committee to finance development projects which the Province is capable of planning and executing without technical assistance from any Agency of the National Government.			
07. <u>Unforeseen Expenses</u>	A-A-15		1,000,000
First installment. Budget may be revised upward at a later date.			
Unforeseen Expenses funds (formerly called "Miscellaneous") are intended to provide the Provincial Committee sufficient flexibility to meet important situations which may arise. The only limitations on the use of the funds are:			

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM	1. AGREEMENT NO. 27	2. ORIGINAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	(CY 64)	REVISION NO.
ANNEX	SHEET 4	OF 5 SHEET

III. Local Currency Budget (cont'd)

Item Number and Description	Action Plan	Plaster Financing (VN\$)	
		GVN	U.S.
07. <u>Unforeseen Expenses</u> (cont'd)			
(1) that it be used only for official purposes and consistent with the overall aims of the program.			
(2) that the Provincial Committee exercise due diligence and judgment in the administering of the fund.			
(3) that if Unforeseen Expenses funds are used for purposes already covered by another budget item, such use must be stated, in writing, to be on a loan basis and must be reimbursed when the proper budget funds become available.			
08. <u>Operations Support - POL</u>	A-A-18	<u>1,225,882</u>	
These funds to be used for all expenses incidental to transportation of USOM and MAP materials including the purchase of POL and labor costs. Funds for warehouse rental or construction, if necessary, will be available from this budget category.			
09. <u>Hamlet Schools</u>	A-A-7	(a)	
(to be provided later)			
10. <u>Rural Health (Salaries of Health Workers)</u>	A-G-1	(a)	
(to be provided later)			
<u>T O T A L</u> :		<u>21,811,892</u>	<u>10,500,000</u>
(a) Amounts to be provided will be included in a subsequent amendment.			

AGREEMENT NO. 27 RELEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM	1. AGREEMENT NO. 27 (CY 64)	2. ORIGINAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	ANNEX	REVISION NO. SHEET 5 OF 5 SHEET

IV. Special Provisions

1. The unit cost estimates set forth in this agreement are considered to be estimates only and are not intended to restrict the Provincial Committee from approving for payment whatever it determines to be a reasonable cost. The Provincial Committee will have to buy material and food at local prices at the time of purchase.
2. A piaster imprest fund (caisse d'avance) will be established under the jurisdiction of the Province Chief for which he will be accountable to the Central Pacification Committee (CPC) for both GVN and U.S. local currency. He will be relieved of accountability upon (1) presentation to CPC of vouchers for expenditures initially authorized by the Provincial Committee, and (2) refunding to CPC any balance in the revolving fund after the purpose for which such fund was established has been accomplished. One copy of each voucher for U.S. local currency items (Self-Help and Unforeseen Expenses) will also be submitted to USOM Controller.
3. For detailed guidance on using both GVN and US funds and accounting procedures, refer to instructions issued by the GVN in Memorandum No. 3005/LB/ACL/TV/HCTC dated 10/7/63.
4. The Province Committee will provide a monthly report of status of funds to the CPC, DGEFA and to the USOM Controller through the Rural Affairs Program Office. This report will be submitted no later than 7 days after the end of the reporting month. Reports will be prepared in the format agreed to jointly by CPC and USOM.
5. U.S. owned local currency in this agreement will be funded from Provincial Agreement No. 46 and does not represent an additional commitment of U.S. owned funds.

CONCURRED IN BY:

Province Chief, Quang Nam

[Handwritten Signature]

June 20, 1964
Date

W. A. Highswonger
USOM

APPENDIX C

Republic of Viet Nam

Saigon, December 20, 1965

CENTRAL RURAL CONSTRUCTION
COUNCIL

POSTAL MESSAGE

Secretary General

From : Central R.C. Council
 To : R.C. Council of Quang Nam Province
 Info : - R.C.C. of T.A. 1
 - Staff Headquarters of Quang Nam Special Zone

Message No. 4198 XDNT/342/BD

We have the pleasure of informing you as follows :

1. With reference to the meeting held on Dec 11, 1965 at the Corps I Staff Headquarters, we have noticed that your pacification plan consists of :

- The general planning for 541 hamlets
- The pacification planning in 1966 :
 - . to strengthen 71 hamlets
 - . to construct 82 new hamlets

2. In support of the following programs, the Central has approved for your council a fund of forty nine thousand eight hundred twenty thousand piastres (49,820,000\$).

ITEMS	PROGRAMS	FUNDS	
01 HAMLET CONSTRUCTION	CADRES : Salaries for 104 Mobile Administrative Cadres + 12 Rural Political Cadres x (16,000\$ x 3months) 2,088,000\$	2,088,000\$	
	RESSETLEMENT : Housing support 3,500\$ x 2,156 families of lowlanders Rice support (6 months x 50 Kg x 10\$) x 2,156 families 6,468,000\$	7,546,000\$	
	Housing support 3,500\$ x 10 families of highlanders Rice support (6 months x 50 Kg x 10\$) x 10 families 35,000\$	35,000\$	
	Support 20Kg/Salt x 5\$ x 10 families 1,000\$	1,000\$	
	BUILDING TO CONSTRUCT HAMLET RESIDENTIAL ZONES : Clearing 10,000 sq.meters x 4\$50 45,000\$	45,000\$	
	labor for hand bulldozing 5,000m ³ x 44\$99 22,497\$	22,497\$	
	Ground levelling of residential zones 48,000 m ² x 4\$00 192,000\$	192,000\$	
	SELF-HELP HAMLET DEVELOPMENT : 30,000\$ x 100 hamlets	30,000\$	
			5,000,000\$
			...
			/2

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

2.

	<u>TRANSPORTATION : 7 International</u>	
	Salaries for 7 drivers x (2,500\$ x 12 months)	1,655,000\$
		210,000\$
	Salaries for warehouse keepers, secretaries and book-keepers	108,000\$
	Office supplies (Quang Nam Special Zone)	192,000\$
	POL	525,000\$
	Maintenance of vehicles	140,000\$
	Laborers	480,000\$
	<u>WAREHOUSES :</u>	1,000,000\$
	3 district warehouses :	
	(1 warehouse x 500,000\$00)	
	(2 " " x 250,000\$00)	
02 RURAL EDUC	Construction and furnishing of 60 classrooms x 70,000\$	4,200,000\$
	Salaries for 60 hamlet teachers in 1966 x (2,500\$ x 9 months)	1,350,000\$
	Salaries for 55 hamlet teachers in 1965 x (2,500\$ x 12 months)	1,650,000\$
	Transportation for 60 hamlet teachers moving to training centers x 200\$	12,000\$
	Training of hamlet teachers 800\$ x 60 teachers x 3 months of training, and lecturing and training allowances + allowances for 1 secretary + 1 laborer	183,000\$
	School supplies for trainees, office supplies, school equipment	134,000\$
	School materials provided to 60 teachers 1 set for ea. x 500\$	30,000\$
03 PUBLIC WORKS		9,430,000\$
	<u>ROADS :</u>	
	- Village Road 1A (Hoa Lan - Micu Hong Duyen Sen)	1,960,000\$
	- Thai-Dong Noi-An (BT 071 + 701 to BT 142 + 570)	3,000,000\$
	- Repair of a railroad to make it a road (AT 988 + 669 to AT 993 + 607)	840,000\$
	Village Road 2 (km 6 to km 10 + 500)	450,000\$
	- From hillside to rivermouth (BT 190 + 594 to 206 + 572,000)	1,180,000\$
	<u>BRIDGES AND SEWERS :</u>	
	Khai Dong Bridge (BT 071 + 701) - Economic Development Program. FY 1965 takes in charge of 600,000\$, a sum of 200,000\$ is requested in order to have 800,000\$	200,000\$
	Phuc Trach Bridge TL2 (BT 182 + 588)	400,000\$
	An Trach Bridge (AT 964 + 664)	600,000\$
	<u>Ferry boat :</u>	
	Man Quang Ferry Boat (BT 030 + 680)	200,000\$
	Market : Ha Tan (repair)	100,000\$
	Hoa Khanh	500,000\$

04 CHIEN HOI	: 250 returnees		1,490,000\$
05 AGRICULTURE			
	<u>AGRICULTURE IRRIGATION :</u>		2,460,000\$
	- Vinh Da Dam - Hoa Giang (156m)	1,500,000\$	
	- Gay Dua Dam (67m70)	900,000\$	
	Pumps : 20 (Taiwan model)	60,000\$	
	<u>ANIMAL HUSBANDRY :</u>		792,000\$
	Salary for 1 staff specialist x (7,000\$ x 12 months)	84,000\$	
	Salaries for 12 cadres x (4,000\$ x 12 months)	480,000\$	
	Training of 400 farmers x (4 days x 30\$)	48,000\$	
	9 drug stations x 10,000\$	90,000\$	
	Anti-plague	10,000\$	
	Demonstrations at 10 pilot-centers x 2,000\$	20,000\$	
	Distribution of live-stock :		
	400 chickens	60,000\$	
	<u>AGRICULTURE PROMOTING :</u>		852,000\$
	Salaries for 2 staff specialists x (7,000\$ x 12 months)	168,000\$	
	Salaries for 13 cadres x (4,000\$ x 12 months)	624,000\$	
	Training of 500 farmers x (4 days x 30\$)	60,000\$	
	<u>AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS :</u>		490,000\$
	Paddy	90,000\$	
	Secondary crops	350,000\$	
	Breeding plants	50,000\$	
	<u>FISHERIES :</u>		1,664,000\$
	Salary for 1 staff specialist x (6,000\$ x 12 months)	72,000\$	
	Salaries for 10 cadres x (4,000\$ x 12 months)	480,000\$	
	Training of 100 river fishermen (4 days x 30\$)	12,000\$	
	20 fish ponds	100,000\$	
	Fishing tackle : nets	1,000,000\$	
UNFORESEEN EXPENSES			1,000,000\$
	Total :		49,820,000\$

3. The above fund is taken in charge by the Viet Nam National Budget.
4. The province chief is designated as administrator of all these programs.-

BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG, COMMISSARY OF R.G.
ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL R.C. COUNCIL,

Brigadier General Nguyen duc Thang

APPENDIX D

357

Schedule of Economic Cadres' Training Program
From May 11 through May 20, 1961.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Training Subjects</u>	<u>Speaker</u>
May 11	08:00-10:00	-Assembling of trainees.	Board of directors
	10:00-12:00	-Organization of groups, and publication of program and regulations.	" "
	14:00-15:30	-Purpose of rural restoration program.	Rural Restoration Bureau
	15:30- 17:30	-Organization of Farmers Association.	Naco
May 12	08:00-10:00	-Cooperative Policy.	Naco
	10:00-12:00	-Agricultural Credit Policy-	Naco
	14:00-17:30	-Extra Crops- Fertilizer Manure compost.	Agric. Section
May 13	08:00-17:30	-Observation of method of fertilizing fertilizer and making manure compost at demonstration pilot spots Vinh Xuan and Ky Ngoc.	Agriculture Section
May 14	08:00-10:00	-Fruit tree planting- Nursery	Agric. Sec.
	10:00-12:00	-Crop protection-Organization of h-T	-H-
	14:00-16:00	-Rural construction	Public Works
	16:00-17:30	-Construction of light materials	Const. Sect.
May 15	08:00-09:00	-Self Help School	Educ. Sec.
	09:30-12:00	-Morality and manners of a cadre	VIS
	14:00-16:00	-The way of activity (new life)	Huynh
	16:00-17:30	-How to report	Huynh
	20:00-22:00	-One's work review	Team leader
May 16	08:00-12:00	-Practice of crop protection at Vinh Tho pilot spot	Agric. Sec.
	14:00-17:30	-Cattle raising, chicken raising & Inoculation	An Hus
May 17	08:00-12:00	-Practice of fruit tree planting at Hoi An Nursery.	Agric. Sect.
	14:00-17:30	-Pig raising- Pig corn program- How to use a syringe	An Hus
May 18	08:00-17:30	-Observation of raising method and pig inoculation at Hoa Vang pilot spot	An Hus
May 19	08:00-12:00	-The way of ATS construction and consolidation	ATS Bureau
	14:00-17:30	-Preliminary conception of secondary road building.	Public Works
	20:00-22:00	-Group meeting- One's work review	Team leader
May 20	08:00-10:00	-The way of propaganding and campaigning-	Propaganda & Campaign Section
	10:00-12:00	-How to make a self help project-	Huynh
	14:00-16:00	-Summary	Board of directors
	16:00-17:30	-Visit and directive of province chief.	

-TRAINING OF VILLAGE COUNCILS & HAMLET COMMITTEES-

Presently, Quang Nam has 115 villages and 537 hamlets. 4 councillors needed to be trained for each village and 3 committee-men needed to be trained for each hamlet.

Villages: 4 people x 115 villages = 460 people.

Hamlets: 3 people x 537 hamlets = 1,611 people.

Time and courses needed for the training purpose:

Village councillors: 3 courses. 150 people in a course, and each course lasts for 15 days.

Hamlet committee-men: 8 courses will be opened for these people. Each course will receive 200 people and will last for 10 days. Each man will get 20\$ a day during training time. Management expenditures for village councillors is 8,000\$ and 5,000\$ for hamlet committee-men.

Following here are expenditures of training courses in details:

Village councils:

Food for students: 20\$ x 460 people x 15 days = 100,000\$	138,000\$
Printing stuff for 3 courses: 8,000\$ x 3 courses =	24,000\$
	<u>Total: 162,000\$</u>

Hamlet committees:

Food for students: 20\$ x 1,611 people x 10 days =	332,000\$
Printing stuff for 8 courses: 5,000\$ x 8 =	40,000\$
	<u>Total: 362,000\$</u>

162,000\$ + 362,200 = 524,200\$

Program of councillors training: (15 days per 7.30 hours each- Total: 112.30 hours)

Politics- (2 days)

- Policy of the Military Revolutionary Council and GVN
- Preponderance of the Republic of Vietnam in comparison with VC
- Problems of the unity of people
- Neutralization problem of South Vietnam
(to be prepared and taught by VIS)
- VC sabotage plot (to be prepared ~~by~~ and taught by National police)
- Chieu Hoi policy (to be prepared ~~by~~ and taught by the Political Section)
- Activities of civic campaign
- Manners and morality of village councillors. (to be prepared and taught by Civic Action.

Administration- (3 days)

- General idea of administration organization
- Limit of powers and duty of village council (to be prepared and taught by Administration Section)
- Program of Rural Restoration project (to be prepared and taught by Rural Restoration Bureau)

over please.....

Finance & Tax: (2 days)

- Village finance: village budget (estimates and management)
- Village income
- Procedure and method of establishing and keeping books (to be prepared and taught by Finance Section)
- Village taxes: Different kinds of taxes
 - How to operate and collect taxes
 - Violation of taxes
 - Duty of village council toward taxes (to be prepared and taught by Tax Section)

Economics- 2½ days

- GVN economic improvement and program of economic development
- Violation of economics
- Control of commodities, and eradication of speculation
- Duty of village council concerning about the establishment of handicraft and industrial agencies (to be prepared by economic section)

Agriculture: Production increasing, how to use fertilizer (to be prepared by Agriculture section.)

Land: Establishment and administration of land
Maintenance of land documents (prepared by Land Section)

Cattle raising; and animal protection etc... (prepared by An Hus Section)

Fishing: (prepared and taught by Fishery Section)

Social works: 1½ days

- Public sanitation, disease prevention, and disease curing etc...
- First aid giving (prepared and taught by Public ~~HEALTH~~ Health Section)
- Primary education, and popular education
- School organization, and procedure of asking permission to open a school (prepared and taught by Education Section)
- Physical education & sport movement
- Youth organizations (prepared and taught by Youth Section)

Justice: 1 day

- Outline of separation of judiciary, legislative, and executive powers
- Courts of laws in Vietnam
- Prosecution
- Judiciary police
- Procedure of arresting people and controlling houses
- Duty of a civil status member
- General rules and regulations of civil status documents
- Birth, marriage, and death certificate. (prepared and taught by the Justice ~~AREA~~ of the Peace Court, Hoi An)

Military works and intelligence: 3 days-

Military affairs: (will be taken charge by SDC Training Center) - Consisting of methods of using of weapons (theory and practicing) especially with the various kinds of weapons such as sub-machine guns, rifles, pistols, and handgrenades etc....

over please....

Intelligence:

- Definition of intelligence
- Purpose of news
- News of origin
- Organization of intelligence net
- The use of news

Program of hamlet committee-men training: (10 days per 7.30 hours each-
total: 73 hours)

- 1st day: Opening ceremony- Publicity of program and its content (by the Board of Directors)
- 2nd day: Program and purpose of Rural Restoration works (by Administration Section)
- Manners and morality & procedure of working of a cadre (by VIS)
- 3rd day: Chieu Hoi policy (fundamental theory- Campaign technic- classification, and liberation- organization and management)
(by Youth Section)
- 4th day: Organization of people intelligence
Inspection of property, filtration of ranks, and classification of people composition (guidance of establishment of family census paper)
(prepared by National Police)
- 5th day: To organize and strengthen the system of hamlet defense
To organize and strengthen the hamlet armed force
Special activity group - Intelligence group
Intelligence method
To organize liaison signal system (prepared by Strat. Ham. Bureau)
- 6th day: Guidance and division of works to hamlet compositions during peaceful time as well as emergency cases (alarm, guerrilla & counter-guerrilla tactics, fighting practicing etc...)
Duties of Hamlet Committee, Special Activity Group (prepared by Strat. Ham. Bureau or Civic Action Section)
- 7th day: To organize and strengthen body communities
Method of people campaign
People intelligence (by Civic Action Section)
Way of establishing and strengthening of New Activity Hamlet
(by Strat. Ham. Bureau)
- 8th day: Extra crop plantation, how to fertilize chemical fertilizer, how to make manure sheds, program of fruit tree planting, and program of crop protection.
Practicing at experimental points. (by Agric. Section)
- 9th day: Methods of raising cattle, pigs, poultry, and ducks
Pig-corn program
How to raise pig, and how to vaccinate (by An. Hus. Section)
- 10th day: NACO policy
Organization of Farmers Associations
Program of ACL economic development
Questionnaire solving
Works reviewing- (by NACO section of New Activity Bureau)

TỈNH QUẢNG - NAM

Bản chính của Tỉnh giữ

GIẤY PHÉP VĂN PHÒNG ẤP CHIẾN LƯỢC

ACL AUTHORIZATION FORM

Giấy phép ACL số _____
ACL Auth. No

Ngày tháng :

Date :

Chương trình được chấp thuận :

Program Authority :

Mục đích :

Purpose :

Loại phẩm vật :

Type of commodity :

Số lượng

Trọng lượng

Amount :

Weight :

Color-coded copies for:

Province

District

Hamlet

Warehouseman

Truck driver

Người nhận :

Recipient :

Nơi đến :

Destination :

Tại kho :

Warehouse location :

Nhân viên phụ trách :

Man in charge :

Phương tiện chuyên vận :

Transportation :

Số lượng xăng yêu cầu :

Gas required :

Chức vụ :

Title :

Tên tài xế :

Name of driver :

Khoảng cách hành trình :

Kilometers :

Chấp thuật phẩm vật :

For commodities :

Approved :

TỈNH-TRƯỞNG,

Chấp thuận phiếu lưu hành xe và công vụ lệnh.

For trip ticket and travel authority :

Approved :

Hội An, ngày tháng năm 196

Hội-An, ngày tháng năm 196

Thực phẩm hoặc vật liệu do tài xế lãnh :

Commodities or materials received by driver :

Chữ ký :

Signature :

Tên và chức vụ : (bằng chữ in)

Name and title : (print)

Ngày, tháng

Date

Nhận :

Received :

Cho

ẤP

For

Hamlet

Trưởng ban trị sự ấp hay nhân viên

Chief or committeeman

Nhận cho

Received for

Đề phân phát

For distribution

Tên (chữ in)

Ngày tháng :

Date

Quận

District

chữ ký

Tên (chữ in) và chữ ký

Name (print) and signature

Nhân viên ban trị sự ấp thứ nhì

2nd committeeman

Tên (chữ in) và chữ ký

Name (print) and signature

Ngày tháng

Date

APPENDIX G

Bản mẫu : HỆ THỐNG PHÂN LOẠI NHÀ KHO

Sample : WAREHOUSE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

A, B, C, v.v....: Chỉ rõ từng loại và thứ của các mục

A, B, C, etc....: Designates general area or type of item.

Số theo sau chữ chỉ rõ từng loại riêng biệt A1 Gạo mì, B2 tôn, v.v...

Number following letter is specific item A1 Bulgur, B2 Roofing, etc...

Code Qui tắc	English	Vietnamese	Code Qui tắc	English	Vietnamese
A.	Foodstuffs	Thực phẩm	D.	Clothing & Fabrics	Vải vóc và những vật tương tự
A1	Bulgur	Gạo mì	D1	Shirts *	Sơ mi
A2	Corn	Bắp	D2	Pants	Quần
^{A3} 3	Cooking oil	Dầu ăn	E.	Automobile parts and supplies	Dụng-cụ xe hơi và vật-dùng
A4	Shortening	Mỡ	F.	Earth & masonry tools	Dụng-cụ nề và đào đất
A5	Canned food	Đồ hộp	G.	Woodwork Tools	Dụng-cụ làm đồ gỗ
B.	Construction materials	Vật dụng xây cất	H.	Metalwork tools	Dụng-cụ làm đồ sắt
B1	Cement	Xi-măng	I.	Mechanics tools	Dụng-cụ thợ máy
B2	Roofing	Tôn lợp	J.	Fertilizer	Phân bón
B3	Iron rod, size 8	Sắt 8	K.to Y.	Reserved for use as needed	Để làm những việc khác
B4	Iron rod, size 6	Sắt 6	Z.	Miscellaneous	Linh tinh
B5	Iron rod, size 4	Sắt 4	Z1	Bicycles *	Xe đạp
B6	Iron rod, size 3.8	Sắt 3.8	Z2	Brief cases* etc	Cặp da, v.v...
C.	Petroleum	Dầu hỏa			
C1	Gasoline	Xăng			
^{C2} 2	Diesel	Dầu cặn			
C3	Motor oil	Dầu máy			

* These items checked out on loan basis to cadres.

Những mục này cấp cho cán-bộ mượn dùng.

WORK PLAN (Dự án công việc)

Ty Bảo lãnh (Sponsoring section)	Chương trình (Program)
Đơn vị (Unit)	Số (Number)
Phẩm vật (Commodities)	Tiền (Piasters)
Ngày khởi công (Start Date)	Ngày hoàn tất (Finish date)

JAN. (Tháng Giêng)	: FEB. (Tháng Hai)	: MAR. (Tháng Ba)
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
APR. (Tháng Tư)	: MAY (Tháng Năm)	: JUNE (Tháng Sáu)
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
JUL. (Tháng Bảy)	: AUG. (Tháng Tám)	: SEPT. (Tháng Chín)
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
OCT. (Tháng Mười)	: NOV. (Tháng Mười Một)	: DEC. (Tháng Chạp)
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:
:	:	:

APPENDIX J

Số lộ-trình
(Daily Transportation Log)

Ngày : tháng năm
Day :

Loại xe số : Vehicle :	Giấy phép : (Authorizat)	Chương-trình : (Progr)	Hàng hóa : (Cargo)	Số lượng : (Amount)	Nơi đến : (Destina-tion)	Giờ đi : (Hour: out)	Giờ về : (Hour: in)	Chữ ký tài-xe : (Driver's signature)
DODGE	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
1002	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
1004	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
1006	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
1011	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

Selections, Vinh Binh Province
Self-help Chart

BẦU CỬ BAN TRỊ SỰ ẤP




6. DÂN CHÚNG BẦU BAN TRỊ-SỰ ẤP VÀ LẬP HƯƠNG-ƯỚC. 8

The people elect their hamlet council.



**MỖI NGƯỜI DÂN TRONG ẤP PHẢI NGHIÊN-CỨU
DỰ-ÁN TỰ-TỨC MÀ HỌ MUỐN XÂY-CẤT VÀ XỬ DỤNG.** 9

Each person in the hamlet must study what he wants for
a self-help project.




**TOÀN THỂ DÂN ÁP QUYẾT-ĐỊNH VỀ DỰ-ÁN
XÂY CẤT TRONG ẤP THEO Ý-NGUYỆN CỦA HỌ.**

All the people decide on the construction
project according to their own ideas.

XI-MĂNG




CỔNG




CÁT SỎI




GẠCH NGÓI



TÔN




GỖ VÁN



BEST AVAILABLE COPY

**BAN TRỊ-SỰ ẤP PHẢI ƯỚC-ĐỊNH SỐ LƯỢNG
VẬT-LIỆU VÀ KINH-PHÍ CẦN-THIỆT CHO DỰ-ÁN.**

The hamlet committee must decide the total amount of
material and money needed for the project.



DÂN CHÚNG TỰ Ý GÓP SỨC ĐỂ HOÀN-TẤT DỰ-ÁN.

17

Each person voluntarily contributes as he is able in order to complete the project.

APPENDIX L

SUMMARY OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY PROJECTS

Hamlet Plans (Province Administered)

A-A-1 Strategic Hamlet Construction Teams - - provides per diem and equipment for eight-man construction/civic action teams who direct initial establishment of strategic hamlets, VN\$ 1,000 per man month.

A-A-3 Hamlet Militia Training - - pays per diem to militia during two-week training period, VN\$ 280 per man x 10 to 20 per hamlet.

A-A-4 Resettlement - - furnishes cash resettlement allowances, surplus foods, and commodities such as blankets, clothing, tools (generally excess property) to families relocated as part of strategic hamlet establishment.

A-A-5 Hamlet Council Training - - builds and equips provincial training centers, develops training course and trains instructors, and pays per diem and travel course of trainees and instructors, to give all newly elected hamlet officers a two-week course on hamlet administration.

A-A-6 Self-Help - - furnishes VN\$ 15,000 to 45,000 per hamlet plus commodities, mainly cement, roofing, rod and wire, hand tools and small generators and machines, for hamlet community improvement projects to which villagers contribute labor. Funds supervision of seven rural self-help specialists.

A-A-7 Hamlet Schools - - builds 500 to 1200 classrooms a year at a cost of VN\$ 20,000 to 50,000 per classroom (depending on amount of labor contributed by the hamlet), plus cement and roofing (from self-help project), teaching aids, school supplies, and two textbooks per child. Gives teachers for the new schools a two-month training course, paying instructor and trainee per diem plus supplies and expenses of the provincial courses, and pays the first year salary of VN\$ 600 per month, for each new teacher.

A-A-8 Provincial Development Works - - provides funds and commodities - - largely cement, reinforcing bars and pipe, and small hydraulic equipment - - plus the services of a well drilling advisor, for small scale economic development projects servicing several hamlets. Projects are to be selected and managed by provincial and district authorities.

A-A-11 Viet-Cong Rehabilitation - - provides funds for per diem and retraining of Viet-Cong returnees, plus commodities for establishment of new hamlets for those who cannot return to their own villages.

A-A-13 Para-Military Dependents Support - - provides surplus foods rations for families of CG and SDC troops, about 30 kgs. of bulgar wheat plus 2 gallons of cooking oil per dependent per quarter.

A-A-15 Miscellaneous & Contingency - - provides cash allowances, surplus foods, and blankets and other emergency supplies for victims of VC attacks and other disasters. Also provides a reserve fund of piasters and PL 480 foods for targets of opportunity.

- 2 -

Hamlet Plans (Central Government Administered)

A-C-1 Rural Wells - - provides requirements for drilling about 400 wells a year, including 3 technicians, well components and rig maintenance parts, and funds for drilling crews and local services.

A-C-2 Hamlet Commedia - - provides personal radios for villagers, and tri-wheel audio-visual units and mimeographs for district information offices, plus apparatus for provincial photo labs, plus local currency for operation of district offices.

A-C-3 Special Livestock Development - - provides low cost improved hogs and surplus feed grain, to be sold to poorer farmers on special NACO loans, plus grants of cement for pigsties, plus some poultry. USOM livestock, extension, credit and veterinary advisors give technical direction.

A-C-4 Fertilizer -- furnishes fertilizer for 350,000 to 400,000 hectares in the lower Delta, through special commercial channels at subsidized prices on no-interest loans, and furnishes fertilizer for 250,000 to 300,000 hectares in the Central Lowlands, to be distributed through government agencies and coops at a fraction of the landed cost.

A-C-5 Plant Protection - - distributes insecticides gratis through the provincial agricultural services in priority areas and sells insecticides at half price through coops in other provinces, proceeds being used by the Plant Protection Service to buy additional pesticides.

A-C-6 Village/Hamlet Radio - - installs transceivers in villages and hamlets, as part of the national police network.

A-D-1 Military Civic Action - - provides medicines for joint US/ARVN medical civic action teams, which make rounds of strategic hamlets treating the population.

Agricultural Production Support

A-E-1 Agricultural Production Services - - provides replacement equipment and parts for experiment stations, extension, crop reporting and other agricultural technical services, plus cement, seed, and fertilizer for further testing and trials. Local currency pays salaries of employees in these operations, plus some new construction of facilities, plus a JCRR team.

A-E-2 Rural Credit and Cooperatives - - provides fertilizer for distribution by coops, proceeds being used to expand coop capital, plus construction of 25 new NACO offices and 10 new district coop offices.

A-E-3 Land Settlement & Agricultural Equipment Maintenance - - provides spare parts and expendable supplies for land clearing equipment.

- 3 -

A-E-4 Irrigation - - provides equipment and funds for construction of about 50 small irrigation projects a year, plus a JCRR irrigation team, to direct planning and construction.

A-E-5 Fishing Facilities - - provides equipment for fish landing facilities, hatcheries, and hamlet fish ponds, plus local currency for construction of such facilities.

A-F-1 Rural Trade & Agriculture Schools - - provides funds and equipment for new two-year schools in three provinces and expansion and renovation of six others.

Health

A-G-1 Rural Health - - provides salaries and training per diem for rural health workers, plus medicines for hamlet dispensaries. Provides three surgical teams at regional hospitals, advisors to the rural health program.

A-H-1 Malaria Eradication - - provides US advisors, training of Vietnamese personnel at the Malaria Eradication Training Center in Manila, insecticides, vehicles, and supplies and replacement parts. The operation conducts intensive spraying of all hypocoendemic and mesoendemic areas under government control - - generally in the Highlands - - surveillance and initial spraying of new settlements in other areas. (Funded by Development Grants as part of the world-wide Malaria Eradication program)

A-J-1 Improvement of Local Government - - provides US advisors and participant training to assist GVN in local government, financial management, and rural credit reorganization.

Operations Support

A-I-1 Support of Rural Affairs - - funds the province representatives and the staff of the Office of Rural Affairs, and provides equipment and handling and transportation costs for movement of Counter-insurgency commodities.

A-I-2 Support of Agriculture - - provides US advisors and training in the US for key personnel of various Vietnam agricultural services, particularly the services and operations of the AE series action plans.

A-I-3 Support of Public Works - - provides technical personnel and training abroad for all Public Works projects.

- 4 -

A-I-4 Support of Public Health - - provides US advisors and participant training for public Health projects.

A-I-5 Support of Communications Media - - provides US advisors and participant training for the Ministry of Information.

A-I-7 Support of IVS - - provides 70 IVS technicians, working in agriculture, education, and malaria eradication.

APPENDIX M.

ACTIVITY PROGRAM OF THE RURAL CONSTRUCTION MINISTRY
DURING 19661. GENERAL.

- a. On 1 Dec 1965, the Prime Minister and concurrently Chairman, Central Rural Construction Board, signed a directive prescribing rural construction policies.

This directive explained that :

" The eventual objective of our people and Armed Forces is a unified, democratic and powerful Fatherland of Vietnam.

Our practical, essential, short-range objectives are Security, Freedom, Democracy and Happiness for the people of South Vietnam".

To attain these objectives, the National Leadership Committee and the Central Executive Committee have outlined the following three main lines of action : military offensive to defeat the VC, rural construction and building of democracy".

The directive also defined : "Construction of an area is to restore public security and to carry out the policies of the Government in order to improve the living conditions of the inhabitants in that area in political, economic and social fields etc..." and the following three fundamentals are established :

(1) Fundamental 1 :

"The Rural Construction can only be achieved through the unity of military, administrative and civic personnel.

The important and deciding element for the success of rural construction is the People. Military and administrative personnel only have the responsibility to assist, provide guidance and motivate the people so that the people will recognize the necessity and importance and carry out rural construction by themselves as their initiated work.

(2) Fundamental 2 :

The Government must formulate a well-defined and practical new life development policy in rural areas and publicize this policy to the people. When carrying out this policy in rural areas, cadres must know the sincere aspirations of the people so that their work not only fit the policy of the Government, but they also meet the legitimate aspirations of the people.

(3) Fundamental 3.

The rural construction will only obtain everlasting results, if the enemy's infrastructures are destroyed and constantly followed up and our infrastructures, that is our regional administrative agencies and people's defense groups created and supported by the people must be constantly protected and controlled. The follow up of our infrastructures and the infrastructures of the enemy must be indefinitely carried out. In other words, the rural construction will only produce ever-lasting results, if VC underground cadres and cruel rural officials are eliminated and democratic, uncorrupted and effective administrative agencies are activated.

The Directive also prescribed : "The construction of an area consists of two phases : Peace restoration phase and new life development phase".

The peace restoration phase will be carried out through two periods : clearing period and securing period.

The clearing period will aim at annihilating or driving VC regional and main forces from the areas to be constructed.

The purposes of the securing period will be to destroy VC military political infrastructures and consolidate or construct our infrastructures, that is to liberate the people from VC control, and instill a sense of responsibility among the people to maintain the restored security by themselves.

During the new life development phase, the policy of the Government will be carried out to meet the sincere and legitimate requirements and aspirations of most people residing in peace restored areas in political, economic and social fields etc...".

The Ministry of National Defense will be responsible for carrying out clearing phases. The Ministry of the Interior and the Rural Construction will carry out securing phases. New Life development phases require the efforts of all ministries. The Central Rural Construction Board will closely coordinate the activities of these ministries. Similar Rural Construction Boards have been activated in CTZ's, DTA's provinces and districts.

The Central Rural Construction Board has :

- Published Directive No 1535/UBHP/CT/M dated 11 Dec 65 prescribing the initial concepts on Rural Construction.
- Published Directive No 1382/UBHP/CT/M dated 6 Nov 65 prescribing the Rural Construction control system from central to district levels.
- Published Order No 2164/XDNT dated 10 Dec 65 prescribing the regulations for Rural Construction Cadres.
- Outlined criteria to direct all provinces in the preparation of 1966 Rural Construction Plans, and approved these 46 plans and provided an appropriation of 1,561,208,000?

The Central Rural Construction Board has reminded all provinces to prepare practical plans, that is, these plans must be based on actual capabilities of low level cadres, capabilities of the enemy, military support capabilities of DTA's, and sincere and legitimate aspirations of the people. The policy of the Central Rural Construction Board is that work must be slowly carried out, but they must be successful. Once an area is pacified, it must be able to defend itself. Pacifications must be gradually and continuously carried out from secure areas to insecure areas, from densely populated developed areas to thinly populated underdeveloped areas. Security in an area must be restored before work will be carried out at another area.

The plan of the province must be practical in order that at least 75% of the mission be expected to realize at the end of the year.

Below is the capitulation list of the vital missions of the Rural Reconstruction Ministry in 1966.

2. VITAL MISSIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN 1966.

PURPOSE	M I S S I O N
1. Have a uniform and appropriate conception on rural reconstruction.	<p>It is requested to coordinate with the ministries concerned to :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Publish the initial and sketchy conception of the Central Rural Construction Board, concerning the reconstruction of rural areas, to the people, the cadres, the government and the armed forces in order that they all have a thorough knowledge on it. b. Organize 4 seminars for the military and civil cadres to discuss and exchange their views, experiences on rural construction. c. Submit to the Central Rural Construction Board a digest of the suggestions from the people and the experiences of cadres, with a view to amend the initial and sketchy conception, and to meet the actual situation of rural areas.
2. Have an effective group of "rural construction cadres"	<p>It is requested to :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Urge the provincial rural construction boards to recruit about 200 "rural construction cadres", including : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) voluntary, local and new cadres. (2) a variety of non specialized, voluntary and qualified cadres. b. Build and consolidate the three Rural Construction Training Centers at Giadinh, Vung-tau and Pleiku. c. Train and re-train about 130 rural construction cadres. d. Exploit the experiences of cadres, improve continuously the techniques from the rural construction training centers, concerning the construction of rural areas. e. Publish a monthly magazine, using it as an agency for technical development, and as means of communication between the cadres of the nation. Radio broadcasting and television can be used for the same purpose.

3. Have an effective system of directing the rural construction.
- It is requested to coordinate with the ministries concerned of the government to :
- a. Assume the missions as General Section, Central Rural Construction Board. Guide, promote and support the activities of the provincial rural construction boards.
 - b. Provide additional activity facilities to general sections, CTZ rural construction boards, DTA rural construction boards, provincial rural construction boards, and district rural construction boards, specially in areas to be pacified in priority.
 - c. Make a digest of and submit to the Central Rural Construction Board, the recommendations of the provinces relating to the reorganization of the administrative and people elected agencies at rural areas, in order that appropriate actions can be taken to direct, support and promote the pacification missions.
 - d. Set up an effective and numerous rural construction inspection team at the Central Rural Construction Board and in each CTZ.

4. Have a short range, but practical program.
- It is requested to coordinate with the ministries of the government concerned to :
- a. Promote and support the execution of the provincial rural construction programs in 1966. These programs are to be prepared by the provinces in compliance with the standards from the Central Rural Construction Board and the CTZ's, and based on the actual situation of the area concerned.

The CTZ's, the DTA's and the provinces have engaged to the Government to realize 75% of the Rural Construction program prior to 1 January 1967, if not in obligatory case.

- (1) They will pacify 969 hamlets with 1,005,081 inhabitants who have just been concentrated there (7% of the population of the nation).

They will consolidate 1,083 hamlets with 1,152,388 inhabitants (8% of the population of the nation) by setting up self-defense civilian groups, the hamlet executive board through election, the village administrative council, and by organizing the new life.

They will continue to develop the construction of 3,620 newly pacified hamlets and the town areas with 7,842,000 inhabitants (61% of the population of the nation)

(2) They will resettle 41,000 families who have left VC controlled areas.

(3) They will realize 2,779 hamlet self-help programs.

(4) They will construct 2,251 class-rooms, recruit 2,604 teachers for hamlets.

(5) They will construct roads, 913 km long,

They will construct 19 bridges, ferries and markets with the expenses of over 1,000,000%

They will construct 129 bridges, ferries and markets, with the expenses of under 1,000,000%

(6) They will construct 14 dams and dikes with the expenses of over 1,000,000%

They will construct 43 dams and dikes with the expenses of under 1,000,000%

They will dredge or excavate canals, 119 km long.

(7) They will train 3,700 farmers on modern techniques of agriculture, animal husbandry and fishery.

They will issue good seeds, subordinate cereal and plants with the expenses of 13,000,000%

They will issue 61,000 chicken and ducks and 16,000 pigs.

They will construct 759 markets and fish ponds.

They will issue fishing implements with the expenses of 16,000,000%

b. They will promote the establishment of 20 power plants at areas to be pacified in priority.

c. They will particularly support the areas to be pacified in priority in every aspect, specially in manpower and military matters.

3. RURAL CONSTRUCTION FUNDS TO BE ALLOCATED TO THE PROVINCES IN 1966.

The estimated obligation for rural construction is 2 billions.

In the first phase, after studying and considering the plans from the provinces at the CTZ headquarters, the General Sections, Central Rural Construction Board has allocated to the 43 provinces and 3 towns a total fund of 1,561,208,000% distributed as follows :

a. Classified by Provinces.

Serial Nr	Provinces	Funds allocated (VN \$)	Proportion	Classes	High- ways in Km	Bridges Ferries and markets	Dams Dikes	Canals in Km
1	An giang	84,433,000.	5.40	212	36.6	28	0	16.5
2	An xuyen	28,659,000.	1.84	47	13.0	0	1	0
3	Ba xuyen	36,146,000.	2.31	45	16.4	0	8	7.1
4	Bac lieu	33,273,000.	2.13	40	13.1	1	0	0
5	Bien hoa	36,266,000.	2.32	58	14.5	0	1	2.0
6	Binh duong	35,853,000.	2.30	40	14.7	5	0	0
7	Binh dinh	40,951,000.	2.62	56	22.0	17	2	4.2
8	Binh long	14,659,000.	0.94	12	13.0	11	0	0
9	Binh tuy	17,135,000.	1.10	27	8.4	0	0	0
10	Binh thuan	28,448,000.	1.82	40	5.1	4	1	0
11	Cam ranh	15,917,000.	1.02	10	3.0	5	0	0
12	Chau doc	49,325,000.	3.16	75	69.0	0	0	26.7
13	Chuong thien	21,465,000.	1.38	30	4.0	1	0	0
14	Darlac	36,297,000.	2.32	42	22.0	0	0	0
15	Da nang	24,115,000.	1.54	28	4.1	0	0	0
16	Dinh tuong	40,930,000.	2.62	50	33.6	0	1	5.3
17	Go cong	28,587,000.	1.83	38	19.5	0	0	0
18	Gia dinh	65,796,000.	4.21	288	18.1	3	0	0
19	Hau nghia	32,643,000.	2.10	50	27.8	0	0	0.8
20	Kien giang	43,160,000.	2.77	33	21.6	0	1	3.0
21	Kien hoa	40,347,000.	2.59	56	6.5	1	0	7.5
22	Kien phong	35,708,000.	2.29	30	20.8	4	0	8.0
23	Kien tuong	19,983,000.	1.28	24	20.5	2	0	0
24	Kontum	25,479,000.	1.63	24	14.0	2	2	7.2
25	Khanh hoa	23,421,000.	1.50	41	4.0	1	0	0

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26	Lam dong	22,257,000.	1.43	15	9.7	0	0	0
27	Long an	50,155,000.	3.21	60	43.5	5	0	0
28	Long khanh	15,125,000.	0.97	12	6.8	2	3	0
29	Ninh thuan	26,079,000.	1.67	40	18.5	1	4	10.0
30	Phong dinh	35,270,000.	2.26	50	26.1	12	3	0.3
31	Phu bon	11,803,000.	0.75	15	10.5	0	0	0
32	Phu yen	26,535,000.	1.70	33	8.0	1	0	0
33	Phuoc long	16,706,000.	1.07	15	11.5	4	0	0
34	Phuoc tuy	23,822,000.	1.52	30	8.8	0	0	0
35	Pleiku	21,734,000.	1.39	10	23.0	4	1	3.0
36	Quang duc	18,641,000.	1.20	0	18.5	5	3	0
37	Quang nam	50,692,000.	3.25	60	48.3	6	2	0
38	Quang ngai	50,494,000.	3.23	57	33.0	5	2	1.0
39	Quang tin	48,427,000.	3.10	82	5.1	0	3	2.5
40	Quang tri	60,600,000.	3.88	75	39.8	2	11	0
41	Tay ninh	38,486,000.	2.47	64	7.7	1	0	8.6
42	Tuyen duc	36,969,000.	2.37	50	55.0	10	1	3.0
43	Thua thien	49,218,000.	3.15	50	43.7	3	7	0
44	Vinh binh	41,269,000.	2.64	70	11.3	2	0	2.4
45	Vinh long	44,581,000.	2.86	45	31.8	0	0	0
46	Vung tau	13,349,000.	0.86	22	7.0	0	0	0
	TOTAL	1,561,208,000.	100.00	2,251	912.9	148	57	119.1

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b. Classified by items.

Serial Nr	Programs	Funds allocated (VN\$)	Proportion
1	Settlement	264,125,000.	16.92
2	Rural Reconstruction cadres	38,994,000.	2.50
3	Development of self-sufficient hamlets	138,550,000.	8.87
4	Rural Education	295,470,000.	18.92
5	Hydraulics	76,477,000.	4.90
6	Agriculture and animal husbandry in the Highlands	59,725,000.	3.82
7	Cattle	56,251,000.	3.60
8	Pisciculture	46,394,000.	2.98
9	Bridges and Roads	330,568,000.	21.17
10	"Open arm" operation	104,747,000.	6.70
11	Earth work	9,579,000.	0.62
12	Transportation	68,144,000.	4.37
13	Warehouses	26,184,000.	1.68
14	Unexpected expenses	46,000,000.	2.95
	TOTAL :	1,561,208,000.	100.00

Summary Explanations of the above programs

The above funds of 2 billions belong to the Central Rural Reconstruction Board to provide financial support to nationwide rural reconstruction programs which have been considered and approved by the Board. The rural reconstruction commissioner, the Secretary General to the Central Rural Reconstruction Board are responsible for the planning and use of these funds.

The own budget of the Rural Reconstruction Ministry for the fiscal year 1966 is only 33 millions, used to bear all expenses on personnel salary and internal operation.

(1) Settlement

The settlement program aims at providing assistance to the communist refugees to resettle in the areas of security. The settlement assistance funds for one family are 3,500\$ for housing and 3,000\$ for rice as a maximum. A mountaineer family will receive additional 100 piasters for salt.

(2) Rural Reconstruction Cadres

The funds on rural reconstruction cadres as stated above are only for supporting the salary of cadres during the transition period. Later, another funds will continue to provide financial support to this program.

(3) Development of Self-sufficient Hamlets

The program of self-sufficient development aims at coordinate the money supported by the Government with the labor of people in order to achieve works of a common interest at the hamlets, based on the sincere and legitimate aspirations of the local people. On an average, each self-sufficient project is 50,000\$.

(4) Rural Education

The Rural Education Program aims at providing to children in the hamlets with adequate means for learning, and progressively reaching the compulsory elementary education in order to raise the intellectual life of people in the entire country. Each hamlet receives 3 class-rooms as a maximum, each class-room can accommodate 60 students. Each class-room is worth 70,000\$, not including tin and cement.

(5) Hydraulics

Help the countrymen in digging canals, dredging gutters, building locks, reconstructing or repairing dikes and dams to hold the salt water, bringing water into the rice fields, or keeping the water level for farmers to till their grounds.

(6) Agriculture and Animal Husbandry in the Highlands

Help the farmers in protecting their crops, and increasing their productions : train farmers, issue farm implements, good seeds, insecticides, lend water-pumps to them...

Especially at provinces of the Central Highlands, there are 10 Mountaineer Agriculture and Husbandry Centers in order to train the mountaineer people to understand the new methods of husbandry and cultivation.

(7) Cattle

Help the farmers in developing husbandry : provide training, issue domestic animals, preventive and curing medicine...

(8) Pisciculture

Help the fishermen in fishing and fish-breeding : issue fishing implements, build fish markets, dig ponds to rear fish...

(9) Bridges and Roads

The Bridges and Roads Program aims at developing the communication system at hamlets, villages, districts, for farmers to easily travelling and for easy development of rural economy. Bridge and Road Projects of a pattern or purely strategical nature, such as provincial roads, National Highways... are all assumed by the Public Works Ministry or the Defense Ministry.

(10) Chieu hoi (Open arms) Operation

The funds are used in support of the Chieu hoi Operations at provinces. In addition, a funds of 21,082,000\$ has been reserved for the Chieu hoi Division/Psywar Ministry for use in the operation of central programs.

(11) Earth working

Support the settlement program (foundations)

(12) Transportation

Transport equipment and supplies under the Rural Reconstruction Program, from Provinces to Villages, Hamlets.

(13) Warehouses

Build warehouses at provincial and district towns in order to storage equipment under the Rural Reconstruction Program.

(14) Unexpected Expenses

Provide additional financial support to the above programs in case funds reserved for these programs are inadequate; use funds on emergency tasks which had not been planned.

(15) In addition to the above programs, the Central Rural Reconstruction Board still plans funds to achieve the following tasks :

- (a) The program of providing electricity to villages, with a total funds of 40,000,000⁸ in order to establish 20 generator stations at the priority areas after the Rural Reconstruction Program here has attained a satisfactory level.
 - (b) Establish inspection teams at the Central Hqs and at CTZ. Inspection personnel will permanently come to provinces in order to provide guidance to, and control the execution of rural reconstruction programs.
- (16) For other programs performed at villages such as the Rural Medical Program, the development of small industry, Agricultural Credit Cooperative..., see the programs of ministries concerned.

FIVE OATHS


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THE RURAL CONSTRUCTION CADRES

Standing before the Altar of our Fatherland and the National Flag we, in the capacity of rural construction cadres, take the oath :

- FIRST** : To remain faithful to the country of Viet Nam until the last breath, to fight for the anti-communist struggle and the future of the people, in order to attain our short-range objectives which are security, freedom, democracy and happiness to the people of South Viet Nam, and to serve our eventual objective which is a unified, democratic, prosperous and powerful Viet Nam.
- SECOND** : To firmly believe in the success of the Rural Construction policies and decide to carry out seriously all assignments despite their hardships and dangers.
- THIRD** : To keep constantly in our mind the belief that cadres are created by the people; to fight courageously because of the people; to serve wholeheartedly the people, to decidedly get rid of the command spirit; to act in such a way to have the full confidence of the people, their sympathy, their love when we live with them, and their good memories when we leave them.
- FOURTH** : To mingle with the people; to unite our efforts with those of the people in the annihilation of underground Communist cadres and of village bullies; to bring the people social facilities fit to their sincere and legal aspirations so that they will trust the government policy, will carry out rural construction and village management by themselves, with a view to develop a new life in liberty, democracy and happiness.
- FIFTH** : To make constant efforts in study in order to progress in behavior, education and technics. To become, through a self-training, standard rural construction cadres, deserving to be the vanguard soldiers fighting against Communism for the sake of the people.

**AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
UNITED STATES OPERATIONS MISSION TO VIETNAM**




APPENDIX N
USOM/Vietnam Organization Chart, 1963.

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APPENDIX D
USDM/Vietnam
Organization Chart, 1964.





APPENDIX P

USOM ORGANIZATION CHART


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


APPENDIX Q
 USOM/Vietnam
 Organization Chart
 May, 1965



APPENDIX R
 USOM/ Vietnam
 Organization Chart
 December, 1965

USAID VIETNAM



NATIONAL PROGRAMS

APPENDIX S

REGIONAL & PROVINCIAL PROGRAMS

USOM/Vietnam Organization Chart, February, 1966.

GLOSSARY

- AID - Agency for International Development. Also USAID.
- ARVN - Universal American acronym for the Army of Vietnam.
- CIDG - Civilian Irregular Defense Groups. A project of Special Forces.
- Combat Youth - Volunteer hamlet militiamen under the Strategic and New Life Hamlet campaigns.
- GAMO - Groupe Administrative Mobile Organisation. French directed village administrative cadres prior to 1954. Also the regular designation of Mobile Administrative Cadres initiated in 1964.
- hectare - Vietnamese Government official unit of land measure. 2.471 acres, or 10,000 square meters.
- IVS - International Voluntary Services.
- JUSPAO - Joint United States Public Affairs Office. Includes United States Information Service, USOM Communications, Media Division, and MACV Psywar elements.
- MAAG - Military Advisory Assistance Group. Subsumed under MACV in 1962 and merged in 1964.
- MACV - Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
- MAF - Marine (U.S.) Amphibious Force.
- Military Assistance Command, Vietnam - American military command which includes all American combat, support, and advisory units.
- Mobile Action Cadre - The New Life pacification cadre who replaced the Strategic Hamlet Construction cadres in 1964.
- NACO - National Agricultural Credit Organization.
- piaster - Vietnamese basic currency unit. Official exchange rate: 73 VN\$ to \$1.00 U.S. Black market values run 150-200 VN\$ or more per U.S. dollar.
- PERT - Program evaluation and review technique.
- Popular Forces - Full time village-level armed forces, formerly known as Self-Defense Corps (Dan Ve).
- Regional Forces - Provincial armed forces known previously as the Civil Guard (Bao An).
- Regular Forces - The Army, Navy, and Air Force of Vietnam.
- release agreement - Vietnamese-American agreements funding province-level rehabilitation programs.
- Revolutionary Development Cadres - The name given by the American Mission to what the Vietnamese call Rural Construction cadre. Also referred to as Rural Reconstruction Cadre.
- Rural Construction Cadres - A fusion of all rural pacification cadre systems in late 1965. Often called Rural Reconstruction Cadres, Political Action Teams (PAT), and Revolutionary Development Cadres.
- USIS - United States Information Service. The overseas missions of the United States Information Agency.
- USOM - United States Operations Mission. The designation in Vietnam of the local mission of the Agency for International Development universally abbreviated to USOM in Vietnam.
- VIS - Vietnamese Information Service.